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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the way in which the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) uses the margin of discretion-technique to adjudicate cases involving 
fundamental rights, and importantly, what this use entails. This thesis will answer these 
questions by presenting the argument that the margin of discretion-technique opens up 
discretional spaces in specific instances of adjudication that enable participation of actors 
from both legal loci, along with their respective readings of legal sources. This creates an 
adjudicative process that blurs the boundaries between what is a EUropean and what is a 
nationally defined standard of fundamental rights protection. The margin of discretion-
technique therefore promotes euro-national interconnectedness in the formulation of the 
applicable standard of fundamental rights protection in a given case, rather than separating 
subject matters and legal conflicts along jurisdictional lines. The presentation of this thesis 
proceeds as follows. Firstly, the origins of techniques of coordination of overlapping 
jurisdictions that share commitment to norms, such as margins of discretion, will be 
investigated and thereafter understood in the context of the European Union. Secondly, three 
dominant narratives pertaining to discourse on the CJEU’s adjudication of fundamental rights 
will be reconstructed and their reliance on euro-national binary logics will be highlighted. 
These narratives then serve as points of contrast in what is the main body of the thesis, 
namely a presentation of three typologies of the CJEU’s margins of discretion-use in its case 
law involving fundamental rights. In contrast to the dominant narratives, these typologies will 
illustrate the intricate sharing of interpretative authority that the margins of discretion 
represent, which creates the precondition for an interconnected elaboration of the standard of 
fundamental rights protection. Lastly, the legal pattern of interconnectedness will be picked 
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This is a thesis about the Court of Justice of the European Union’s use of the margin of 
discretion-technique to adjudicate cases involving fundamental rights, and importantly, what 
this use entails.1 In this work, “margin of discretion” refers to a method of adjudication 
whereby the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) identifies an instance where a 
decision-making body within a Member State has, or will have discretion to decide on a 
shared norm-commitment, such as the protection of fundamental rights. 
     This thesis therefore studies one method of adjudication within the CJEU’s vast body of 
case law involving fundamental rights. This is not a thesis about whether the protection of 
fundamental rights is strong or weak, high or low, good or bad. It is a study about how the 
standard of fundamental rights protections is elaborated where margins of discretion are 
operationalized. 
     What happens when the CJEU uses a national margin of discretion? My thesis is that the 
margin of discretion-technique opens up discretional spaces in specific instances of 
adjudication that enable both the CJEU and actors from the national legal locus to participate 
with their respective reading of legal sources. This creates an adjudicative process that blurs 
the boundaries between a EUropean and a nationally defined standard of fundamental rights 
protection.2 
     The margin of discretion technique promotes euro-national interconnectedness in the 
formulation of the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection in a given case, rather 
than separating subject matters and legal conflicts along jurisdictional lines. Separating the 
truly national from the truly EUropean is therefore not, I argue, a representative description 
of the operation of the margin of discretion technique within the world of the CJEU’s 
adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights.  
     This thesis will be developed by moving between narrow perspectives and case law studies 
of the interconnected micro-interactions that the margin of discretion enables, and much 
broader perspectives and theorizing on the better understanding of legal methods for 
coordination of overlapping jurisdictions. The margin of discretion, I argue, is an example of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In this thesis I will refer to CJEU and EU law even when case law and legislation refer to the ECJ and EC 
periods. 




the latter. This thesis therefore engages with theories on transnational law but it does so while 
specifically exemplifying the detailed dynamics of transnationalism.  
    I will conduct this simultaneously narrow and wide analysis of the margin of discretion-
technique in the context of the protection of fundamental rights, which is an area of law to 
which both the EU and the Member States have agreed to adhere, even though the precise 
shape of that adherence in specific cases is subject to interpretation. Importantly, I argue that 
where margins of discretions are used this interpretation is a shared exercise, which makes it 
increasingly difficult to make the case that fundamental rights simply have “fixed 
relationships to jurisdictional lines.”3 
     In order to develop my thesis and present an analysis of the fundamental rights case law 
material containing margins of discretion, which emphasizes interconnectedness, I will 
proceed in the following way. 
     First, in chapter 2 I will set the stage and explain the origins of methods of coordination of 
overlapping jurisdictions, such as the margin of discretion. I have been guided by literature 
that investigates the relationship between transnationalism and constitutionalism, federalism’s 
less territorially categorical aspects, especially how techniques of adjudication and methods of 
decision-making may open up jurisdictional categories traditionally conceived as closed (such 
as federal states and states), as well as literature adhering to an understanding of legal 
pluralism as ultimately concerning coordination and collaboration, rather than separation of 
jurisdictions. With this guidance, I will illustrate the importance of not prematurely 
proclaiming interests to which margins of discretion cater, beyond the function of 
coordination.  
     Then I will move the margin of discretion to the context of the European Union and firmly 
locate it within the EU’s structure of institutions and legal sources. I will also outline the 
difference between my reading of the CJEU’s margin of discretion and mainstream 
commentary on the European Court of Human Rights’ use of the margin of appreciation-
technique. This exercise serves primarily to make my reading clearer and is not a thorough 
compare and contrast-exercise.    
     In chapter 3, I will reconstruct dominant narratives in discourse on the CJEU’s 
fundamental rights adjudication and I will argue that these narratives rely on a euro-national 
binary rationale that contrasts with the operation and affects of the margin of discretion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Resnik, J 2014, Federalism(s)'s Forms and Norms: Contesting Rights, De-Essentializing Jurisdictional Divides, 
and Temporizing Accommodations, in Fleming, JE and Levy, JT (eds.) Federalism and Subsidiarity: Nomos Lv, 




These narratives will then be interwoven into the case law analysis conducted in chapter 5, 6 
and 7 as points of contrast. Beyond crystalizing the case law analysis conducted in this work, 
this reconstructive discourse analysis serves to illustrate the contributions of my reading of 
the operation of the margins of discretion to the broader discourse on the CJEU’s fundamental 
rights adjudication. 
     In chapter 4 I will lay out a method for studying margins of discretion as they appear in 
the CJEU’s adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights. I will start by providing a 
thorough definition of “margin of discretion” as a research object. Thereafter I will explain 
how I have constructed typologies of margins of discretion and outline the usefulness and 
novelty of this method.  
     In chapters 5, 6, and 7 I present three typologies of margin of discretion-uses that the 
CJEU operationalize to adjudicate fundamental rights, namely the deviation margin of 
discretion, the balance margin of discretion, and the compliance margin of discretion. These 
three, although sharing the same core dynamic, have distinct shapes and originate in 
differently structured legal conflicts pertaining to the EU fundamental rights material.      
     The deviation margin of discretion is triggered in a setting where a litigant challenges a 
national measure on the grounds that it violates an EU-sourced fundamental right. The 
deviation margin of discretion then functions so as to accommodate a national deviation from 
the EU-sourced right.  
     The balance margin of discretion handles clashes between the EU internal market law 
fundamental freedoms and the protection of fundamental rights. The balance margin of 
discretion is attached to a national instance of decision-making understood to have achieved 
balance between these two competing interests. 
     The compliance margin of discretion is operationalized when secondary EU legislation is 
challenged on the grounds that it violates fundamental rights. The compliance margin of 
discretion is addressed to the competent national authority to make sure that the secondary EU 
source is applied in a fundamental rights compliant way.    
     The mere construction of these three typologies represents a novel contribution to the field 
of EU fundamental rights law. Taken together, they cut through several sectorial distinctions 
within EU law, such as internal market law, equal treatment, and several sets of secondary 
legislation. Furthermore, these typologies capture both the width of EU fundamental rights 
utilities and the myriad of sources that constitute the EU fundamental rights material: primary 
law, secondary law, the Charter, the ECHR and national constitutions.  




investigate the CJEU’s use of the technique and detect legal patterns of interconnectedness. In 
particular, these typologies will amount to a critical consideration of the euro-national binary 
mode of analysis of EU fundamental rights law, which in contrast relies on the constant 
separability of the national and the EUropean qualities of the standard of protection.  
     Finally, in chapter 8 I will explore the interconnectedness that I found in the operation of 
the typologies. Most importantly, I will summarize and develop the components of 
interconnectedness. By means of conclusion I will explain where I believe one finds 
important and interesting representations of interconnectedness within the world of the 
CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication, which could provide baselines for further 
investigation.  
     Ultimately it is hoped that the reader of this thesis will emerge with a clearer 
understanding of how the CJEU uses the margin of discretion-technique in cases involving 
fundamental rights, coupled with an appreciation for how the interconnectedness that this use 






















2. Margins of Discretion and the Adjudication of EU Fundamental Rights 
Law: Positioning Interconnectedness 
 
 
2.1 Origin: Overlapping Jurisdictions, yet Jurisdictional Divides 
 
National margins of discretion are found where jurisdictions overlap and share commitment 
to norms, such as fundamental rights.4 They address the need to coordinate and mediate the 
forms and methods of norm protection, and as such they are ultimately tools for ensuring that 
the jurisdictions concerned keep their promise to collaborate.  
     Within the European Union and elsewhere, the use of margins of discretion in adjudication 
is triggered by such jurisdictional overlaps and common commitments. This minimalist 
understanding of the origins of this technique, which runs through this work, serves to avoid 
moving directly to normative conclusions about the interests to which margins of discretion 
may cater. Margins of discretion originate in the need to ensure collaboration on shared 
commitments, but it is not immediately clear which particular interest this collaboration 
promotes.  
     Flowing from this understanding, there seems to be little demand for national margins of 
discretion in a legal setting with completely uncoordinated and absolutely independent units, 
such as a landscape populated with the stereotypical image of a sovereign and self-sufficient 
state.5 In such a legal context the lack of shared commitment generates disassociation sooner 
than cooperation.6  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Resnik writes: “the effort to respect variations while adhering to certain specified legal obligations is 
increasingly familiar as a burgeoning number of multilevel and transnational institutions aim to mediate 
differences while developing shared commitments.” Resnik 2014, supra note 3 at 364. Walker writes about 
“overlapping polities,” see Walker, N 2010 Constitutionalism as the Incompleteness of Democracy: An Iterative 
Relationship, Edinburgh School of Law WP NO 2010/25, p. 28. 
5 On this point see Benhabib on the “outmoded Westphalian conception of unbridled sovereignty” where “states 
are free and equal; they enjoy ultimate authority of all objects and subjects within a circumcised territory; 
relations with other sovereigns are voluntary and contingent.” States thus, (as quoted by Benhabib from Held, D 
2002, Law of States, Law of Peoples, Legal Theory 8 (2), p. 4) “regard cross-border processes as a private matter 
concerning only those immediately affected.” See Benhabib, S 2006, Another Cosmopolitanism, in Post, R (ed.), 
Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 23 and 47.  
     On this point, Tuori for instance, reveals the fallacy of the way in which the ”traditional legal mapping of our 
global universe gives expression to a state-sovereigntist view of modern law.” See Tuori, K 2014, Transnational 
Law: On Legal Hybrids and Perspectivism, in Maduro, M, Tuori, K and Sankari, S (eds.) Transnational Law: 
Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York. 
6 For an elaboration of the argument that true separation between entities in legal theory is fiction see West, R 




     National margins of discretion are instead commonly associated with a modern, globalised 
world with an ever-increasing number of international and regional forms of cooperation.7 A 
post-sovereignty condition, often understood as taking shape in the after-war period and 
onwards.8 Accordingly, national margins of discretion are more a contemporary legal reality 
than legal tradition.9 
     This condition is mirrored in the efforts of present-day democracies to navigate overlaps in 
decision-making authority, and the fact that an increasing number of issues are not only 
regulated within nation-state territories. Purely domestic affairs are in short supply, 
notwithstanding the insurgency of nationalist political parties determined to contain politics 
and potential progress within certain territorial borders.10 
     In other words, people live their lives in overlapping jurisdictions that come under the 
name of federations, supranational organizations and unions. They also live within the 
subunits of these structures, described as states, members, member states, contracting parties 
and so forth.  
     Within all of this we find the origins and the demand for legal methods of coordination. In 
the larger unit as well as within the smaller units, differences in ideas, decision-making, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Delmas-Marty, M 2009, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational 
Legal World, Bloomsbury Publishing, Oxford. For a different way of thinking and critique of the ease and 
benevolence with which the analytical move from state-sovereignist to globalisation has been performed and 
constructed by some, see Scheuerman, WE 2014, Cosmopolitanism and the World State, Review of International 
Studies 40 (3), pp. 426-427.  
8 MacCormick, N 1996, Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State, Political Studies 44 (3), pp.553-
567. 
9 Yet, looking specifically at Europe there is a long trajectory of coordinate and subordinate jurisdictions like 
cities, empires, churches and “complicated institutional structures.” Aroney, N 2007, Subsidiarity, Federalism 
and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, Law and Philosophy 26 (2), p. 195. 
And see further p. 172, where Aroney describes Aquinas’ thinking on multiple legal sources and loci: ”Thus, in 
the Summa Theologiae, he affirms that the goal of human law is ‘the temporal tranquillity of the state,’ which is 
to be achieved through punishment of external acts to the extent that they may disturb the peace of the state – 
whereas the purpose of divine law is to lead human beings to the end of external happiness and is thus concerned 
with both external and internal acts.” Thus, overlapping jurisdiction and the need to mediate between them is not 
necessarily a condition dependent on contemporary forms of globalization and international cooperation. Rather, 
mediation between overlapping jurisdictions, the origin of national margins of discretions, could be understood 
as a recurring European theme, notwithstanding that every epoch comes with a different set of powers and 
institutions and that the shared commitments change character. For instance, from rules governing trade and 
religion to rules governing trade and human rights. 
10 On this point see Nollkaemper, A and Nijman, JE 2007, Introduction, in Nollkaemper, A and Nijman, JE 
(eds.), New Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p.12: ”Individuals are no longer invisible, shielded by the domestic legal order; the subject matter of 
national and international law look more and more alike and sources are less and less controlling of any 
particular order. However, the reality is more complicated. We also face what can be called a ‘new nationalism’ 
that leads to fragmentation rather than a construction of a universal society.” See also Walker 2010, supra note 4 
at 21 and 22, he writes with the EU in mind: “as the political life of individuals and communities is increasingly 
dispersed across a variety of polities, the complex and obscure technology of coordination and co-articulation of 




needs, beliefs, methods and politics create clashes that call for mediation, by means of both 
legal and non-legal methods.  
     In this vein, the twentieth century analytical move from the imaginary of the self-sufficient 
sovereign state to a globalized world with “jurisdictional redundancies” that demand 
coordination, has fuelled interest in legal techniques of coordination beyond the state.11  
     Margins of discretion represent one such technique, and in the thinnest sense “margin of 
discretion” labels a method of adjudication whereby a superior court of a larger jurisdiction 
identifies an instance of decision-making within the smaller jurisdiction where the decision-
making body has or will have discretion to decide on a shared commitment, such as the 
protection of fundamental rights, even though the superior court has jurisdiction. 
     Studying the technique thus means, in concrete, a micro focus on how margins of 
discretion are operationalized within the adjudicative process of a superior court belonging to 
the larger unit, which is ultimately responsible for the coordination of the shared commitment 
of the jurisdictions at play. Specifically, this refers to how and when that superior court 
indicates that some decision-making body within the sub-unit should be involved in decision-
making and interpretation.  
     As such, the margin of discretion is a legal tool that serves to structure the myriad 
questions prompted by the condition of overlapping jurisdictions and shared commitment to 
norms, such as the fundamental rights of people.12 In particular, it seeks to account for how 
and when the smaller unit in a supranational structure in principle is, and perhaps should be 
involved in decision-making, as well as how such allocation of decision-making is best 
understood and managed. Hence, structuring the question of how to organize what should be 
decided where. 
     In this capacity, margins of discretion (often under the label of “margin of appreciation”) 
appear in different subsets of literatures determined to provide the best explanation for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 On the point of the imaginary of the sovereign state and jurisdictional redundancy, Cover writes, primarily 
with the US in mind: ”Many of the formal attributes of the sovereignty of the states have bowed before the 
onslaughts of necessity and convenience time and again throughout our history while the crazy patchwork of 
jurisdiction, if anything, has become more complex and apparently anachronistic.” Cover, R 1981, The Use of 
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology and Innovation, William & Mary Law Review 22, p. 642. On this 
shift see further: Benhabib 2006, supra note 5 at 24: “Sovereignty no longer means ultimate and arbitrary 
authority over a circumcised territory, states which treat their citizens in violation of certain norms, close their 
borders, prevent freedom of market, speech, and association and the like are thought not to belong within a 
specific society of states and alliances.”    




internal and not yet obvious logic of a legal world of overlapping jurisdictions and shared 
commitment to norms.13  
    When confronting these issues authors may, for instance, start from more experimental 
accounts of federalism and seek to understand how techniques of adjudication (for example 
the margin of discretion, among others) and methods of decision-making open up 
jurisdictional categories traditionally conceived as closed, such as federal states and states.14 
Writings on transnationalism and the question of what it does to constitutionalism are related 
to this strand of scholarship. The margin of discretion technique is regularly mentioned in 
such discourse.15 Another plausible starting point is global legal pluralism, possibly using 
margins of discretion as a way of thinking about coordination, but not necessarily separation 
of different components of legal pluralism.16 Additionally, margins of discretion also feature 
in work that starts within international human rights law, and in that context the technique 
frequently functions as a tool that accommodates difference between jurisdictions by 
operationalizing the jurisdictional divide.17 Indeed, this last mentioned instance is one of the 
more mainstream reconstructions of margins of discretion.18  
     These samples of different strands of legal thinking have divergent visions of the ultimate 
purpose of thinking about the margin of discretion-technique. Although there is agreement on 
the thin definition of its operation – a superior court of a larger jurisdiction gives a decision-
making body within the smaller jurisdiction discretion to decide on a matter that is a shared 
commitment, even though the superior court has jurisdiction – there are different visions of 
what the margin of discretion has do to the system of overlapping jurisdictions in which it 
operates.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I use ”margin of discretion” here to encompass all versions of margins not pertaining to any specific court, 
later in this work I will use “margin of discretion” to label the specific sub-category of the CJEU’s use of the 
technique. This is further explained in chapter 4. 
14 Here I think in particular of Cover’s elaboration of ”dialectic federalism” (no reference to margins of 
discretion) and Resnik's critique of categorical federalism in a similar vein (explicit reference to margin of 
appreciation). See Cover, R and Aleinikoff, AT 1977, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 
Yale Law Journal 86 (6), pp. 1035-1102 and Resnik 2014, supra note 3 and Resnik, J 2001, Categorical 
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, Yale Law Journal 111 (3), pp. 619-680. 
15 Jackson, V 2010, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era, Oxford University Press, Oxford, on 
page 57 she discusses ”the margin of appreciation” as a doctrinal position of convergence.  
16 In particular (with explicit reference to margin of appreciation) Berman Schiff, P 2006, Global Legal 
Pluralism, Southern California Law Review 80, p. 1195  
17 See for instance the following examples from international human right law: Carozza, PG 2003, Subsidiarity 
as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, American Journal of International Law 97 (1), p. 
40: “it is not surprising to find in the development of human rights law that other doctrines and ideas have arisen 
that function at least in part as analogues to subsidiarity in addressing the pervasive dialectic between universal 
human rights and legitimate claims to pluralism. The doctrine of the "margin of appreciation” first developed by 
the ECHR, is the most notable example.” And see Shany, Y 2005, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in International Law?, European Journal of International Law 16 (5),  pp. 907-940. 




     In other words, margins of discretions as they originate in overlapping jurisdictions and 
shared commitment to norms have triggered robust and dedicated inquiry into the 
maintenance of jurisdictional divides. The dominance of this type of inquiry in turn prompts 
the question of whether the national margin of discretion-technique is truly a method best 
understood as an interaction between, or a separation of, overlapping jurisdictions?  
     It is clear from the interest in such questions, as in the samples of scholarship mentioned 
above, that jurisdictional divides are not analytically erased only because jurisdictions 
increasingly overlap. Rather the opposite. Such divides remain a central focus of the inquiry, 
and national margins of discretion may be used to navigate such investigation.  
     When margins of discretion feature in these discussions one may find two main analytical 
routes. Namely, on the one hand margins of discretion may be used by those interested in any 
residual guarantee that separates, along jurisdictional lines, subject matters that according to 
some criteria are better decided in one or the other original jurisdiction, thus emphasising 
difference between the larger and smaller units.19 Which means describing why a subject 
matter ought to be, for instance, national rather than European and better dealt with in one or 
the other locus. The commentator would insist on this separation even though whatever is to 
be decided is a shared commitment rather than, for instance, an altogether internal concern of 
the smaller unit.  
     On the other hand, there are strong arguments in favour of using such techniques and 
theories of mediation to downgrade the importance of jurisdictional divides as the central 
organizational framework in a legal setting of interacting jurisdictions and find a “middle 
ground between strict territorialism (...) and universalism,” thus downplaying the centrality of 
difference between the larger and smaller units and the importance of jurisdictional divides.20  
Or at the very least, to understand doctrines of deference such as the margin of discretion as 
based on the “recognition of the competence of the domestic legal order to contribute in 
determining the content to be given to some indeterminate international notions.”21 
     The investigation carried out in this work is in part framed within this tension between 
separation and collaboration as the best understanding of what national margin of discretion, 
understood as a supranational adjudicative method that operationalizes national discretion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See scholarship that starts within international human rights law such as, Carozza 2003, supra note 17 and 
Shany 2005, supra note 17.  
20 See for instance Berman Schiff 2006, supra note 16 at 1195 and Resnik, 2001, supra note 14.  
21 Cannizzaro, E and Bonafè, B 2014, Beyond the Archetypes of Modern Legal Thought: Appraising New and 
Old Forms of Interaction Between Legal Orders, in Maduro, M, Tuori, K and Sankari, S (eds.) Transnational 




does to jurisdictional divides and shared commitments.22 
    I am interested in conducting this inquiry in the specific context of the European Union’s 
fundamental rights protection. Therefore, as a preliminary remark I will firstly delineate the 
features of the EU contexts that condition national discretion in the process of adjudication. 
Secondly, I will present the characteristics of the EU’s fundamental rights material.   
     I will, within the tension outlined above between emphasis and destabilization of 
jurisdictional divides in a legal setting of jurisdictional overlap, favour the position that within 
the EU judicial operationalization of national discretion works as a method for interaction 
between, rather than separation of, the EU and the different national jurisdictions. I will do so 
under the guidance of literature that investigates transnationalism, federalism’s less-territory-
categorical aspects, and understandings of legal pluralism as more about coordination and 
collaboration than separation.  
     In sum, I argue the act of separating the truly national from what is the EU, is not the best 
description of the operation of the margin of discretion technique within the EU-context.  
 
 
2.2 Context: The European Union 
 
2.2.1 Hierarchy and the Question of Interpretative Authority 
The details and micro-interactions of national margins of discretion, just like any doctrine of 
deference, must be understood in the context in which they operate.23 Apprehending the 
margin of discretion technique in the specific context of the European Union’s fundamental 
rights protection is essentially an investigation that starts by finding the technique within the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law, delineating its operation(s) and ultimately 
understanding its function, effect and consequence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Along these lines, Walker states: ”The regulatory circuits that develop within this complex set of movements 
affect the demarcation dimension of constitutionalism in two apparently opposite but connected ways, with 
various ramifications for other dimensions of constitutionalism. In some cases, globalisation engenders more and 
more heavily overlapping boundaries relevant to constitutionalism, while in others, by contrast, it dispenses with 
the logic of boundaries altogether.” Walker 2010, supra note 4 at 22. 
23 In the same vein: ”Finally, a pluralist framework suggests a research agenda that emphasizes the micro-
interactions among different normative systems. Such a case study approach would serve as a contrast to rational 
choice and other forms of more abstract modelling, by focusing instead on thick description of the ways in which 
various procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices actually operate as sites of contestation and creative 
innovation. Thus, applying pluralism to the international arena illuminates a broader field of inquiry and asks 
scholars to consider studying in more depth the processes whereby normative gaps among communities are 




     Inevitably then, such an investigation lives in a symbiotic relationship with the 
particularities of the European Union; its court system; its preliminary reference proceedings; 
its primary law; its secondary law; all the national law within the scope of EU law; the 
multitude of national decision-making bodies and so forth.24  
     National margins of discretion are techniques of adjudication, and appear in the immediate 
contexts of the superior court and the competent national authorities that are engaged in the 
superior court’s process of decision-making. 
     Specifically in the context of the European Union, article 267 TFEU holds that the Court 
of Justice of the European Union “shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings 
concerning the interpretation of the Treaties,” and the CJEU is accordingly placed above the 
national courts and authorities in relation to the interpretation of the treaties’ provisions.25 
Because of the hierarchical structure of this relationship, the CJEU may, during the process of 
adjudication of an EU law subject matter, decide to use a national margin of discretion and 
thus direct decision-making or incorporate decision-making from a national court or authority 
into its process of adjudication, even if the CJEU in principle has jurisdiction.  
     In sum, where the CJEU has jurisdiction, hence where a question concerns, as stated in 
article 267 TFEU, “the interpretation of the Treaties,” the CJEU decides whether a margin of 
discretion is to be used in the process of interpreting EU law in cases that come before it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The European Union’s Member States cooperate on a large number of issues, which are enumerated in the 
Lisbon Treaty. See articles 3-5 TEU and articles 3-6 in TFEU. The EU’s institutions and the Member States, 
separately and when they interact within the scope of EU law, are committed to the protection of fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed in a series of sources both national and enacted on EU level, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See article 6 TEU. Furthermore, in Opinion 2/13 delivered on 18 
December 2014, paras., 158 and 166-167 the CJEU (Full Court) describes the EU legal order in the following 
way: “the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional 
framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules 
to ensure its operation, (…).” And frames EU law as ”characterised by the fact that it stems from an independent 
source of law, the Treaties, by its primacy over the laws of the Member States (…), and by the direct effect of a 
whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves (…). 
These essential characteristics of EU law have given rise to a structured network of principles, rules and 
mutually interdependent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each 
other, which are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article 1 TEU, in a ‘process of creating 
an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.’” 
25 The competent judicial body within these Member State may initiate a process of adjudication by asking 
questions of interpretation through the preliminary reference procedure as regulated in article 267 TFEU. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union then answers. There are other forms of procedures too, see articles 258, 
259, 265 and generally section 5 of the TFEU. See both article 19.3 TEU and article 267 TFEU that in terms of 
jurisdiction in full reads ”a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.” The latter ground does not trigger national margins of 




Hence the CJEU owns the question of when to operationalize a national margin of discretion, 
or any other technique of adjudication, in the process of interpreting EU law.26  
     The fact that the CJEU decides to operationalize a national margin of discretion does not 
however automatically translate into singularity of interpretative authority for the CJEU. 
Here I draw a distinction between the initiative to operationalize a margin of discretion and 
the effects of a margin of discretion within the context of adjudication of cases involving EU 
fundamental rights. In other words, the CJEU has the prerogative to use margins of discretion 
in cases that come before it and solely possess the initiative to operationalize the technique in 
those processes of adjudication. This does not mean however, that the CJEU maintains 
interpretative authority in a process of adjudication where a margin of discretion is used. 
Instead, the initiative of the CJEU to use a margin of discretion opens up for sharing 
interpretative authority. This will be explained further in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.1.    
    As stated at the outset, I seek the best understanding of the operation of margins of 
discretion in the tension between whether it upholds or destabilizes jurisdictional divides. One 
of the recurring lines of inquiry in this work is the extent to which jurisdictional divides 
become more porous and the nature of legal sources less characterizable as belonging to a 
specific locus, if interpretative authority is multiple rather than singular.  
    I will argue that within the EU’s world of fundamental rights protection the choice of the 
CJEU to operationalize national discretion is ultimately a choice of a methodology for the 
sharing of interpretative authority. Descriptively then the CJEU’s use of margins of discretion 
in cases involving fundamental rights is best framed as a method for destabilizing 
jurisdictional divides, thus creating a collaborative process of adjudication, which will be 
outlined in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
     In the following section, with the purpose of placing the margin of discretion-technique on 
the CJEU’s adjudicative stage, I will make two separate points aimed at clarifying the 
contours of the national margins of discretion as they appear in the CJEU’s adjudication of 
cases involving fundamental rights; how they are best understood to relate to the outer limits 
of the EU’s legal context (1) and how they are best understood to relate to what is commonly 
conceived as “its” sibling – the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation (2). In other words, I will 
address two questions relating to the external dimensions of the use of the margin of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The case law of the CJEU is the object of study in this work. It should however be pointed out that an 
interesting line of inquiry would be to investigate the use of margins of discretion or similarly structured 
techniques outside of the case law of the CJEU, potentially in the acts of a vast number of national courts and 
administrative authorities. Cases, in other words, that never come before the CJEU. Here, however, the research 




discretion-technique within the specific context of the CJEU’s adjudication of fundamental 
rights before I turn to the internal. 
 
2.2.2 Margins of Discretion Do Not Define What Is Out of Scope of EU Law 
Do margins of discretion communicate what is in, and what is outside the scope of EU law 
when used by the CJEU? In abstract terms, this question is that of whether the technique 
possibly establishes the borders of the larger unit in a system of overlapping jurisdictions?  
     This question could be highlighted by contrasting this brand of discretion with the notion 
of discretion in a completely national setting, say one of criminal law in any given European 
country during the 1960’s.27 In such a setting discretion has been understood as existing 
“whenever the effective limits on power leave an official free to make a choice among 
possible courses” or “where law ends.”28 There are many possible nuances of such framings, 
and well-known debates about the inevitability of discretion.29 The conceptual tension in such 
discourse lies however, in establishing the best understanding of where law ends and 
discretion begins.  
     In contrast, in a supranational setting where jurisdictions overlap, such as the EU, a 
national margin of discretion does not direct decision-making to “where law ends,” hence 
functioning as a means of exiting the system. Rather, it coordinates who decides and under 
what circumstances on a shared legal commitment.  
     This means that in this work, understanding national margins of discretion within the EU 
does not mean understanding when a subject matter is inside or outside of EU law. In other 
words, national margins of discretion do not as such externalize decision-making, nor do they 
define the outer borders of the EU legal order. 
     This is not to say that the CJEU has never held, in the area of cases involving fundamental 
rights, that something is out of the scope of EU law because it is an absolutely national 
concern that the CJEU cannot, or better still, will not touch.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 To be contrasted with sub-national margins of discretion in national administrative law: marge d’appréciation, 
margine di discrezionalita', Ermessensspielraum and so forth, which have been used to indicate discretionary 
powers of administrative or political bodies. 
28 Davis writes that: “Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean either 
beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness.” Davis, KC 1969, 
Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, p. 3 and 4. 
29 See for classic contributions: Hart, HLA 1961, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 124 
ff; Dworkin, R 1963, Judicial Discretion, Journal of Philosophy 60 (21), pp. 624–638; Dworkin, R 1967, The 
Model of Rules, The University of Chicago Law Review 35 (1), pp. 14-46; Raz, J 1972, Legal Principles and the 
Limits of Law, Yale Law Journal 81 (5), p. 847 ff. See further Shapiro, SJ  2007, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: 




     For instance, Grogan from 1991 (the right to life, i.e. abortion and the freedom of 
services)30 and Grant from 1998 (equal protection and sexual orientation) 31 are both cases 
where, despite a clear EU law link, the CJEU deemed the question at issue in the case as 
being outside the scope of EU law altogether. These cases, though they might be described as 
the CJEU taking an absolutely deferential position and as having an interesting story to tell 
about adjudicating shared commitment, deviate from the patterns of the ordinary operation of 
the margin of discretion technique presented in chapter 5, 6 and 7. Indeed, as distinct from the 
methods applied in Grogan and Grant, national margins operate inside the scope of EU law.  
     Instead, national margins of discretion will be identified within the micro-interactions 
between the CJEU and the national decision-maker in cases relating to clashes between 
internal market law and fundamental rights protection, within secondary legislation that is 
challenged on fundamental rights grounds, and when formulating acceptable deviations to EU 
rights. Within these inherently EU-natured legal conflicts and judicial processes, 
straightforward answers on the ‘in or out’ of EU law are in short supply.32   
 
2.2.3 Contrasting with the Understanding of the ECtHR’s Margin of Appreciation as an 
Upholder of Jurisdictional Divides  
In Strasbourg, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has created one of the prime 
examples of a doctrine of national discretion in the area of human rights law, namely the 
margin of appreciation. A technique that, as will be discussed in some detaile below, is 
commonly conceived as separating decision-making on certain issues along territorial lines, 
and as such upholds jurisdictional divides.  
     In this work the aim is not that of carefully analysing and reconstructing the margin of 
appreciation as used by the ECtHR. Indeed, my interest is not even in an in-depth compare-
and-contrast exercise between the use of national discretion within the EU and the Council of 
Europe’s Convention system respectively.33 Instead my aim is to sharpen, by way of (generic) 
contrast between the two, the contours of the CJEU’s use of national discretion.  
     The necessity of addressing this issue, albeit in a limited fashion, is highlighted by the 
connection made, by several authors and in various forms, between the use (or desired 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Case C-159/90, The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v Stephen Grogan and others 
ECR [1991] I-04685, for further comments on this case see Coppel, J and O'Neill, A 1992, The European Court 
of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously, Common Market Law Review 12 (2), p. 675 and Nic Shuibhne, N 2009, 
Margins of Appreciation: National Values, Fundamental Rights and EC Free Movement Law, European Law 
Review 34 (2), p. 250. 
31 Case C-249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd, ECR [1998] I-00621.  
32 Admissibility decisions are somewhat artificially excluded from this statement. 




increase in use) of some sort of doctrine of deference in the CJEU’s fundamental rights case 
law and the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation.34  Drawing on the proximity between the 
European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights system, particularly when 
the EU acts in the area of fundamental rights,35 these authors have sought to explicitly or 
implicitly elaborate on the proximity between the uses of national discretion within the 
respective bodies of case law.  
     In this work, and in contrast to such an analytical move, one reason for choosing the term 
“margin of discretion” in the analysis of CJEU case law is that this difference in labelling 
serves to emphasise that I am not concerned with a project of legal transplantation of the 
ECtHR’s “margin of appreciation” into the CJEU’s jurisprudence.  
     In this vein, I will present a short summary of how mainstream commentary (1), and the 
ECtHR itself when it elaborates explicitly on the origins of the margin of appreciation 
technique (2), seem to favour an understanding of the margin of appreciation as an upholder, 
rather than a destabiliser, of jurisdictional divides. Herein, it is submitted, lies the essential 
contrast. In addition, I will point to the manner in which national discretion serves to mediate 
different types of legal conflicts and handle differently structured legal sources within the 
respective systems (3). 
     Again, clearly, by relying on secondary sources and a very limited number of primary 
sources this reconstruction only serves to cast in relief the contours of the CJEU’s use of 
margins of discretion rather than capturing the internal logics and complexities of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Delmas-Marty, M 1992, The Richness of Underlying Legal Reasoning, in Delmas-Marty M (ed), The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Nijhoff Publishing, Dordrecht; Boston, p. 335; 
Küling, J 2006, Fundamental Rights, in von Bogdandy, A and Bast, J (eds.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law. Vol. 8. Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 538; Shany 2006, supra note 17 at 927; Sweeney, J 2007, 
A 'Margin of Appreciation' in the Internal Market: Lessons from the European Court of Human Rights, Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 34 (1), pp. 27-52; Nic Shuibhne 2009, supra note 30; Torres Pérez, A 2009, 
Conflicts of Rights in the European Union: A Theory of Supranational Adjudication, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p.168; Kumm, M 2010, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the New Human Rights Paradigm, 
in Maduro, M and Azoulai, L (eds), The Past and Future of EU Law The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 
50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Martinico, G 2010, Preliminary Refernce and 
Constitutional Courts. Are you in the Mood for Dialogue?, in Fontanelli, F, Martinico, G and Carrozza, P (eds.), 
Shaping Rule of Law Through Dialogue : International and Supranational Experiences, Europa Law Publishing, 
Groningen; Gerards, J 2011, Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, European Law 
Journal 17 (1) p. 81; Fichera, M and Herlin-Karnell, E 2013, The Margin of Appreciation Test and Balancing in 
the Area of Freedom Security and Justice: A Proportionate Answer for a Europe of Rights? European Public 
Law 19 (4), pp. 759–788. 
35 “While the EU and the ECHR were in some ways quite different in origin and aspiration, they are now closely 
linked systems of transnational cooperation sharing an instantiation of a dynamic form of constitutionalism 
beyond the state.” de Búrca, G and Gerstenberg, O 2006, The Denationalization of Constitutional Law, Harvard 
International Law Journal 47, p. 257. See further article 6(2) TEU read together with Opinion 2/13 of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union delivered on 18 December 2014, and article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental 




ECtHR’s margin of appreciation. In other words, I will merely use the more popular 
conceptions of the latter to strengthen my reading of the former.   
 
* 
The European Court of Human Rights’ margin of appreciation doctrine is often represented as 
an embodiment of a sovereignty rationale that allows for diversity of fundamental human 
rights formulation between the Contracting Parties.36  
     Shany argues that the essence of the margin of appreciation doctrine is judicial deference 
coupled with normative flexibility.37 Mahoney is more pointed however: “in an international 
system, some interpretational tool is needed to draw the line between what is properly a 
matter for each community to decide on a local level and what is so fundamental that it entails 
the same requirement for all countries whatever the variations in traditions and culture.”38  
     The mainstream lines of scholarly inquiry thus seem to presuppose that the overall aim of 
the technique is to “set the limits of state sovereignty in the sphere of human rights.”39 
     In sum, the ECtHR, according to the mainstream commentary, uses the margin of 
appreciation to uphold jurisdictional divides in a system of overlapping jurisdictions and the 
debate is centred around, albeit not limited to, whether this function is desirable or not.40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Sir Humphrey Waldock, President of the ECtHR, described the margin of appreciation as ”one of the more 
important safeguards developed by the Commission and the Court to reconcile the effective operation of the 
Convention with the sovereign powers and responsibilities of governments in a democracy.” Waldock, H 1980, 
The Effectiveness of the System set up by the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law 
Journal 1 (1), p. 9. See also Carozza 2003, supra note 17. 
37 Shany 2006, supra note 17 at 909.  
38 Mahoney, P 1998, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism, Human Rights Law 
Review (19), p. 1. 
39 For a recent summary of these arguments and an attempt to challenge them see: Legg, A 2012, The Margin of 
Appreciation in International Human Rights Law: Deference and Proportionality, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, p.1. This has, throughout the history of the technique, exposed it to accusations of promoting relativism, 
see for instance: Itzcovich, G 2013, One, None and One Hundred Thousand Margins of Appreciations: The 
Lautsi Case, Human Rights Law Review 13 (2), pp. 287-308; Lester, A 1998, Universality versus Subsidiarity: A 
Reply, European Human Rights Law Review 73 (1), pp. 75-76; Macdonald, RSJ 1993, The Margin of 
Appreciation, in Macdonald, RSJ, Matscher, F and Petzold, H (eds.), The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights, M. Nijhoff, Leiden; Boston, p. 85. Or the margin of appreciation, with a more nuanced framing, 
address the “functional differentiation of spheres of life” in a legal system where different states participate, see 
de Búrca and Gerstenberg 2006, supra note 35 at 252. 
40 For examples of critical analyses of how the margin of appreciation operates as a tool for absolute deference to 
the national level which create an inconsequential ECHR jurisprudence, see Benvenisti, E 1998, Margin of 
Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 31, pp. 843 -
854 and Itzcovich 2013, supra note 39.  
Normatively then, debates about the desirability of the margin of appreciation technique mirror the lines of 
inquiry in the universalism versus particularism debate, which have focused on ”the tension between (1) the 
universalistic claims of rights, and (2) the diversity of culture and moral views in the world.” See Stone Sweet, A 
2012, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, Global 
Constitutionalism 1 (1). p. 54. See further, Rorty, R 1993, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in 
Shute, S and Hurley, S (eds.), On Human Rights, Basic Books, New York, pp. 111-134; Ignatieff, M 2001, 






The building blocks of the margin of appreciation have been elaborated in the case law of the 
ECtHR, most notably in Handyside from 1976; one of the very first times that the method was 
used.41  
     Handyside concerned a restriction of the freedom of expression with the aim of 
safeguarding public morals. The ECtHR held that “the machinery of protection established by 
the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems of safeguarding human rights,” and went 
on to state that it is not possible to find a uniform conception of morals amongst the 
Contracting Parties. Furthermore, it held that: “the state authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge” to give an opinion on “morals” as well as on the criteria 
for derogation from the right to freedom of expression.42 For these reasons the Contracting 
Party was accorded a margin of appreciation.43  
     It should be noted that articles 1 and 35 of the ECHR embody the idea that it is first and 
foremost the Contracting Parties that should ensure effective rights protection and, as is stated 
in Handyside, the principle of subsidiarity is central to the ECHR system and the legitimacy 
of the margin of appreciation.44 In this vein, the ECtHR has explained that it uses the margin 
of appreciation as an outflow of the principle of subsidiarity, reinforced specifically by the so-
called better-placed argument, namely that the national decision-maker is more suited to 
deciding certain issues.45  This is especially so with such issues on which, according to the 
ECtHR’s best understanding, there is no European consensus.46 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I (eds.) 2001, Negotiating Culture and Human Rights, Columbia University Press, New York; Donnelly, J 2007, 
The Relative Universality of Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly 29(2). pp. 281-306.	  
41 Handyside v United Kingdom, Judgement of 7 December 1976, application no 5493/72. For discussion of 
earlier use by the ECommHR see Hutchinson, MR 1999, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European 
Court of Human Rights, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48 (3), p. 639. 
42 Found in article 10.2 ECHR. 
43 Handyside, para. 48: “Consequently, article 10 para. 2 leaves the Contracting States a margin of appreciation 
[…] both to the domestic legislator […] and the bodies, judicial amongst others, […]. The domestic margin of 
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision.”  
44 As a consequence which should be noted, the EU’s preliminary reference system (article 267 TFEU) and the 
principle of subsidiarity embodied in the exhaustion of domestic remedies (article 35 ECHR) causes national 
discretion to operate in different procedural settings. The former typically appears in the context of an ongoing 
case, “in the spirit of cooperation” between the national and the supranational as part of an answer to an EU law 
interpretational question, and the latter as an international last resort if the national level which is primarily 
responsible is suspected of not upholding minimum protection. For such terminology in relation to the 
preliminary reference system see, Schmidberger, para. 31; “in the context of that cooperation” and para. 32; “the 
spirit of cooperation” and Viking, para. 28; “in the context of cooperation.” 
45 Drawing on these building blocks, in April 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
initiated a process of codifying the margin of appreciation-technique by adopting Protocol 15 amending the 
Convention. See the Explanatory report on Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of 




     This should be contrasted with the CJEU’s lack of any explicit elaboration of why it uses 
the margin of discretion-technique and its incoherent terminology when using the technique to 
adjudicate cases involving fundamental rights.47 The principle of subsidiarity is guaranteed in 
EU primary law, yet the CJEU does not as a rule connect it with the use of deferential 
adjudicative methods in cases involving fundamental rights.48 Moreover, as a rule the CJEU 
does not invoke the better placed-argument or lack of  “European consensus” as determining 
concepts for the operation of national discretion in the process of judicial review in cases 
involving fundamental rights.49 There is thus a clear difference in communication as between 
the two courts of the premises and reasons underpinning their operationalization of the margin 
of discretion-technique.     
 
* 
Beyond the ECtHR’s moments of explicit elaboration and the recurring line of interpretations 
presented in dominant strands of commentary, it is important to highlight the forms of 
interaction enabled by the ordinary uses of the CJEU’s margin of discretion and the ECtHR’s 
margin of appreciation respectively. In other words, to delineate what typically happens 
between the ECtHR and the Contracting Parties and between the CJEU and its Member States 
when these techniques of national discretion are operationalized in the process of adjudication 
of cases involving fundamental rights.  
     The ECHR is designed to provide a minimum floor of protection of human rights in 
Europe. The Contracting Parties, amongst which all of the EU’s Member States are included, 
are free to offer a higher standard of protection.50 When a conflict arises in relation to one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
jurisprudence of the Court makes clear that the States Parties enjoy a margin of appreciation in how they apply 
and implement the Convention, depending on the circumstances of the case and the rights and freedoms 
engaged. This reflects that the Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at national 
level and that national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs 
and conditions. The margin of appreciation goes hand in hand with supervision under the Convention system. In 
this respect, the role of the Court is to review whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible with 
the Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of appreciation.”  
46 The caveat in formulation that modestly balances the deferential language of the ECtHR is that the margin of 
appreciation is coupled with “European supervision.” See Handyside, para. 48: “The domestic margin of 
appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision.” 
47 It is submitted that this compromises transparency and makes it harder for both commentary and the wider 
public to engage with the use of the technique within the EU. For a discussion on how such elaboration improves 
transparency see, Delmas-Marty 2009, supra note 7 at 57.  
48 See article 5 TEU. The preamble to the Charter reads in part: ”This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the 
powers and tasks of the Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity (…).” 
49 In what appears to be an opposition to EU deference in the area of fundamental rights, the CJEU has defined 
its own role, especially as it relates to the ECHR-system, as contributing “to the implementation of the process of 
integration that is the raison d’être of the EU itself.” See Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union delivered on 18 December 2014, para. 172. 




the rights enshrined in the Convention, the ECtHR may hold that the Contracting Party is not 
in violation of that right by reference to its margin of appreciation.  
     The quintessential Convention-conflict is thus between a state and an individual (or group 
of individuals) that claims that the state violated a Convention-right within its territory.51 
Therefore, the margin of appreciation enables an outcome where the ECtHR steps back and 
does not enforce the Convention right in the case at hand and leaves the state practice 
untouched.52 In other words, the ECtHR’s use of the margin of appreciation responds to a 
legal conflict in such a way as to enable the observer to conclude that it defines what is inside 
and outside the scope of the Convention rights.  
     As has already been explained, this contrasts with the CJEU’s use of national margins of 
discretion, which will be identified within the micro-interactions between the CJEU and the 
national decision-maker in cases addressing clashes between internal market law and 
fundamental rights protection, within secondary legislation that is challenged on fundamental 
rights grounds and within the elaboration of acceptable deviations to EU rights. 
       Because of the fact that the EU is a legal system that integrates more subject matters than 
the Convention-system and encompasses a multitude of fundamental rights sources (including 
the ECHR), it also harbours more than one “typical” rights-conflict. Put differently, the 
CJEU’s margin of discretion mediates and operates within a broader set of legal conflicts and 
within the text and application of more detailed and sophisticated legal sources, compared to 
the working environment of the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation. To be clear, the distinction 
that I draw does not relate to the fact that the discretional space can vary, because the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation appears to vary according to context.53 Rather, it is the type 
of conflict-mediation requested, the difference between the legal sources that the technique 
handles, and the interaction triggered, that differ between the two systems.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 An addition to the rule in article 34 ECHR on individual application stating that the “Court may receive 
applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of 
a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto” is the rarely used possibility of inter-state applications in article 33 that states: “Any High Contracting 
Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by 
another High Contracting Party.” Between 1956 and 2014, 17 such inter-state applications were lodged. 
52 With the view that the smaller jurisdiction is better placed to decide the matter, which in turn is motivated, 
frequently but not solely, by a lack of European consensus. The genuineness and the coherence in the use of this 
motivation in relation to say, different Contracting Parties or different subject matters is outside the scope of this 
work but remains an important question. See Itzcovich 2013, supra note 39.  
53 The ECtHR has held that the “scope of this margin of appreciation is not identical in each case but will vary 
according to the context (…). Relevant factors include the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance 
for the individual and the nature of the activities concerned.” This quote is taken from Buckley v United 




     The CJEU operationalizes national discretion to elaborate on acceptable deviations from 
an EU fundamental right, to balance internal market law with fundamental rights, and to 
ensure compliance between a piece of EU secondary legislation and fundamental rights. The 
type of coordination required is thus broader in terms of the legal conflicts that the margin of 
discretion is supposed to handle, and simultaneously more detailed in terms of its source-
sensitive mode of operation, compared to the margin of appreciation and the coordination 
required within the Convention-system. 
     Having said this, in the former case where an individual claims that a national measure 
violates a right guaranteed by the EU and the CJEU uses a national margin of discretion to 
deviate from an EU right, one finds the closest resemblance to the ECtHR’s use of the margin 
of appreciation, since the type of legal claim, conflict and mediation requested is similar. This 
will be discussed further in chapter 5.  
     In sum, the language of the ECtHR, as well as of mainstream commentary and indeed the 
Parliamentary assembly on the Council of Europe,54 takes the position that the margin of 
appreciation is a method of adjudication that separates decision-making along jurisdictional 
lines.55 This separation, as noted above, occurs when an individual alleges that a national 
measure violates Convention-rights. Such separation, as will be carefully examined below, 
does not represent the best understanding of the CJEU’s use of national discretion. In any 
event, studying the CJEU’s use of national margins of discretion in cases involving 
fundamental rights goes far beyond cases where individuals rely on E(U)ropean rights against 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Drawing on these building blocks, in April 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
moreover initiated a process of codifying the margin of appreciation-technique by adopting Protocol 15 
amending the Convention. See the Explanatory report on Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (CETS No. 213), Article 1 of the amending Protocol, 
para 9. 
55 Whether or not this is indeed the best understanding of the margin of appreciation-technique or not is outside 
the scope of this work. See for instance, pointing in the direction of a more interconnected and less categorical 
understating: Spielmann, D 2014, Whither the Margin of Appreciation? Current Legal Problems 67 (1), p. 53, 
on the Handyside case, contrasting with mainstream commentary he writes: “subsidiary to what? Not, as some 
would have it, to State authorities in a broad or general way on traditional sovereignty grounds. Rather, the 
Convention mechanism is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. The point is crucial to a 
correct understanding of the margin of appreciation, its nature and its purpose.” See also, which Spielmann 
quotes as well; the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska, and Vucinic in Mouvement 
Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland, Judgement of 26 September 1996 [GC], App no 16354/06: “The doctrine of 
margin of appreciation is a valuable tool for the interaction between national authorities and the Convention 





2.3 Sources: The European Union’s Fundamental Rights Material 
 
My interest is in the CJEU’s operationalization of national margins of discretion and the 
question of what forms of interaction are produced by this method of adjudication. The legal 
sources involved in the process of adjudication are central to such an inquiry.  
     The sources primarily discussed in this work are those that contain the European Union’s 
fundamental rights material. Put differently, the comprehensive set of sources for rights-
access for people living in the EU.  
     At an early stage the CJEU stated that fundamental rights are “rights of fundamental 
nature.”56 This understanding of “fundamental” is neither limited or sparse, but rather far-
reaching and rich. The European Union goes outside of the paradigm of “one legal order and 
one bill of rights,” and the blinking lights that signal which norms are “fundamental” come 
from various institutions and geographical locations.57  
     This is not a recent development as much as it is an EU tradition. Throughout the history 
of the European Union as a fundamental human rights protecting organization the legal 
sources supporting such protection have been myriad. Moreover, the EU has traditionally 
adopted a comprehensive approach to the concept of fundamental rights, thus including not 
only classic civil and political rights, but also social rights.58 Hence, in the European Union 
one finds that the genesis of the sources are multiple, the decision-making bodies entrusted 
with their enforcement are several, and that social, political and civil rights are all considered 
fundamental.  
     At the core of the source-multitude is the euro-national duality,59 which in a narrow sense 
accounts for how fundamental rights are both progressively protected by the Union itself and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, ECR 
[1970] Page 01125, para. 4.  
57 This could be compared to what Eskridge and Ferejohn, in a US federal setting, describe as a non-traditional 
way for thinking about constitutionalism, namely by understanding statutes as devices of “thin 
constitutionalism” which “have evolved from the early days of the republic to permit the protection of an 
extensive and flexible system of rights and liberties and other forms of security that exists outside of the 
traditional Constitutional frame.” See Eskridge, WN and Ferejohn, JA 2010, A Republic of Statutes: The New 
American Constitution, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.1. 
58 Perhaps this is one of the reasons fundamental rights have been the term used within the EU rather than human 
rights. A choice that signals reaching beyond the core of human rights protecting bodily integrity and freedom of 
thought, to rights that promote minimum protection in the workplace and when creating a family.  
59 This notion of EU fundamental rights protection is, for example, to be found in the preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU): “The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever closer union 
among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. […]   
The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the 




traditionally guaranteed by the Member States, now 28, in constitutions, ordinary legislation 
and common law.  
     Beyond this, the history of source-multiplicity within the EU framework could be 
reconstructed in summary in the following terms. In the late 1960s the CJEU identified 
“fundamental human rights” as being “enshrined in the general principle of Community law 
and protected by the Court.”60 In the 1970s the sources were interpreted as being derived from 
the “common constitutional traditions of the member states,”61 the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 62  and provisions of the EU Treaties (such as the principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality and the right to equal pay for equal work).63  
     Thus already at this stage the genesis of fundamental rights sources are varied; enacted by 
national constituencies, enacted by the Council of Europe, enacted by the EU, and guaranteed 
by both European and national judiciaries.64 This, perhaps needless to say, creates formal 
overlaps. Which in the thinnest and most simplistic sense, means that within the EU the 
“same right” can be protected in various instruments with different origins.  
     Moving from this core of fundamental rights derived from primary law, national 
constitutional traditions and the ECtHR, the EU affirmed its own agency in the area of 
fundamental right in Europe in a series of important secondary law instruments. Prominently, 
in two waves in the 1970s and then the 1990s, the EU adopted secondary law in the social 
field designed to provide for minimum European work-rights protection.65 Triggered by “the 
worker” as a key category of early European integration, social rights, both as primary and 
secondary law rights, are in the DNA of EU fundamental rights protection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Case 29-69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, ECR [1969] 00419, para. 7.  
61 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, ECR 
[1970] 01125. 
62 Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrobhandlung v European Commission, ECR [1974] 00491, p. 12 and 
13 states that the ECHR ”can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community 
law.” 
63 The European Coal and Steal Community Treaty already prohibited discrimination based on nationality of 
migrating coal and steel workers, this later developed into a general provision. Equal pay between men and 
women see article 119 of the now replaced EEC Treaty. See on article 119 EEC Case 43/75, Defrenne II, ECR 
[1976] I-455, paras. 26-27: “The Court has repeatedly stated that respect for fundamental personal human rights 
is one of the general principles of Community law, the observance of which it has a duty to ensure. There can be 
no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights.”  
64 In addition to non-legally binding declarations on human rights by the three European institutions see further 
Craig, P 2010, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 195. 
65 For instance, Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to collective redundancies, [1975] OJ L 48; Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 
February 1977 relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses, [1977] OJ L 61; Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993, 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, [1993] OJ L 307; Council Directive 96/34/EC of 
3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, [1996] 




     Social rights however, is only one example of a fundamental rights subject matter 
guaranteed in secondary legislation within the EU. Other examples are secondary legislation 
in the area of voting rights,66 criminal law (especially procedural rights relating to the 
European arrest warrant),67 data protection,68 immigration law69 and family reunification.70 
     Only in 2009 did the EU, by its own motion, make a wide-ranging fundamental rights 
document legally binding, namely the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(the Charter). This document, faithfully following EU tradition, includes both civil and 
political, and social rights. The chapters of the Charter are entitled; Dignity, Freedoms, 
Equality, Solidarity, Citizen’s Rights, Justice, and General provisions. Its preamble set the 
tone of multitude by stating that it reaffirms the content of a series of legal sources and in 
particular, that it guarantees a level not inferior to ECHR-standard.71 Even though it formally 
consolidates the different components of fundamental rights protection, the Charter applies, 
by contrast to primary and secondary law, to the EU institution and to the Member States only 
when they implement EU law.72  
     My interest is in the way margins of discretion are used in cases, which the CJEU itself 
qualifies as its fundamental rights material, namely national constitutions, Council of Europe 
instruments, and primary and secondary EU law. It is important to note that the choice to use 
the CJEU’s own conception of fundamental rights allows me to test the use of the margin of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For instance, Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down detailed arrangements for the 
exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing 
in a Member State of which they are not nationals,  [1994] OJ L 368. 
67 For instance, Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the 
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the right 
to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons and with 
consular authorities while deprived of liberty, [2013] OJ L 294. 
68 For instance, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
[1995] OJ L 281. 
69 For instance, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in 
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, [2005] OJ L 326 and Directive 2008/115/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, [2008] OJ L 348. 
70 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
[2004] OJ L 158. 
71 See article 53, and the preamble which reads in part: “This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers 
and tasks of the Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in 
particular, from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the 
Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe 
and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human 
Rights.”  
72 For example, and schematically on the right to equal treatment, article 23 of the Charter will have a vertical 
impact and bind the Member States when they implement EU law whereas article 157 TFEU has both vertical 




discretion-technique only in the case law that concerns fundamental rights according to the 
EU’s own understanding. This is a non-critical approach, which can never develop into a 
meaningful critique of the European Unions understanding of fundamental human rights. I 
will return to this point when explaining the method of case selection in chapter 4. 
     In sum, in chapters 5, 6, and 7 I will show how the type of EU-law conflict and the type of 
fundamental rights source involved in the conflict affects the shape of the margin of discretion 
and the interaction between the CJEU and the competent national authority on the national 
level. Therefore, when thinking about fundamental rights within the EU, multiplicity is an 
important starting point, yet, and which should not be underestimated, a characteristic that 
adds complexity.73   
     The Member States and the EU, when they interact and when they act within EU law, 
share a commitment to engage in the enforcement of this multitude of fundamental rights 
sources. Before outlining how national discretion is operationalized in this process, I will say 


















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73See further Besson, S 2014, European Human Rights Pluralism, in Maduro, M, Tuori, K and Sankari, S (eds.), 






3. Stories of Separation – Improvement, Intrusion and Diversity in Discourse 
on the CJEU’s Fundamental Rights Adjudication 
 
* 
My interest is in the way in which the Court of Justice of the European Union uses the margin 
of discretion-technique to adjudicate fundamental rights. In chapters 5, 6 and 7, I will present 
three ways in which the CJEU has used the margin of discretion-technique to engage 
decision-making bodies on the national level in an essentially interconnected form of 
elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection. 
      In this chapter, I will delineate what I believe to be the dominant narratives in the 
discourse on the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication: the narrative of improvement, 
according to which the CJEU improves the standard of fundamental rights protection, the 
narrative of intrusion, describing the CJEU’s undue intrusion into the Member States’ 
systems for the protection of fundamental rights, and the narrative of diversity, which holds 
that the CJEU does and should defer to the different national constitutional systems of rights 
protection.  
     I will argue that none of these dominant narratives accurately capture the shared decision-
making that the margin of discretion-technique represents because these narratives, in 
different ways, rely on a binary analytical structure that separates the EU from the national. In 
contrast, the use of the margin of discretion-technique by the CJEU that I identify blurs these 
boundaries.  
     The aim of the following reconstruction of dominant narratives is the illustration of their 
analytical reliance on the EU and the Member States as two separate spheres. This is therefore 
not a chapter about every story ever told about EU fundamental rights protection, but an 
attempt to sketch the stories that rely on binary reasoning and to highlight their limits. 
     Ultimately, this will serve as a contrast to my reading of the meaning and effects of the 









3.1 The Euro-National Binary 
 
The binary, I argue, with the EU as one sphere and the Member State as the other, is a central 
organizing frame in important strands of EU fundamental rights discourse. Generally, in the 
thinnest sense, it accounts for how fundamental rights are both progressively protected by the 
Union itself and traditionally guaranteed by the Member States, and it relies importantly on 
the boundary between these two legal spaces. 
     This binary could be constructed hierarchically, typically with the EU placed above the 
national.74 However the binary can also be invoked in the analysis without relative ranking 
and thus reject the idea of a strict hierarchical relationship. This two-component analytical 
structure, notwithstanding how the two components are understood to relate to each other 
(who is described as the most powerful, competent, important etcetera), is central in important 
strands of fundamental rights discourse. As will be shown, with this binary as a starting point 
there are stories that celebrate the increasing involvement of the EU in the protection of 
fundamental rights, and stories that critique it. 
     I will thus explore this national and EUropean binary in the specific area of EU 
fundamental rights discourse where the CJEU features centrally.75 The ultimate aim is one of 
constructing a platform from which to sharpen and distinguish my claim that the margin of 
discretion-technique blurs the boundaries that fundamental rights have been perceived as 
creating between the different national settings and the EU legal order. Instead, I argue that 
the decision-making process enabled by margins of discretions produces an interconnected, 
and thus shared elaboration of the applicable standard of protection.  
     In sum, the idea is thus to enhance the understanding of this non-binary condition by 
contrasting it with academic perception and storytelling about the separability and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 When studied together with the minimum floor of protection provided for by the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR), to which all EU member states (and perhaps one day the EU itself) are contracting 
parties, it has been referred to as European-styled multi-layered or multi-dimensional rights protection. See 
further, Fabbrini, F 2014, Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations of a Multilevel 
System in Comparative Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford and Morton, V 2014, European Union 
Human Rights Law, Edward Edgar Publishing, Cheltenham.  
75 Glancing at historical literature on European integration Milward express this duality as “an assumption, 
which underlines most of the theoretical and scholarly writing about the European Community, the assumption 
that it is in antithesis to the nation-state.” A claim that points towards the centrality of a, at times, dichotomist 
euro-national binary. Milward, A 1992, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Routledge, London, p. 2. For 
an exposé of the ”rooted character of binary logic in contemporary legal thought,” see: Glenn, HP 2014, 
Transnational Legal Thought, Plato, Europe and Beyond, in Maduro, M, Tuori, K and Sankari, S (eds.) 
Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 




distinctiveness of the national and the European in the sphere of EU fundamental rights 
protection.   
     So, to paraphrase Resnik, in the following I will critically consider the mode of analysis of 
EU fundamental rights law for which distinctly national and distinctly European are 
touchstones.76 Of particular significance from the point of view of the effects this analysis has 
on EU fundamental rights adjudication discourse is the question of which lines of inquiry it 
prompts and perhaps more importantly, hinders. 
     I will show how this binary reoccurs, to different degrees, in three of the central narratives 
in EU fundamental rights discourse.  
     Firstly, the narrative of improvement: the story that describes how the EU, and in particular 
its Court, can have the potential to improve the protection of fundamental rights in the various 
Member States. Secondly, the EU law intrusion narrative: the perennial assertion of an 
intrusive CJEU whose fundamental rights jurisprudence unduly expands into the national 
milieu. Thirdly, the EU law diversity narrative: the (celebratory) story that there is, or 
alternatively should be, an emerging body of constitutional diversity jurisprudence that defers 
to national constitutional traditions. 
     My interest is thus primarily in how the role of the CJEU is understood in relation to the 
national legal sphere – as an improver, as an intruder or as a guarantor of diversity. The CJEU 
tends to be a prominent figure in stories about EU fundamental rights protection. Indeed, a 
classic position in EU law scholarship describes the CJEU as a single-minded engine of 
European integration, prone to judicial activism in the area of fundamental rights.77 Hence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Resnik 2001, supra note 14 at 620. 
77When deconstructed, this story rests on two factors. At the time it started to adjudicate fundamental rights the 
CJEU did not have a written bill of rights. This dissonance borne of a positivistic preoccupation created the story 
of judicial activism. See Weiler, JHH 1986, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the 
European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal Order of the 
European Communities, Washington Law Review 61, p. 1105: “Briefly stated, in the absence of a written bill of 
rights in the Treaty and an apparent freedom for the Community legislature to disregard individual rights in 
Community legislation, the European Court of Justice, in an exercise of bold judicial activism, and a reversal of 
earlier case law, created a judge-made higher law of fundamental human rights, culled from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and international agreements such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).” For a colourful version see Cappelletti, M 1989, The Judicial Process in Comparative 
Perspective, Clarendon Press, Oxford, on page 174: “those thirteen little men unknown to most of the 320 
million community citizens, devoid of political power, charisma and popular legitimization” who claim “for 
themselves the … capacity to do what the framers did not even think of doing, and what the political branches of 
the Community do not even try to undertake.” 
For two contributions to edited collections on this theme with a critical and tentatively historical perspective on 
this phenomena, see Arnull, A 2013, Judicial Activism and the European Court of Justice: How Should 
Academics Respond?, in De Witte, B, Dawson, M and Muir, E (eds.), Judicial Activism at the European Court 
of Justice, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham. Discussing and problematizing  the notion of judicial activism 
in the area of citizenship see Dougan, M 2012, Judicial Activism or Constitutional Interaction? Policymaking by 




the CJEU is a strong presence in any investigation of dominant narratives in EU fundamental 
rights discourse.78    
    As regards the narratives of improvement, intrusion and diversity, taken together they rely 
on a vision where fundamental rights protection is either pertinent to the EU or pertinent to 
the national, albeit differently. This is so since these narratives presuppose, inter alia, that the 
European fundamental right locus can intrude into the national sphere, that improvement of 
that sphere is possible through EU involvement or that separation of the national and 
European is possible (and perhaps desirable). These are narratives with a two-separate-
components structure and this is the aspect I would like to zoom in on. 
     The binary starting point implicit in these narratives triggers questions about how the two 
distinct entities relate to each other. Can one better the other?79 Is one dominating the other?80 
Are they in conflict or cooperation?81 Is there a tension?82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, Intersentia, Cambrdige. See also Tridimas, T 1996, The Court 
of Justice and Judicial Activism, European Law Review. 21 (3). p. 199; Horsley, T 2013, Reflections on the Role 
of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: Legal Limits to Judicial Law-Making, Common 
Market Law Review 50 (4), pp. 931-964, who frames the debate as whether the CJEU properly or improperly 
oversteps its limits.  
78 For instance, the CJEU activity during these early days of adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights 
has been described as fortunate, excessively interventionist or creative (1), its actions qualify it as the guardian 
of EU fundamental rights (2) or as a nation-builder (3), perhaps soberly as an adventurous enterprise that is not 
necessarily a good thing (4) and in a classic and seemingly never out-dated critique as not taking human rights 
seriously but instead using them as no more than a vehicle…to extend the scope and impact of European law (5). 
See in this order: (1) Tizzano, A 2008, The Role of the ECJ in the Protection of Fundamental Rights, in Arnull, 
A, Eeckhout, P and Tridimas, T (eds.), Continuity and Change in EU law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis 
Jacobs, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 138 where the author is characterising the evaluation of his 
opponents and his own opinion, the author himself describes the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication as 
fortunate; (2) Muir, E 2013, The Court of Justice: A Fundmantal Rights Institution Among Others, in De Witte, 
B, Dawson, M and Muir, E (eds.), Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice, Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, p. 100; (3) Tridimas, T 2010, Primacy, Fundamental Rights and the Search for Legitimacy, in 
Maduro, M and Azoulai, L (eds.), The Past and Future of EU law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 103; (4) Mancini, GF 1989, The Making of a 
Constitution for Europe, Common Market Law Review 26 (4), p. 612; (5) Coppel, J and O'Neill, supra note 30 at 
692. 
79 For inquiry along these lines see for instance, Lenaerts, K and De Smijter, E 2001, A "Bill of Rights" for the 
European Union, Common Market Law Review 38 (2), pp. 273-300; Cichowski, RA 2004, Women's Rights, the 
European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism, Law & Society Review 38 (3), pp. 489-512; Pernice, I, 
Griller, S and Ziller, J 2008, The Treaty of Lisbon and Fundamental Rights, in Griller, S and Ziller, J (eds.), The 
Lisbon Treaty, EU Constitutionalism Without a Constitutional Treaty, Springer, New York, pp. 235-256. 
80 For inquiry along these lines see for instance, Dubout, E 2014, The Protection of Fundamental Rights and the 
Allocation of Competences in the EU: A Clash of Constitutional Logics, in Azoulai, L (ed.), The Question of 
Competence in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford; de Vries, S, Bernitz, U and Weatherill, S 
2013, Introduction, in de Vries, S, Bernitz, U and Weatherill, S (eds.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in 
the EU After Lisbon, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 4; with a Member State specific analysis see 
Grabenwarter, C 2010, National Constitutional Law Relating to the European Union, in von Bogdandy, A and 
Bast, J (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 84 ff; 
Aziz, M 2004, The Impact of European Rights on National Legal Cultures, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland. 
81 For inquiry along these lines see, Alter, K 1998, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in Slaughter, AM, Stone Sweet, A and 
Weiler, JHH (eds.), The European Court and National Courts- Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its 




     All these questions, while sometimes aiming at investigating closer interaction, rarely 
depart from the two-component structure. Indeed, the binary construction relies on the 
identity and origin of actors and sources. It follows along the lines of what Resnik observes 
on the other side of the Atlantic: “many discussions of federations presume a singularity of 
entities and rights, and that the power over a given domain or kind of right belongs either to 
subunits or to the federal government; a few arenas are defined as concurrent; and the 
jurisdictional entities are posited to be unilateral actors. To borrow from critical theory, this 
approach relies on essentializing rights, roles, and jurisdictional allocations.”83 
     The genesis of the actors, as either national or European, is unchallengeable – the German 
constitutional court comes from Germany and the Court of Justice of the European Union is a 
European creation and so on. It is rather the explanations of their interactions, the ideas about 
their roles that set the stage for the construction of dominant narratives, such as the ones of 
intrusion, improvement and diversity. For instance, an instantiation would follow something 
like the following form: How is the Court of Justice of European Union acting and how is the 
Italian constitutional court responding to its actions?84  
     More challenging then is the way in which the distinctiveness and separability of European 
and national sources are central analytical assertions in the construction of these narratives. 
Take for instance the idea of the national constitution as an outflow of truly national values, 
or the debate about whether the EU should promote a maximalist or minimalist standard of 
protection.85 Such ideas and debates represent a view of fundamental rights sources involved 
and referred to in the EU project as categorizable along euro-national lines.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
European Union, in Cloots, E, De Baere, G and Sottiaux, S (eds.), Federalism in the European Union, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford; Portland; Mayer, F 2010, Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in von Bogdandy, A and 
Bast, J (eds.), Principles of European constitutional law, 2nd ed., Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 400; with 
a Central and Eastern European perspective see Albi, A 2007, Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States, 
European Constitutional Law Review 3 (1), pp. 25-67. 
82 For inquiry along these lines see, Spaventa, E 2009, Federalisation Versus Centralisation: Tensions in 
Fundamental Rights Discourse in the EU, in Dougan, M and Currie, S (eds.), 50 Years of the European Treaties: 
Looking Back and Thinking Forward, Hart Publishing Oxford; Portland; arguing that fundamental rights 
operates both as reducers and vectors of the autonomy of the Member States. see Azoulai, L 2012, The Case of 
Fundamental Rights: a State of Ambivalence, in Micklitz, H-W and De Witte, B (eds.), The European Court of 
Justice and the Autonomy of the Member States, Intersentia, Cambridge; in relation to the Charter see Eeckhout, 
P 2002, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question, Common Market Law Review 39 (5), 
pp. 945-994. 
83 Resnik 2014, supra note 3 at 366. 
84 See for instance, Cartabia, M 1995, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea, Giuffrè, Milano, pp. 97-102, 
Donnarumma, MA 2010, Il processo di “costituzionalizzazione” dell’Unione Europea e la tensione dialettica tra 
la giurisprudenza della corte di giustizia e le giurisprudenze delle corti costituzionali, Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
Pubblico Comunitario, fasc.2, p. 407. 
85 In essence, the idea that the CJEU should choose the highest standard of fundamental rights protection offered 
by either the national or the European level, see Besselink, LFM 1998, Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On 




     These binary-based questions and observations, notwithstanding their merit and 
importance, tend to lead away from investigations that seek to establish more complex 
patterns of interconnected existence and decision-making between the national and 
European.86 The logic of this type of analysis is thus that within the EU’s fundamental rights 
protection the national/European binary is a categorization that exists both ex ante and ex 
post a European fundamental rights conflict. 
     Therefore, the binary starting point for the analysis of a particular problem tends to turn 
into a conclusion based on the binary. Is the EU dominating the Member States in the area of 
fundamental rights protection? Yes. Is there a conflict between the EU and the national 
concerning the level of protection? Yes. And so on. The investigation has been carried out, 
but the binary remains the same. 
     In contrast, I will later argue that even if the European and the national exists ex ante, my 
concern is the manner in which the distinctiveness of the national and the European identity 
of the standard of protection in numerous cases involving fundamental rights is 
considerably blurred ex post the process of adjudication. This is the point that most 
distinctively separates the actual operation of the margin of discretion technique in cases 
involving fundamental rights from the legal perception expressed in the narratives of 
intrusion, improvement and diversity. Thus, an evolution where a binary before becomes a 
non-binary after... 
     Yet, the relationship between the binary, the narratives of improvement, intrusion, and 
diversity, and the interconnected decision-making which the margin of discretion-technique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671. This agenda has however received thorough critique and must nowadays be described as a minority 
position. This is especially so since the weakness of the maximalist approach can be summarized as follows: 
how can it be determined what the highest (maximal) level of protection is? Classic examples of high/low 
protection as a problematic paradigm are the right to abortion and clash of rights-situation, for instance between 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion. See further; Olsen, F 1984, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of 
Rights Analysis, Texas Law Review 63, pp. 387-432; on the high-low conundrum see Weiler, JHH 1999, 
Fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries: on the conflict of standards and values in the protection of 
Human Rights in the European Legal Space, in Weiler, JHH (ed.), The Constitution of Europe: “do the clothes 
have an emperor?” and Other Essays on European Integration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
86 Not to say that such has never been made, see for instance: Payandeh, M 2011, Constitutional Review of EU 
Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship Between the German Constitutional Court and the EU 
Court of Justice, Common Market Law Review 48 (1), pp. 9-38; On the difference between ‘outcome’, 
‘guidance’, and ‘deference’ cases see Tridimas, T 2011, Constitutional Review of Member State Action: The 
Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction, International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (3–4), p. 737; 
Komárek, J 2014, National Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy, International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 12 (3), pp. 525-544, stating that his argument offers something ”that should be 
welcomed by orthodox EU lawyers as much as national constitutionalists.” More generally, on inquires that 
centre on “various forms of ‘paraconsistent,’ ‘inconsistency tolerant’ or ‘dialectic logic.” See Glenn 2014, supra 
note 75 at 67. Further, Jackson describes the classic constitutional conflict of constitutional authority treasured 




produces is not to be reduced to claims of what is right and wrong – a truly correct or truly 
incorrect description of the nature of EU fundamental rights protection.  
     Hence, it is important to note how these doctrinal narratives could, for instance, be 
triggered by the interpretation of certain cases handed down by the CJEU,87 by pieces of 
legislation or treaty provisions that are considered to have a certain meaning and potential88 or 
by normative arguments.89  
     Consequently, I do not seek to argue that the binary and the narratives of intrusion, 
improvement and diversity have no merit, logic or empirical traction. I argue that these 
narratives do not adequately capture the interconnected nature of important strands of the 
fundamental rights adjudication enabled by the operationalization of national discretion 
through the margin of discretion technique. In other words, that these narratives do not 
account for the way in which important strands of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication 
erases the solidity of the binary analysis. 
     There is an important point to be made about how deconstructing narratives and 
constructing new ones is not simply about establishing a right and wrong dichotomy.90  
Instead it is about investigating what lines of inquiry certain narratives produce, and which 
they frustrate. In doing this, the significance of alternative ways of reading the CJEU’s 
fundamental rights jurisprudence can exist in relation to other stories.  
     Thus, this reconstruction is a first step towards an elaboration of the disparity between, on 
the one hand, the binary rationales of the narratives, and on the other hand, the legal realities 
of the use of national margins of discretion to adjudicate fundamental rights. This disparity 
then provides the basis for a structured critique of the dominance of these narratives, which in 
turn opens up space for different readings of the EU’s fundamental rights material.  
     With this critical agenda in mind I will reconstruct the three dominant narratives in the 
discourse of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication; the narrative of improvement, 
intrusion, and diversity. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 For instance, the importance of Laval for certain version of the narrative of intrusion. 
88 For instance, the importance of article 4.2 TEU for certain strands of the narrative of diversity. 
89 For instance, the position that the horrors of WW2 should never happen again which is frequently elaborated 
within certain strands of the narrative of improvement.  
90 For a classic work on, inter alia, the relationship between dominant narratives and alternative narratives see 
Lyotard, J-F 1984, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, where Lyotard writes about the way in which postmodernism represented the end to “grand 
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3.2 The Narrative of Improvement 
 
The narrative of improvement has been around for the entirety of the EU’s human rights 
protecting career. It celebrates the EU’s activity in the area of fundamental rights and 
considers it to represent progress. It is an account of the benefits of European integration, and 
more broadly, a narrative of appreciation of the transnational and supranational elements in 
contemporary legal systems. 
     The EU, in this account, has the potential to raise the quality of the fundamental rights’ 
protection compared to that the Member State can, or is willing to offer, either in general 
terms or as exemplified in relation to a specific issue such as workplace discrimination.91  
     The narrative of improvement is a searchlight. It identifies and reacts to what it holds to be 
insufficiencies and violation within the Member State’s legal order, or at the very least, a 
situation where “the ‘costs of non-Europe’ would have been higher in many countries (…) 
than the ‘costs of Europe.’”92 
     In concrete then, the EU fundamental rights sources and the CJEU add a separate 
dimension to the fundamental rights architecture of the Member State. Specifically, the 
narrative of improvement understands the CJEU’s power to interpret EU law and strike down 
non-complying national provisions as offering the possibility of constructive reformation of 
the national system. The improvement narrative embraces the hierarchical relationship 
between the EU and the Member States. 
     To broaden the perspective, the narrative of improvement builds on the idea that more 
supranational fundamental rights protection, not less, enhances the solidity of the individual’s 
protections and promotes European development. 
     This assumption about the need for more supranational European rights protection could 
be traced to what Arendt once qualified as the roots of 20th century European totalitarianism: 
“the constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who 
had lost nationally guaranteed rights, made it possible for the persecuting governments to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 For a general example see: Bryde, BO 2010, The ECJ’s Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence - a Milestone In 
Transnational Constitutionalism, in Maduro, M and Azoulai, L (eds.), The Past and Future of EU law: The 
Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 
119:“With this jurisprudence the Court developed a system of human rights protection that could (and should) 
become an example for other international systems of government.”  
92 Kilpatrick, C 2002, Emancipation Through Law or the Emasculation of Law: The Nation-State, the EU, and 
Gender Equality at Work, in Conaghan, J, Fischl, RM and Klare, K (eds.), Labour Law in an Era of 




impose their standard of values even upon their opponents.”93 Therefore, Arendt underlines 
how “millions of people lived outside normal legal protection and needed an additional 
guarantee of their elementary rights from an outside body.”94 
     The experience of the insufficiency of the nation state in protecting fundamental rights 
under the Nazi and fascist era informed the raison d'être of European cooperation in a broad 
sense. Arendt’s call for an outside body was taken seriously, as it were. 
     The appeal of the improvement narrative lies, I believe, in the fact that it connects to the 
origins of post World War Two European cooperation and emphasises its humanistic 
potential, namely destabilising nationalism by constructing national cooperation, and as a 
consequence making sure that fascism and Nazism will not reappear as powerful and violent 
systems of government.95  
     In fact, the rise of European nationalist and xenophobic parties during the 2000s might 
revitalize these “classic” ideas of how European cooperation relates to the momentum of such 
political parties and their visions of government.96 Especially since the improvement narrative 
tends to draw extensively on EU anti-discrimination law, thus pushing back on nationalistic 
and xenophobic ideals of differentiation between people. In contrast however, an important 
strand of European fundamental rights commentary is busy asserting the uniquely national in 
the constitutional, which must be considered an analytical move in the opposite direction.97 
This constitutes a tension that will be explored further below. 
     De Búrca has shown that the idea of including human rights in the architecture of 
cooperation was already present in pre-Coal and Steel Community deliberations, but was 
finally rejected.98 Instead, the issue of the protection of fundamental rights emerged with the 
CJEU’s case law, mostly concerning right to property in Germany of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. 
     This line of case law was characterised by several commentators as being in sync with the 
EU’s anti-totalitarian and peacekeeping function. Take for instance Cappelletti’s 
argumentation in favour of the Court of Justice’s work towards the creation of a “law of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Arendt, H 1958, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Meridian Books, New York, p. 269. 
94 Ibidem at 275. 
95 See further: de Búrca, G 2013, Europe's Raison D'être, NYU Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, WP NO. 13-19.  
96 For a diverging opinion see, Weiler, JHH 2011, 60 Years Since the First European Community: Reflections on 
Messianism, European Journal of International Law 22 (2), p. 303. 
97 Particularly the work that is being done on the concept of ”national constitutional identity,” which will be 
discussed in the section on the narrative of diversity. 
98 de Búrca, G 2011, The Road Not Taken: The European Union as a Global Human Rights Actor, American 




Europe” in the area of human rights: “by universalizing fundamental values, peoples will 
grow closer, the risks of conflicts and wars will diminish, and new enriching syntheses will 
emerge from divergent customs, cultures, races, and traditions.”99 
     De Búrca soberly frames similar accounts, which I would refer to as early improvement 
narratives, as: “The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is placed at the center of this narrative, 
as a heroic and solitary actor that, through its pioneering case law, has encouraged and cajoled 
the main political actors into accepting human rights as a key element of the EU constitutional 
framework.”100 The improvement narrators thus believe that the EU and its Court should 
construct its function in fundamental rights terms, just like the ECtHR and its Convention, the 
UN, the national constitutions and constitutional courts and so forth.101 
     This idea of improvement, despite the fact that it has been rejected in large part by the 
intrusion and diversity narrative, has never been completely eradicated.102  
     For the purpose of presenting the improvement narrative I will give two examples of 
strands of scholarship where its presence is very strong. They also illustrate two different, 
albeit closely related, generations of improvement narratives. 
     Firstly, the legislative and case law-driven advancement of equal treatment between men 
and women and the celebratory description of this as an important development of EU 
fundamental rights protection. 
     Secondly, and connected to EU anti-discrimination law, the idea that the EU provides a 
forum for transnational cause-lawyering and strategic litigation with the capacity to improve 
the standard of rights protection in the Member States.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Cappelletti, M 1979, The ”Mighty Problem” of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis, 
The Southern California Law Review, 53, p. 440. Cappelletti is however not necessarily celebrative of all the 
early decisions in the field. 
100 de Búrca 2011, supra note 98 at 652. For the sake of clarity I will give one example of how a first hand 
account can be framed: “Thus the focus in the human rights studies is not so much on fundamental rights as 
such, but on how their protection though central devices can not only help, in many cases, guarantee a better 
standard of protection but also lead to an increased cohesion of the “union.”” To be found in Cappelletti, M, 
Seccombe, M and Weiler, JHH 1986, General Introduction, in Cappelletti, M, Seccombe, M and Weiler, JHH 
(eds.), Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience. Vol. 1. Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin, p. 233.  
101 Around the first years of the millennium fundamental rights was studied in the capacity of a potential next 
epicentre of European integration See, for example, Lenaerts, K 2000, Fundamental Rights in the European 
Union, European Law Review 25 (6), pp. 575-600; Beaumont, P 2002, Human Rights: Some Recent 
Developments and Their Impact on Convergence and Divergence of Law in Europe, in Beaumont, P, Lyons C 
and Walker, N (eds.), Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 151; 
Alston, P and de Schutter O 2005, Introduction: Addressing the Challenges Confronting the EU Fundamental 
Rights Agency, in Alston, P and de Schutter, O (eds.), Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU, The 
Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 1; Besson, S 2006, The European 
Union and Human Rights: Towards A Post-National Human Rights Institution? Human Rights Law Review 6 
(2), pp. 323-360. 
102 Apart from the two examples that will be discussed, some of the commentary on the enactment of the Lisbon 





3.2.1 The Example of Equal Treatment 
The core of this version of the improvement narrative is that European law and the CJEU has 
helped to promote the right to equal treatment between men and women.103 The EU itself is 
the source-maker and not an organisation that internalizes the protection standards of its 
Member States. 
      It is a powerful story fuelled by pieces of secondary legislation deemed successful at 
achieving their aims,104 and landmark cases by the CJEU that pushed national actors coming 
before the courts, mostly employers, to better their treatment of women. This is especially 
emphasised in relation to the stopping of work-place discrimination such as differences in pay 
between men and women for carrying out the same work.   
     Thus, this is a straightforward story about the supranational promotion of a right by both 
the legislature and the court.105  
     In particular, the concept of discrimination was gradually refined to encompass both direct 
and indirect discrimination. This represented a conceptual novelty for several Member States 
and was thus a clear sign of the EU adding a new and (possibly) progressive dimension to the 
national rights-protection regime.106 
     In particular the 1976 case Defrenne II was a pivotal catalyst for this narrative; a case 
about an airhostess winning against her employer by successfully arguing that it discriminated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Burrows, N 1980, The Promotion of Women’s Rights by the European Economic Community, Common 
Market Law Review 17 (2), pp. 191-209; Mazey, S 1998, The European Union and Women's Rights: From the 
Europeanization of National Agendas to the Nationalization of a European agenda?, Journal of European Public 
Policy 5 (1), pp. 131-152; Heide, I 1999, Supranational Action Against Sex Discrimination: Equal Pay and Equal 
Treatment in the European Union, International Labour Review 138 (4), pp. 381-410; Anagnostou, D and 
Millns, S 2013, Gender Equality, Legal Mobilization, and Feminism in a Multilevel European System, Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Société 28 (2), pp. 115-131. 
104 Three sources stand out: Article 119 on equal pay in the EEC Treaty, Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, and Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. 
105 One reason, albeit not the only one, for the legislative and case law driven momentum was of the logic that 
the common market was used to restructure the workplace power balance between men and women. See 
Defrenne II, para 8. ”The aim of Article 119 is to avoid a situation in which undertakings established in States 
which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay suffer a competitive disadvantage in intra-
Community competition as compared with undertakings established in States which have not yet eliminated 
discrimination against women workers as regards pay.” See further, More, G 1999, The principle of equal 
treatment: From market unifier to fundamental right?, in Craig, P and de Búrca, G (eds.), The Evolution of EU 
Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 517–553. 
Furthermore, discrimination on grounds of nationality has historically been the main tool of market integration, a 
trajectory that also assisted in paving the way for launching the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women. See; Prechal, S 2004, Equality of Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in 
Three Themes, Common Market Law Review 41 (2), p. 548. 




against women employees by giving “cabin stewards’ higher pay for the same work.107 In 
Defrenne II the Court relates the principle of equal treatment between men and women to the 
community objective of “ensuring social progress.”108  
     Thus, it is a case that is emblematic of the equal treatment story. It simultaneously pushes 
a quintessentially European right forward and relates it to a broader notion of social progress.  
     The momentum of this success story peaked somewhere around the mid 1990s. The 
retelling of the story about EU and gender equality became more affected by nuanced and 
contextual framings.109 It was also critiqued outright using feminist scholarship110 and by 
commentators who detected neoliberal biases.111  
      There is in other words, a clear move towards questioning the success story and nuancing 
the effects of the CJEU’s activity in this area. A sign of fragility perhaps of any 
straightforward claim that the EU improves national rights protection, it does not take many 
counter-indicative CJEU cases or critical framings to arrive at more pessimistic conclusions. 
However the EU changed shape as well. After the Maastricht Treaty’s expansion of the reach 
of the EU, well beyond the common market, improvement narratives perhaps needed more 
fuel than “simply” gender equality in employment and occupation. In other words, the 
statement: “the EU improves” has to be made in the context of, and is highly dependent on 
what the EU project de facto covers. 
     Yet many have interpreted this moment as an enduring, and most likely an evolving 
achievement of EU fundamental rights protection.112 This helped pave the way for the version 
of the improvement narrative described below, one more focused on method but still closely 
linked to the success story of equal treatment between men and women.  
 
3.2.2 The Method of Strategic Litigation 
The strategic litigation wave of the improvement narrative belongs to the new millennium.113 
It belongs to a post-Maastricht Europe with both citizens and third country-nationals 
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109 Kilpatrick 2002, supra note 92. and de Búrca, G 2012, The Trajectories of European and American 
Antidiscrimination Law, American Journal of Comparative Law 60 (1), pp. 1-22.  
110 Especially the way in which equality was conceived and reproduced by the court, see: Fredman, S 1992, 
European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique, Industrial Law Journal, 21 (2), pp. 119-134 and see 
further MacKinnon, CA 1991, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, Yale Law Journal, pp. 1281-1328. 
111 Somek, A 2011, Engineering Equality: An Essay on European Anti-Discrimination law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
112 Prechal 2004, supra note 105; Cichowski 2004, supra note 79; Anagnostou and Millns 2013, supra note 103. 
113 Despite there being a sense of novelty within the field, the idea of raising awareness in Europe on the 




populating the territory, and to a post-Lisbon Europe with its own Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.  
     It is a story about cause lawyering and how the two European courts (I will focus on the 
CJEU in this section) can act as catalysts of social change by improving the standard of 
protection in the different Member States.114 This is especially the case where they act as a 
tool for eliminating discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religious belief, sex, disability, 
age or sexual orientation in the different Member States.115 In other words, transnational 
public interest law (rather than lawyering concerned merely with one of the parties to the 
case) that addresses the failures of the state to uphold fundamental rights, remedying a 
specific instance of discrimination or some other fundamental rights violation.116   
     This scholarship looks at the CJEU and the EU fundamental rights sources and describes 
how these are being used, or how they could be used to advance the interests of specific 
groups that are being mistreated in some way in the Member State where they reside, work, 
travel and so forth.117 For instance, litigation to advance LGBT-rights118 and litigation to 
combat discrimination of people with Roma origin119  has received extensive scholarly 
attention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scholarship on access to justice. See Cappelletti, M and Garth, BG 1978, Access to Justice: The Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective: A General Report, AW Sijthoff, Leiden. Yet the ultimate source of 
inspiration is arguably US legal thinking on public interest law. See Cummings, SL and Trubek LG 2008, 
Globalizing Public Interest Law, UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 13, pp. 1-53. 
114 Scott, J and Sturm, S 2006, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 
Columbia Journal of European Law 13, pp. 565-594. 
115 Hilson, C 2002, New Social Movements: The Role of Legal Opportunity, Journal of European Public Policy 
9 (2), pp. 238-255; de Waele, H and van der Vleuten, A 2010, Judicial Activism in the European Court of 
Justice-The Case of LGBT Rights, Michigan State University College of Law Journal of International Law 19, 
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116 Jacquot, S and Vitale, T 2014, Law as a Weapon of the weak? A Comparative Analysis of Legal Mobilization 
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Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the European Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration and 
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Minority Protection Within the European Union, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, p. 3: “potentially 
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118 Weiss, A 2007, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-Sex Couples in the United States 
and the European Union, Columbia Journal of law and Social Problems, 81, pp. 81 -122; de Waele and van der 
Vleuten 2010, supra note 115, Helfer, LR and Voeten, E 2014, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: 
Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, International Organization 68 (1), pp. 77-110. 
119 Goodwin, M 2006, DH and Others v. Czech Republic: A Major Set-Back for the Development of Non-
Discrimination Norms in Europe, German Law Journal, 7 (4), pp. 421-432; Goldston, JA 2010, The Struggle for 
Roma Rights: Arguments That Have Worked, Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2), pp. 311-325; Dawson, M and 
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     This version of the improvement narrative is essentially transnational, connecting different 
people of different states around a common cause, and supranational in its use of institutions. 
In this story the EU’s legal sphere is placed above the national legal sphere, with the capacity 
to change it and possibly improve it, thus relying on a hierarchical relationship between the 
national and European. 
     Ultimately, this emerging trend of building on the improvement narrative by thinking 
about the possibilities of cause lawyering and strategic litigation is arguably part of a broader 
tendency to think about the creation of social justice and progress without necessarily 
thinking about the state, in particular the welfare state.120  
     This legal development could thus be understood as linked, albeit not causally, to the 
decline of the redistributive European welfare state model, which in turn opens up spaces for 
other forms of social justice projects. In sum, methods for achieving social change that are 
less dependent on the legislator and the welfare state and more reliant on civil society and 
courts.  
     Fraser has written about the move from a politics of redistribution to a politics of 
recognition. How “the ‘struggle for recognition’ is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of 
political conflict in the late twentieth century. Demands for ‘recognition of difference’ fuel 
struggles of groups mobilized under the banners of nationality, ethnicity, ‘race’, gender, and 
sexuality.”121 
     In this way Fraser deepens the understanding of a broader move towards more identity-
based and court-centred notions of achieving justice by filling the gap left by, or maybe at the 
expense of, 122  a politics of redistribution typically administered by the welfare state. 
Following her inquiry helps us think critically about the turn to lawyering, rather than voting, 
for social change.123  
     Still, read as a part of a broader societal trend, the interest in cause lawyering and public 
interest law can also be understood as being prompted by virtue of necessity. In the 
improvement narrators’ own words, the outside body is the best hope for improvement when 
Member States fail to maintain an adequate standard of protection.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Hemerijck, A 2012, Changing Welfare States, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
121 Fraser, N 1995, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 'Post-Socialist' Age, New Left 
Review 212, p. 68. 
122 Fudge, J 2015, Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Canada and Europe: Freedom of Association, Collective 
Bargaining, and Strikes, Current Legal Problems, first published online June 23, 2015.  
123 For critical reflections on the strategic litigation apparatus by academics sympathetic to the cause in question 
see: Stoodard, TB 1997, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, NYU Law 
Review, 72 (5), pp. 967-983 and Spade, D 2011, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, 






3.3 The Narrative of Intrusion 
 
The narrative of intrusion tells the story of how the EU’s fundamental rights protection 
apparatus, and particularly the CJEU’s adjudication, intrude into the national milieu. The 
central theme is that the EU’s production of fundamental rights protection deliberately places 
it in a national situation where it is unwelcome or uninvited, and a worst-case scenario, where 
it poses a direct threat to the proper functioning of the national system. Unwarranted, 
unwanted, harmful, risky and so forth are thus the leitmotivs that mark the moral of this story.  
     The binary starting point is at the epicentre of this account since the act of intrusion 
presupposes two separate spheres of control over the formulation and interpretation of 
fundamental rights; one that belongs to the European Union and one that is national. The idea 
of a Union that intrudes into the national – one into the other – is made possible by keeping 
the two entities analytically separable and distinct. This distinctiveness evolves into an 
inquiry along the lines of what will happen if the EU and its Court intrude? 
     In this story told by legal scholars, as has been hinted above, the CJEU tends to be the 
engineer of intrusion. The Court is an institution with absolute interpretative authority – a 
protagonist that decides its own fate. Thus the narrative of intrusion, even though it can be 
preoccupied with the quality of EU fundamental rights’ legislative sources, is largely focused 
on the Court and its adjudication.  
     Yet it is worth pointing out that some versions of the narrative of intrusion could be 
constructed around the CJEU’s unwillingness to act. For instance, when it refuses to constrain 
or even review acts on fundamental rights grounds enacted by European Union institutions, 
which can be described as intruding into national systems of rights protection.124  
     The core theme of the storytelling could be the motives behind the intrusion as well as its 
risks. When critical attention is directed towards the motives behind the EU’s expansiveness, 
the questions are, for instance: is the EU, and particularly the CJEU, really interested in the 
protection of fundamental rights? Or is it merely (and disingenuously) interested in pursuing 
other aims such as market integration and the efficacy of EU law?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The recent post-financial crisis expansion of EU involvement in policy areas such as fiscal discipline and 
national budgetary design, and the CJEU’s seeming unwillingness to constrain or even review these measures on 
fundamental rights grounds might give new life to an other version of the narrative of intrusion, with different 
features, most prominently the question of the application of the Charter. However, categorising this emerging 




     When the narrative of intrusion is instead centred on the risks that intrusion poses, the 
inquiry is along the lines of: what will happen when the national no longer has the last word 
on fundamental rights issues triggered by European cooperation? The narrator can thus 
advance a normative posture by means of an EU legal framework that allows the CJEU to 
expand into areas of fundamental rights protection traditionally conceived as national, by 
adjudication measures that fall within the scope of EU law, hypothetically lowering or 
eliminating national standards.  
     The narrative of intrusion, when deconstructed, poses a destabilizing critical challenge to 
European integration. Which in the thinnest sense represent the idea of “a whole spectrum of 
activity ranging from mere cooperation to ultimate complete unification.”125 
     This is not to say that it undermines the existence of integration. The point is rather that it 
disturbs the assumption of progress and development upon which integration is so often 
constructed, both outside and inside legal scholarship. 
       Another way of putting the same point is that the intrusion narrative might be said to 
cohere with a more traditional and limited vision of the EU’s raison d'être – to bring peace 
and prosperity by means of economic cooperation.126  
     Fundamental rights then, in the intrusion narrative, fit badly, or at least the compatibility is 
too opaque, in relation to European economic integration. The intrusion narrative adheres to a 
vision where the EU and its modus operandi are separable from the protection of fundamental 
rights, a function that is and should be national, and ultima ratio, a task of the ECtHR. The 
contrast with the narrative of improvement is sharp. 
     With this in mind I will try to decode some of the specifics of the narrative of intrusion by 
giving two examples of its possible forms. 
     The first of these is the classic version of the intrusion narrative that focuses on the risk of 
letting the CJEU be the final arbiter on the constitutionality of legislation within the scope of 
EU law.  
     Second, and related to the above-noted preoccupation, I will focus on the version of 
intrusion that centres on the EU and CJEU intruding into national social protection as 
expressed in, or constructed as, social rights.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler 1986, supra note 100 at 12. 
126 For a reconstruction of this view and suggestions for new ways of thinking about the EU’s raison d'être, see 
de Búrca, G 2013, Europe’s Raison D’être, in Kochenov, D and Amtenbrink, F (eds.), The European Union's 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, and see also for a classic 






3.3.1 Intrusion Felt by National Constitutional Courts 
This small section could be a doctoral thesis.127 Here however, a very brief summary of this 
version of intrusion will be given. The ultimate question underlying this story is who decides 
whether measures taken within the scope of EU law are compliant with fundamental rights – 
the CJEU, or the national constitutional courts based on the standards offered by their 
constitutions? 
     The situation in the 1970s European legal landscape, the epoch in which this narrative 
originates, is well known. In broad brush strokes: the EU’s preoccupation was disintegration – 
hypothetically happening when an EU law is struck down on fundamental rights grounds in 
some of its Member States – and the Member States’ preoccupation was intrusion, in the 
shape of a CJEU that lower or alters the standard of protection otherwise offered by the 
national system.128 
     This constituted a transparent accusation of the manner in which the EU and its Court 
overreach in the area of fundamental rights to the point of causing harm to the national system 
and depriving national citizens of the protection they expect from their constitution. 
     The example par excellence of this form of intrusion into national constitutional concerns 
comes from Germany, in the tension between the German constitutional court and the CJEU, 
a dynamic that has developed over the course of the history of European integration.129 This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 127See for examples of published versions of PhD theses on this topic: Claes, M 2005, The National Courts’ 
Mandate in the European Constitution, Hart Publishing, Portland; Tatham, AF 2013, Central European 
Constitutional Courts in the Face of EU Membership: The Influence of the German Model in Hungary and 
Poland, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden. 
128 See for instance, Frowein, JA, Schulhofer, S and Shapiro, M 1986, The Protection of Fundamental Human 
Rights as a Vehicle of Integration, in Cappelletti, M, Seccombe, M and Weiler, JHH (eds.), Integration Through 
Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience. Vol. 1. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1986, p. 233: “it should 
be recognized that fundamental human rights may be protected in a manner which produces clearly 
disintegrative effects. With respect to the EC, this would be the case were a Member State’s Bill of Rights to be 
applied to strike down Community legislation or other acts.”  
129 For different generations of the same conflict see: Davies, B 2012, Resisting the European Court of Justice: 
West Germany's Confrontation with European Law, 1949- 1979, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
Lanier, ER 1988, Solange, Farewell: The Federal German Constitutional Court and the Recognition of the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities as Lawful Judge, Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review 11 (1), pp. 1-28; Reich, N 1996, Judge-made Europe a la carte: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts 
between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana Litigation, European Journal of 
International Law 7 (1),  pp. 103-111; Halberstam, D and Mollers, C 2009, German Constitutional Court says Ja 




clash of titans, as it were, symbolizes the relationship between the CJEU and (what is often 
referred to as) the national constitutional courts.130  
     This has been constructed as the emblematic conflict of EU fundamental rights law 
notwithstanding the fact that not all Member States have constitutional courts or a tradition of 
guaranteeing rights in constitutional documents, rather effecting such guarantees through 
ordinary legislation.131 
     In fact, this version of intrusion – a hard-fought battle of legal reasoning between Courts, 
eventually won (or consistently being almost-won) by the CJEU – is conceived for a legal 
setting with a national constitutional court. Without this the game is hard to play, or at least 
considerably less exciting.   
     Yet this version of intrusion remains a central point of reference in current debates on EU 
fundamental rights law.132 The enactment of the Charter has not changed this. Indeed, some 
have construed case law relating to the Charter as an uneventful continuation of the same 
clash, and the same risk of intrusion.133  
 
3.3.2 Social Protection Intruded Upon 
The idea that there is a tension between EU economic integration and national systems of 
social protection has been thoroughly researched.134  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Kumm, M 1999, Who Is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, Common 
Market Law Review 36 (2), pp. 351-386. 
131 That the ’problem’ of the protection of fundamental rights was actually a German, and to a lesser extent, an 
Italian concern as opposed to a Belgian, French, Luxembourgish or Dutch one, was sustained by Pescatore. 
Pescatore, P 1970, Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the System of the European Communities, American 
Journal of Comparative Law 18, pp. 343-351.  
132 See for instance in relation to newer Member States: Sadurski, W 2008, ‘Solange, chapter 3’: Constitutional 
Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union, European Law Journal 14 (1), pp. 1-35. 
133 Fontanelli, F 2013, Hic Sunt Nationes: The Elusive Limits of the EU Charter and the German Constitutional 
Watchdog: Court of Justice of the European Union: Judgment of 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. 
Hans Åkerberg Fransson., European Constitutional Law Review 9 (2), pp. 315-334. Though there are counter-
arguments to this fear of intrusion, see Sarmiento, D 2013, Who's Afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, 
National Courts and the New Framework of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe, Common Market Law 
Review 50 (5), pp. 1267-1304. 
134 Ball, CA 1996, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and 
Individual Rights under the European Community's Legal Order, Harvard International law Journal 37, pp. 
307-388; Maduro, M 1999, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the 
EU, in The EU and Human Rights, Alston, P, Bustelo M and Heenan J (eds.) Oxford University Press, Oxford; 
Sciarra, S 2002, Market Freedoms and Fundamental Social Rights, in Hepple, BA (ed.), Social and Labour 
Rights in a Global Context: International and Comparative Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; Syrpis, P and Novitz, T 2008, Economic and Social Rights in Conflict: Political and Judicial 
Approaches to their Reconsiliation, European Law Journal 33 (3), pp. 411-427; Giubboni, S 2010, Social Rights 
and Market Freedom in the European Constitution: A Re-Appraisal, European Labor Law Journal, 1 (2), pp. 





     This strand of thinking is a story about the European as the economic and the national as 
the social. And it has been reconstructed multiple times and perhaps needless to say, not only 
by lawyers.135  
     To take one, very on-point example of how this has been framed: ”The ordo-liberal 
European polity consists of a twofold structure: at supranational level, it is committed to 
economic rationality and a system of undistorted competition, while, at national level, 
redistributive (social) policies may be pursued and developed further.”136   
     From a legal perspective, although the “highly problematic extension of jurisdiction into 
areas of social regulation” has been a recurring observation,137 no set of case law is as 
emblematic of this debate as the sister cases Viking (Finland) and Laval (Sweden).138  
     In Viking and Laval the CJEU answers the question whether a collective action (framed by 
the CJEU as the fundamental right to strike), aimed at protecting the interests of workers can 
constitute a justified restriction on the right to freedom of establishment (Viking), and freedom 
of movement of services (Laval). The answer is no.139  
     The no proffered by the CJEU in this instance becomes the epicentre of this version of the 
intrusion narrative. The perennial identification of a tension between the European as the 
economic and the national as the social is gifted a pedagogic example, and the narrative of 
intrusion understandably gains momentum at this moment in time.140  
     Looking closer at the telling of this story, this version of the narrative, centring on how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 See for instance Höpner, M and Schäfer, A 2010, Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three 
Dimensions of European Economic Integration, No. 10/8 MPIfG Discussion Paper; Scharpf, FW 2010, The 
Asymmetry of European Integration, Or Why the EU Cannot be a ‘Social Market Economy’, Socio-economic 
Review 8 (2), pp. 211-250; Algotsson, K-G 2011, De svenska partierna och Lavaldomen, Statsvetenskaplig 
tidskrift 113 (4), pp. 403-422. 
136 Joerges, C and Rödl, F 2009, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European 
Integration: Reflections After the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval, European Law Journal 15 (1), p. 4. 
137 Weiler 1999, supra note 85 at 102. See also Ball 1996, supra note 138, who argues that economic integration 
has happened at the expense of social policy. 
138 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eest ECR [2007] I-10779, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska 
Elektrikerförbundet, ECR [2007] I-11767.  
139 For other commentators who discussed the logical gap between the different treatment of Schmidberger, 
containing a margin of discretion, and Viking/Laval see; Kilpatrick, C 2009, British Jobs for British Workers? 
UK Industrial Action and Free Movement of Services in EU Law, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 16/2009, London School of Economics and Political Science, Law Department, p. 19; Spaventa 2009, 
supra note 82 at 357; Nic Shuibhne 2009, supra note 30 at 234. 
140 For examples from Scandinavian scholarship see: Malmberg J and Sigeman T 2008, Industrial Actions and 
EU Economic Freedoms: The Autonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of 
Justice, Common Market Law Review 45 (4), pp. 1115-1146; Dølvik, JE and Visser J 2009, Free Movement, 
Equal Treatment and Workers' Rights: Can the European Union Solve its Trilemma of Fundamental Principles?, 
Industrial Relations Journal 40 (6), p. 506; Woolfson, C, Thörnqvist, C and Sommers, J 2010, The Swedish 
Model and the Future of Labour Standards after Laval, Industrial Relations Journal 41 (4), pp. 333-350. And see 
further: Davies, ACL 2008, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ, 




national social protection is intruded upon, arguably benefits both from broader framings and 
from not being a limited rights clash-perspective. For example, perhaps as an encounter 
between the “social democratic welfare state regime”141 and the EU’s internal market, or 
being framed in a broader discourse on the EU’s eastward enlargement and stubborn 
Scandinavian protectionism. 
     In contrast, framing it as a strict conflict between fundamental social rights and 
fundamental freedoms might provide strong support for the argument that the CJEU 
adjudicates cases involving social rights in an intrusive way, at the possible risk however of 
important nuances being lost.142 
     Notwithstanding the merit of criticism of these cases and overwhelming agreement that the 
cases were wrongly decided, the question is whether this narrative of intrusion overshadows 
other readings of how fundamental social rights are adjudicated by the CJEU. Without 
challenging the critical observation in this line of commentary, one could ask whether it 
represents the rule or the exception. Is this version of the intrusion narrative constructed on an 
extreme case or an emblematic case?  
     Writing in 2015 it is difficult not to try to frame the manner in which EU crisis 
management, heavily dominated by austerity doctrine, fits into the well-established narrative 
of European intrusion in the area of social rights protection shown above.  
     The economic crisis and subsequent EU crisis management has shown that when the EU 
expands its involvement into new areas of law and policy, such as fiscal discipline and the 
design of national budgets,143 the CJEU’s refusal to engage in reviewing these measures on 
fundamental rights grounds risks altering the standards of both EU and national fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Esping-Andersen, G 1990, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, p. 
27. It is worth noting that amongst the people who voted yes to Swedish membership in the European 
Communities back in 1994, a majority was convinced that whilst the EU would have a positive impact on the 
economy it would have a negative impact on social protection. The people who voted no, on the other hand, 
were convinced it would be bad for both. Oskarson, M 1996, Väljarnas vågskålar, in Gilljam, M and Holmberg, 
S (eds.) Ett knappt ja till EU: Väljarna och folkomröstningen 1994, Nordsteds Juridik, Stockholm, p. 132. This 
shows that sentiments held by swedes at the time of accession is a succinct illustration of this version of the 
intrusion narrative and forms the cultural setting for what were to become an important discourse in, but not 
limited to, Scandinavian legal scholarship. See further Hansen, L and Wæver, O 2003, European Integration and 
National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, London; New York. 
142 In Tuori’s words the ”functional primacy of the economic constitution is manifested by the manner in which 
these clashes are framed as legal issues.” Tuori, K 2010, The Many Constitutions of Europe, in Tuori, K and 
Sankari, S (eds.) The Many Constitutions of Europe, Ashgate, Burlington, p. 8. See for such framings Reich, N 
2008, Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union: The Laval and Viking Cases Before the European 
Court of Justice, German Law Journal 9, pp. 125-143; Hinarejos, A 2008, Laval and Viking: The Right to 
Collective Action Versus EU Fundamental Freedoms, Human Rights Law Review 8 (4), pp. 714-729; Syrpis and 
Novitz 2008, supra note 134; Lo Faro, A 2008, Social Rights and Economic Freedom in the Internal Market: 
Some Brief Notes on" Laval" and" Viking," Lavoro e diritto 22 (1), pp. 63-96; Giubboni 2010, supra note 134.	  
143 See further Dawson, M and De Witte, F 2013, Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis, The 




rights protection.144 Whether this can possibly be described as yet another representation of 
the EU as the intrusively economic and the national as the intruded upon social, or whether 
these events will alter and change the Viking and Laval-based version of the intrusion 
narrative, is a question that is open for debate. 
 
 
3.4 The Narrative of Diversity 
 
Judge Koen Lenaerts, President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (at the time of 
writing), has stated that the Court’s case law embodies the idea of unity in diversity.145 
     What is unity in diversity? Sticking to a surface-understanding of its meaning, it is a phrase 
that has been coined and used as a positive description of the European Union – the rationale 
being that all its members are different but still united and that this is the way it should be.146 
And it has been utilized as a way of succinctly assuring whoever needs to be assured, that 
nation-state Europe is not gone – it is just organized in constructive unity. Here, diversity is 
very much a product of the idea of difference between states and their peoples and cultures, a 
notion closely linked to the idea of the nation-state.147   
     I reflect on the unity in diversity slogan and the way in which it has been used because it 
fits nicely with the core of the diversity narrative, which is a story that aims to account for 
how the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication respects, but more importantly, should 
respect, whatever diversity is to be found in national modes of protecting fundamental rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 See Kilpatrick, C and De Witte, B (eds.) 2014, Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of 
Fundamental Rights’ Challenges, EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/05; Groppi T, Spigno I and Vizioli N 2013, 
The Constitutional Consequences of the Financial Crisis in Italy, in Contiades, X (ed.), Constitutions in the 
Global Financial Crisis. A Comparative Analysis, Ashgate, Burlington, pp. 89-113; Kilpatrick, C 2015, 
Constitutions, social rights and sovereign debt states in Europe: a challenging new area of constitutional 
inquiry, EUI WP LAW 2015/34.  
145 During the keynote speech at the Columbia Journal of European Law’s 20th Anniversary Gala in April 2014. 
It was entitled “To say what the law of the EU is: Methods of interpretation and the European Court of Justice.”  
146 In 2004, the motto was written into the failed European Constitution Article I-8 about the EU's symbols and 
read ”The motto of the Union shall be: 'United in diversity.'” According to the EU website 
(http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm, accessed on 4 May 2015) it is the 
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cultures, traditions and languages.” Key operatives of the European institutions often use it as a way of showing 
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new narrative for Europe" where he said: ”Europe has a soul, and that soul is its civilisation in all its rich 
creativity, its unity in diversity and, even, its contradictions.” EC SPEECH/13/357, 23/04/2013. Appearing 
before MEPs as the candidate nominated by the Member States at the European Council in late June 2014, Jean-
Claude Juncker gave a speech listing “unity in diversity” as one of the 10 guidelines for EU. 
147 Habermas, J 1996, The European Nation State. Its Achievements and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future 




     In other words, the idea underpinning the diversity narrative is that the national modes of 
protecting fundamental rights, most notably but not exclusively found in written constitutions, 
are different and that such difference should be treasured. At the heart one finds the 
conviction that the Union should not eliminate the diversity of its members. 148  
     Almost needless to say then, the diversity narrative rests firmly on the distinction between 
what is European and what is national. In the diversity narrative’s account, the national is the 
non-European. The distinctiveness of the diversified is very much extracted from its contrast 
with the European and so the separability is the starting-point, the method for avoiding a 
clash and in the outcome.149 
     The narrative of diversity is younger than the narrative of intrusion, though they are related 
insofar as their bias tilts towards the sanctuary of the national. While the narrative of intrusion 
always poses a direct challenge to the assumption of progress in the process of integrating 
fundamental rights protection, the diversity narratives seeks to formulate a solution or an 
alternative to the tensions posed by that integration. Therefore, the diversity narrative 
implicitly or explicitly answers some of the questions posed by the intrusion narrative.150 Still, 
the diversity narrative maintains the same recurrent identification of a euro-national 
dichotomy.  
     The EU law diversity narrative, especially when it tells the fundamental rights story, 
ranges from the celebratory and descriptive to the normative and has, it is submitted, three 
main moments.  
     First, the initial moment is the original sin, as it were, on which the other two exemplifying 
moments are based. Namely, the construction of a direct link between the Member States, 
their values and their identities on the one hand, and their systems of fundamental rights 
protection on the other.  
     The second moment is represented in the constitutional pluralism discourse that has 
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classic contributions see Rachels, J 1993, The Challenge of Cultural Relativism, The Elements of Moral 
Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, New York, p. 15-29; Renteln, AD 1988, Relativism and the Search for Human 
Rights, American Anthropologist 90 (1), pp. 56-72. 
149  Maduro, M 2012, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism, in Avbelj, M and Komárek, J (eds.) 
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worked as a mobilising and organising framework for the establishment of the dominance of 
the diversity narrative, and which is based on the idea of the plausibility of uniqueness in the 
Member States modes of protecting fundamental rights.  
     The third moment, based on the first move and closely related to the constitutional 
pluralism discourse, takes the form of interest in the idea of national constitutional identity. 
This is rooted and focused on article 4.2 TEU and the CJEU’s fundamental rights 
jurisprudence.  
 
3.4.1 Fundamental Rights as Values and Identity 
The idea that the difference between states is reflected in the difference between what these 
states value, which in turn is expressed in their systems of fundamental rights protection, is a 
crucial logic underpinning the diversity narrative.  
     It is this rationale that supports the diversity narrative’s claim that the national modes of 
protecting fundamental rights, most notably written constitutions, is or should be respected 
because they are the expression of something unique. Hence the member state’s distinctness is 
reassuringly protected by virtue of respect for its legalistic expression.  
     In the context of post World War Two Europe the connection between values and rights 
appears forcefully in the work of Cappelletti, a legal academic prone to improvement 
narrative. He understood constitutions as expressing the “positivization” of higher values and 
judicial review as the method for rendering these values effective, inside and outside of the 
state.151 Yet Cappelletti did not emphasize the national uniqueness of these values, rather the 
opposite. He identified “converging trends” in the proliferation of fundamental rights and 
judicial review throughout the European countries.152 Cappelletti thus makes the first move - 
rights are an expression of values. However the next step – rights are an expression of values 
unique to their national context, is taken by Weiler.   
     In classic and eloquent expression of the seemingly linear connection between states, their 
difference, their values, their identity, and their fundamental rights, Weiler presents the 
analytical pairing of “fundamental rights and fundamental boundaries.” The basic claim 
guiding this framing is that:  
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“ (…) beyond a certain core, reflected in Europe by the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the definition of fundamental human rights often differs 
from polity to polity. These differences, I shall argue, reflect fundamental societal 
choices and form an important part in the different identities of polities and 
societies. They are often part of social identity about which people care a great deal. 
What menu and flavour of human rights are chosen in the Community context 
matters and can become a source of tension even absent direct conflict of norms. 
The choice of human rights is about the choice of fundamental values so the stakes 
are rather high.” 153 
   
     This piece was published in 1999, just before Advocate Generals154 and commentators 
writing about constitutional pluralism and national constitutional identities started to 
operationalize this assumption of a foundational connection between Member States’ 
difference, their identities, their values and their fundamental rights more vigorously.155  
 
3.4.2 Constitutional Pluralism 
The notion of diversity, or better still, a community of distinct national diversities is 
interlinked with the rich literature on constitutional pluralism – an unavoidable point of 
reference for diversity narrators.  
     The core meaning of constitutional pluralism seems to be that more that one constitution 
should be able to exist at the same time in a given legal context. As such it rejects, in sharp 
contrast to the improvement narrators, hierarchy between these coexisting constitutions. I 
will, somewhat artificially, describe the three main routes by which constitutional pluralism 
may be arrived at as a conclusion.  
     First the solution to conflict-route:156 constitutional pluralism is a response to the fear of 
intrusion in connection with a constitutional conflict between the CJEU and a national 
constitutional order.  
     The second route is the epistemic-route: constitutional pluralism is what best describes the 
EU’s constitutional order both as it is,157 and to varying extents as it should be.158 Maduro is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Weiler 1986, supra note 77 at 102. 
154 In more general terms see Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-112/00, Schmidberger, delivered on 11 July 2002: 
“divergencies between the fundamental rights catalogue of the Member States, which often reflects the history 
and particular political culture of a Member State;” More on point see Opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-213/07, 
Michaniki, delivered on 8 October 2008, p.31. 
155 It is noteworthy that Weiler in his later work develops a critique of constitutional pluralism. See Weiler, JHH 
2011, Prologue: Global and Pluralist Constitutionalism—Some Doubts, in de Búrca, G and Weiler, JHH (eds.), 
The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
156 Kumm, M 2005, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before 
and After the Constitutional Treaty, European Law Journal 11 (3), pp. 262-307; Baquero Cruz, J 2008, The 
Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement, European Law Journal 14 (4), pp. 389-422. See 
also Maduro 2012, supra note 149 at 72;“It must be recognized, however, that it has been the risks of 





the most prominent supporter of an understanding of constitutional pluralism as both 
epistemic and normative at the same time. In other words, as a framework that both embraces 
and regulates the nature of the European Union. 
     A third route, adopted most prominently by Walker in his earlier writing, is the necessity-
route:159 constitutional pluralism as the only possible option in a world that is not what it used 
to be when national constitutions were created. In other words, state-centred constitutionalism 
is gone and this new constitutional era demands a vision less focused on hierarchy to 
accommodate a multi-level, fragmented world. 
     These three routes, albeit distinct, are interlinked. Separating them is useful however 
because it illustrates the far-reaching ambitions of this version of the diversity narrative. 
Indeed, the attractive feature of this line of scholarship is that it seems to at the same time 
solve a classic EU law conflict, describe the European Union as it is, describe the European 
Union as it should be, and respond to a world that is changing. The ultimate means of 
achieving all of this is the operationalization of the value of diversity, turning it into a 
determinate criterion for the organization of constitutions, and favouring it over hierarchy.160  
     Following MacCormick, as many of these diversity narrators did, constitutional pluralism 
discourse evolved out of a two-options-paradigm of either choosing the way back to 
sovereign nation states, or the way forward to a massively centralised EU.161  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 For a good example of what it might look like to embrace constitutional pluralism as a description of the EU 
but doubting whether it is ”normatively attractive” see, Komárek, J 2012 Institutional Dimensions of 
Constitutional Pluralism, in Avbelj, M and Komárek, J (eds.) Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union 
and Beyond, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 232. 
158 This position is argued for first and foremost by Maduro. See Maduro, M 2003, Contrapunctual Law: 
Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in Walker, N (ed.), Sovreignity in Transistion, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford; Maduro, M 2009, Courts and Pluralism. Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of 
Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in Dunoff, JL and Trachtman, JP (eds.) Ruling the world?: 
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 
Maduro 2012, supra note 149 at 68: ”Some understand it, in fact, simply as theory regulating conflicts of 
constitutional authority. In other words, constitutional pluralism would not define the identity of European 
constitutionalism itself but the nature of its relationship with other constitutional orders (national and, possibly, 
international). In this piece, I want to discuss the real potential of constitutional pluralism as a constitutional 
theory. I conceive constitutional pluralism not only as remedy for constitutional conflicts of authority but as the 
theory that can best embrace and regulate the nature of the European Union polity.” 
159 Walker, N 2002, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism The Modern Law Review 65 (3), pp. 317-359.  
160 See for further discussion on the feasibility of constitutional pluralism’s rejection of hierarchy Walker, N 
2012, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context, in Avbelj, M and Komárek, J, Constitutional 
Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Weiler 2011, supra note 155. 
161 MacCormick, N 1993, Beyond the Sovereign State, The Modern Law Review 56 (1), p. 17: “we can only 
either go forward or go back – lateral thinking or movement will be out of the question. Either we are fated to go 
forward to a situation in which there is a massively centralised European Community which takes over the 
dominant place in legal imagination. (…) That we may call the way forward. The other way would be the way 
back. No doubt many are tempted by it. The siren voices urge us to go back to the good old world in which we 
did not face the loss of sovereignty through its being granted somewhere else. ”In the same paper on page 5 he 
also writes: ”One thing which it is necessary for jurisprudence or the philosophy of law to do in the present state 




     Yet the condition of existing in more than one part or form, the essence of pluralism, is 
constrained by the insistence on the nation-state as the essential unit of the pluralist 
structure.162 In contrast one could think about other forms of diversity, for instance based on 
ethnicity or class, in people living within the same state. This is a view akin to that adopted by 
the strategic litigation-focused improvement narrators in their understanding of the nation-
state as disabling rather than enabling diverse societies.  
     Resnik writes of US federalism: ”Appreciation of federalism’s pluralism ought not, 
however, be translated into complacency that federalism is a mechanism that will result in the 
production of other norms central to liberalism, such as equality, dignity, and fair treatment of 
all persons. The consequences of federalism’s toleration—and sometimes its celebration—of 
differences through the endowment of authority to various political sectors (be they states, 
provinces, länders, cities, indigenous nations, or linguistic or other minorities) does not, 
intrinsically, produce liberal commitments or preclude illiberal outcomes.” 163 
     In constitutional pluralism discourse such preoccupations are not raised, the focus is on the 
importance of existing jurisdictional divides and difference between states.164 All of this 
stains the prima facie potential for unconditioned, non-territorial human diversity.  
     In other words, the diversity-value is so closely connected to the state entity that all other 
possible ways of expressing diversity (or unity for that matter) are effectively suffocated. This 
move towards celebrating the national constitution as a guarantee of pluralistic diversity paves 
the way for the more outright nationalistic rhetoric in the line of scholarship that elaborates 
the concept of national constitutional identity.  
     In sum, I argue that scholarly investigation on sovereignty’s evolving role in modern 
transnational constitutionalism (following MacCormick) has as of late become a source of 
inspiration for commentary that is interested in pursuing an analysis that draws on the logics 
of nationalism. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
things.” He develops these ideas further in MacCormick, N 1995, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 
European Law Journal 1 (3), pp. 259-266; MacCormick, N 1995, Sovereignty: Myth and Reality, Scottish 
Affairs 11, pp. 1-13. 
162 On this point, especially on the drift to particularity and how nationalism is one of its main expressions, see: 
Vincent, A 2002, Nationalism and Particularity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
163 Resnik 2014, supra note 3 at 364. 
164 Bengoetxea, in more general and mild terms, suggests that: ”Constitutional pluralism has heretofore shown 
little interest in those other important sources of plurality, distinct from the constitutional forms, namely cultural, 
social, economic and political normative systems. Perhaps this can be seen as a suggestion for future research 
rather than a criticism of its focus.” see Bengoetxea, J 2014, Rethinking EU Law in the Light of Pluralism and 
Practical Reason, in Maduro, M, Tuori, K and Sankari, S (eds.) Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law 




3.4.3 National Constitutional Identity 
Perhaps the most straightforward version of the diversity narrative is the claim rooted in 
primary law and case law that lately (i.e. the last 10 years or so), the CJEU has begun to 
couch some of its case law involving fundamental rights in a way that respects national 
constitutional identities (and that this is mostly a good thing).165  
      The progenitors of this position have been traced back to provisions in the early treaties, 
but primarily to article 4.2 TEU, which reads in part: “The Union shall respect the equality of 
Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government.”  
     On the face of it, this provision manifests the core of the assumption outlined above: that 
the uniquely national is expressed, inter alia, through constitutional rights protection. It is 
interesting however, to note that the Maastricht Treaty, enacted in 1993, held in article F.1 
that “The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of 
government are founded on the principles of democracy.” Thus, the concept has been around 
for some time without being a cause for commentary, and more importantly perhaps, the 
desire on the part of scholars and advocate generals to operationalize it is definitively a later 
preoccupation. 
     So, what is the legal argument pursued on the basis of article 4.2 and the CJEU’s case law? 
For instance, von Bogdandy and Schill write: 
By focusing national identity on the fundamental political and constitutional 
structures of Member States, Article 4(2) TEU, we argue, provides a perspective for 
overcoming the idea of absolute primacy of EU law and the underlying assumption 
of a hierarchical model for understanding the relationship between EU law and 
domestic constitutional law, because this provision endorses a pluralistic vision of 
the relationship between EU law and domestic constitutional law.166  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Millet, XF 2014, The Respect for National Constitutional Identity in the European Legal Space: An Approach 
to Federalism as Constitutionalism, in Azoulai, L (ed.) The Question of Competence in the European Union, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford; van der Schyff, G 2012, The Constitutional Relationship Between the 
European Union and its Member States: The Role of National Identity in Article 4 (2) TEU, European Law 
Review 37 (5), pp. 563-583; von Bogdandy, A and Schill, S 2011, Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for 
National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty, Common Market Law Review 48 (5), pp. 1417-1453 and the 
contributions to the edited collection National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, see Saiz Amaiz, 
A and Alcoberro Llivina, C 2013, Introduction, in Saiz Amaiz, A and Alcoberro Llivina, C (eds.), National 
Constitutional Identity and European Integration, Intersentia, Cambridge. And for two more sober, not 
necessarily celebratory contributions; Guastaferro, B 2012, Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional 
Conflicts: The Ordinary Functions of the Identity Clause, Yearbook of European Law 31 (1), pp. 263–318 and 
Konstadinidies, T 2010, Constitutional Identity as a Shield and as a Sword: The European Legal Order within 
the Framework of National Constitutional Settlement, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, 13. 




This quote highlights the main ingredients in this line of scholarship (and its affinity with 
constitutional pluralism). Firstly, there is an affirmation that national identity is an essentially 
coherent concept, or at least that it is not considered necessary to contest it in order to conduct 
fruitful analysis. Secondly, article 4.2 and the emerging body of case law referring to that 
article167 are thought to give the concept the gravitas necessary to unsettle,168 or at least 
modify169 the principle of the primacy of EU law, and as a consequence destabilize the strict 
hierarchical relationship between EU and the Member States.170  
     Such inquiry is significantly less concerned with what this insistence on the national 
constitution as the carrier of something uniquely national does to the living condition of the 
Union.171  
     The turn to the concept of national constitutional identities, disguised further and to 
various degrees in the language of non-primacy and pluralism, introduces the logics of 
nationalism into EU fundamental rights discourse.  
     National constitutional identity discourse, just like nationalism, tends to view national 
identity as a coherent concept or, at the very least, as a tangible and understandable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The most recurrent references being, Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein v. Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECR 
[2010] I-13693and C-391/09, Malgožata Runevič-Vardyn and Łukasz Paweł Wardyn v Vilniaus miesto 
savivaldybės administracija and Others, ECR [2011] I-03787. See further chapter 6.4.2.	  
168 Von Bogdandy and Schill 2011, supra note 165; Relating to another treaty but on the same point, Kumm, M 
and Ferreres Comella, V 2005, The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional 
Conflict in the European Union, International Journal of Constitutional Law 3, pp. 473-492. 
169 Millet 2014, supra note 165; Claes, M 2013, National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation?, in Saiz 
Amaiz, A and Alcoberro Llivina, C (eds.), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, 
Intersentia, Cambridge. The status quo like situation where in fact primacy remains although national 
constitutional identity is referred to is illustrated in this pre-Lisbon opinion of AG Maduro in Case C-53/04 
Marrosu and Sardino, delivered on 20 September 2005, p. 40: “Doubtless the national authorities, in particular 
the constitutional courts, should be given the responsibility to define (…) the constitutional identity of the 
Member States which the European Union has undertaken to respect. The fact remains, however, that it is the 
duty of the Court of Justice to ensure that that assessment is made in accordance with the fundamental rights and 
objectives with which it must ensure compliance within the Community context.” 
170 In the introduction to Saiz Amaiz and Alcoberro Llivina 2013, supra note 165 the editors state that national 
constitutional identity caters to ”the Member States’ need to limit the EU’s claim for original authority on one 
hand without falling back into the traditional sovereignty narrative or impeding further integration on the other.” 
171 Advocate General Cruz Villalón express such concerns in his opinion in Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and others 
v Deutscher Bundestag, delivered on 14 January 2015, paras. 59 - 60: “The first is that it seems to me an all but 
impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, 
ill-defined and virtually at the discretion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category 
described as ‘constitutional identity’. That is particularly the case if that ‘constitutional identity’ is stated to be 
different from the ‘national identity’ referred to in Article 4(2) TEU. 
Such a ‘reservation of identity’, independently formed and interpreted by the competent — often judicial — 
bodies of the Member States (of which, it need hardly be recalled, there are currently 28) would very probably 
leave the EU legal order in a subordinate position, at least in qualitative terms. Without going into details, and 
without seeking to pass judgment, I think that the characteristics of the case before us may provide a good 




concept. 172  Nationalism mainly extracts national identity from people with the “right” 
nationality – discerning similarities in their behavioural characteristics, their language, and 
their traditions. National identity constitutionalism in contrast, extracts national identity from 
the constitutions. 
     Both of these “extractions” represent the tightening of a problematic relationship between 
the values of nationalism and the state.173 It is important to observe how this version of the 
diversity narrative reconnects to the classic nationalistic modus operandi – equating what is 
foundational for a state, such as its “citizen” or its constitution, with “national identity.”174 
     While this latest generation of the diversity narrative could be understood to reintroduce 
the “rampant red line of nationalism” into EU fundamental rights law discourse, the narrators 
themselves tend to refer to their interest in the concepts of national constitutional pluralism as 
a “pluralistic vision” of the EU. 175 There is a disguised resurgence of the idea of the uniquely 
national that, as we know, has been used time and again to define and condition the life of 
Europe and now, apparently, fundamental rights protection in the European Union. Against 
this background, it should be observed that in terms of timing, the turn to national 
constitutional identity discourse (around the 2000’s) parallels the intensified interest in 
nationalism in the European parliament as well as national parliaments. 
 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks: Binary-Based Discourse 
 
The most important reason for this reconstruction of dominant narratives in discourse on the 
CJEU’s adjudication of fundamental rights is the necessity of formulating how and why they 
contrast with the operation of the margin of discretion-technique.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Not to say that its exact definition is not up for debate within the sub-field, see the introduction in Saiz Amaiz 
and Alcoberro Llivina 2013, supra note 165 where the editors write that: ”Scholars, judges and advocates general 
have rendered the concept currently so fashionable and yet so ambivalent that an in-depth analysis putting some 
order into the intense debate over constitutional identity is warranted.”  
173 Guibernau, M 2007, The Identity of Nations, Polity, Cambridge, p.23: ”Most literature on national identity 
tends to define it as a property shared by citizens of a nation-state. I argue that this is an incorrect assumption 
based upon the common error of conflating nation and state.” See also Besselink, LFM 2010, National and 
Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, Utrecht Law Review, 44 (6), pp. 42. This article was published 
in a special issue on Euroscepticism and Multiculturalism. 
174 Needless to say, it is at odds with the ideas of the EU as an opportunity for “dissociation between the juridical 
order of the political community and the cultural, historical and geographical order of national identities.” See 
Lacroix, J 2002, For a European Constitutional Patriotism, Political Studies 50 (5), p. 946. See further Habermas 
1996, supra note 147. 
175 Smith, AD 1998, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nation and 




       The first main contrast is the reliance on the euro-national binary, expressed as an 
understanding of the European and the national as two separate spheres. This is a current that 
runs through all three narratives. In sum, in the area of fundamental rights protection, either 
the EU sphere improves, or it unduly intrudes into, the national legal sphere. Alternatively, 
the two spheres remain or should remain separate altogether. The logic supporting this type of 
analysis is that within EU fundamental rights protection the euro-national binary is a 
categorization that exists both ex ante and ex post a European fundamental rights conflict.  
     In the improvement narrative the CJEU’s adjudication of EU fundamental rights sources 
improves the national standard of protection by modifying or replacing them with a common 
European standard. The CJEU’s superiority is a possibility for constructive societal change.  
      In the intrusion narrative, the CJEU’s adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights 
negatively affects the national system of fundamental rights protection. Here, the hierarchical 
relationship between the CJEU and national courts is accepted but heavily criticised. 
       In the diversity narrative, the CJEU’s adjudication ought to respect the integrity of the 
national sources. In contrast to the other two narratives, the existence of hierarchy is rejected. 
     Set against the logics of these three narratives then, the CJEU’s use of the margin of 
discretion-technique destabilizes the binary by engaging, to various degrees, the competent 
national authority in the elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights 
protection. I argue that even if the European and the national exists ex ante, my concern is the 
way in which the distinctiveness of the national and European identities of the sources 


















4. A Method for Studying the CJEU’s Use of Margins of Discretion in 
Fundamental Rights Adjudication 
 
 
4.1 Finding the Margin of Discretion-Technique 
 
4.1.1 Identifying the Research Object 
Within the European Union and elsewhere, the use of margins of discretion in adjudication is 
triggered by jurisdictional overlaps and shared commitment to norms. This minimalist 
understanding of the origins of this technique, which I presented at the outset, serves to avoid 
defining the technique in direct relation to any specific function or objective a priori. The 
reconstruction of the narratives of improvement, intrusion and diversity, in turn serve to 
destabilize the dominance, of the euro-national binary as a necessary function of the CJEU’s 
adjudication of fundamental rights.   
     I thus maintain that there is no prima facie structure of the margin of discretion-technique 
that conditions it to operate as a separator of subject matters along jurisdictional lines, despite 
the fact that techniques of supranational adjudication that address national decision-makers 
are regularly conceived as upholding jurisdictional boundaries. For instance, and as discussed 
earlier, mainstream commentary on the rationales underpinning the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation-technique represents a view by which subject matters are “bounderied” within 
strict jurisdictional frameworks.  
    All of these considerations are important when providing a definition of “margin of 
discretion,” which ultimately means freeing the analysis from the recurring assumption of 
separation along jurisdictional lines. Specifically, to free it from such assumptions that pertain 
to techniques of supranational adjudication that operationalize national discretion and also to 
free the analysis from assumptions stemming from discourse on the CJEU’s fundamental 
rights adjudication as embodied in the narratives of intrusion, improvement and diversity. In 
turn, this approach facilitates the introduction of the reading I would like to propose, namely 
one which centres on the interconnected decision-making enabled by the margin of discretion-
technique.  
     Accordingly, prior to any analysis of the ultimate function of separation, interconnection 




a superior court of a larger jurisdiction (such as the CJEU), identifies an instance of decision-
making within a smaller jurisdiction (such as a Member State), where the decision-making 
body has or will have discretion to decide on a shared commitment (such as the protection of 
fundamental rights), despite the fact that the CJEU has jurisdiction. 
     In other words, when I look for a “margin of discretion,” I look for a method that the 
CJEU uses to identify instances where a decision-making body within a Member State is 
authorized to decide on a fundamental rights based subject matter within the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction, which is then incorporated into the CJEU’s process of adjudication. In other 
words, national decision-making on an EU fundamental rights law subject matter. I use 
subject matter rather than legal conflict to underline that the national decision-maker to which 
a margin of discretion is analytically attached might be undertaking part of the ordinary work 
of a national administrative body or in a broadly defined policy area, rather than a complex 
case pending before a national constitutional court. Indeed, with the help of a margin of 
discretion the CJEU could identify and incorporate into its adjudicative process a national 
piece of legislation, an administrative decision, or a policy area.  
     A margin of discretion could thus be attached to an instance of decision-making that has 
already taken place, or to an instance of decision-making that will take place in the future. 
Given the topic of this work, these instances of national decision-making have in different 
ways triggered a fundamental rights question. This does not mean that the CJEU’s use of the 
technique is triggered only by questions concerning the protection of fundamental rights, but 
rather that it is the focus of this research project.  
     In sum, this is the thinnest definition of the research object: the margin of discretion is an 
identifier of moments of national decision-making to which the CJEU analytically attaches 
discretion to decide on a shared commitment which is incorporated as such into the CJEU’s 
adjudicative process, despite the CJEU having jurisdiction.   
     As stated at the outset, identifying the research object is only the first step. Subsequently, 
once the core definition is constructed and has served to detect the technique within the 
CJEU’s massive body of case law involving fundamental rights, the question becomes what 
this method produces and what it enables. What is its ultimate function? 
     In this chapter, having provided a core definition of the research object “margin of 
discretion,” I will start by explaining how proportionality review, which is omnipresent in the 
CJEU’s case law, is distinguishable from the margin of discretion-technique, although they 
operate side by side. I will then describe which criteria I have used to select the case law 




discretion that I have constructed, and explain their function. Ultimately, I will illustrate how 
the typologies of uses of margins of discretion points towards an understanding of the 
technique as enabling interconnected decision-making, which blurs the euro-national 
jurisdictional boundaries in the elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights 
protection.   
 
4.1.2 Differentiating Proportionality Review 
The proportionality principle is both a general principle of EU law and a much-studied 
method of adjudication.176 The proportionality principle could be understood as, to various 
extents, discretion-giving in its capacity as a tool of judicial review operationalized by a 
supranational court to review national measures in order to establish whether these are 
proportionate to the aim which they pursue.177 Therefore it is important to draw a distinction 
between the margin of discretion-technique and proportionality review, since both operate in 
similar zones and indeed, as I will show, operate side by side to address the same contested 
measures in many of the cases discussed in this work. 
     On this point of distinguishing between “proportionality and the margin of appreciation,” 
Barak writes, with a generic international setting in mind, that the “rules of proportionality 
leave the legislator an area of discretion encompassing such matters as the need for 
legislation, its purposes, the means adopted for attaining those purposes, and the limits that 
might be imposed on constitutional rights. The legislator may set the relationship among those 
items as long as the rules of proportionality are satisfied; within the zone of proportionality, 
the legislator has freedom of manoeuvre.”178 Whereas the margin of appreciation by contrast 
“affords discretion to national bodies.” 
     Along these lines and still schematically phrased but understood in the EU context, I 
maintain that the margin of discretion identifies a Member State’s measure – a piece of 
legislation, an administrative decision or a broader policy area – as being within a discretional 
space. Thus the national measure is analytically situated within a margin of discretion. In 
contrast, the proportionality principle does not identify an action, such as a piece of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 de Búrca, G 1993, The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, Yearbook of European 
Law 13 (1), pp. 105-150; Ellis, E 1999 (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford. 
177 Barak, A 2012, Proportionality (2), in Rosenfeld, M and Sajó, A (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 748. And with a more pointed framing of the 
proportionality principle as a deliberation-inducing form of constitutional review, Eskridge and Ferejohn 2010, 
supra note 57 at 462. 




legislation, an administrative decision or a broader policy. Instead it is a technique of 
assessment, which reviews national measures. Here lies the fundamental contrast.  
     Proportionality review as performed by the CJEU can be more or less deferential to the 
national decision-maker. The proportionality review of the national measure can even be 
outsourced to the referring national court.179 Yet however loosely the proportionality test is 
constructed, or if the CJEU leaves the national court the possibility of ascertaining 
proportionality of the contested measure, the contested measure itself is being reviewed 
according to certain criteria and it is not constructed as situated within a margin of discretion.  
     Taking a broader view, Barak frames the essential distinction as though the proportionality 
principle “reflects the constitutionality of a limitation on a right from a national point of 
view” while the margin of appreciation “reflects the constitutionality from an international 
perspective.”180  
     Paraphrasing Barak’s distinction, I maintain that the margin of discretion-technique 
coordinates overlapping jurisdictions within a given system of shared commitment by 
identifying moments of national decision-making to be incorporated into the CJEU’s process 
of adjudicating the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection. Proportionality 
review however, will serve to enlighten the national decision-maker on what is to be 
considered a proportionate and therefore permissible action.  
     Yet, as stated above, the margin of discretion-technique and proportionality review 
interact. In such circumstances the proportionality principle is used to review a decision taken 
within a margin of discretion. For instance, when a margin of discretion encompasses a 
national decision understood to balance fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights the 
CJEU can ultimately perform a proportionality review of that decision. Furthermore, when the 
margin of discretion is used to accommodate a national measure deviating from an EU-
sourced fundamental right, the CJEU may ultimately perform a proportionality review of that 
measure. In this way the two techniques meet and the proportionality review can be 
constructed so as to determine the effective discretional zone of the margin of discretion. 
Indeed, the proportionality principle may limit the national discretional space of the margin of 
discretion. This intertwined use of margins of discretions and proportionality review by the 
CJEU, as I will argue below, is yet another indicator pointing towards the interconnected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 See for examples of this Case 302/86, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Denmark, 
ECR [1988] 04607 and Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v 
Heinrich Bauer Verlag ECR [1997] I-03689. 




elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection, which the margin of 
discretion entails.    
     The details of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s simultaneous use of the 
margins of discretion and proportionality principle will be explained in the following 
chapters. 
 
4.1.3 Selecting Case Law 
 It is important to note that the CJEU has never comprehensively elaborated on the criteria 
governing the use of the margin of discretion-technique in fundamental rights cases even 
when the Court has referred to, for instance, a “margin of discretion” or a “margin of 
appreciation.” Accordingly, one must go beyond explicit references to any specific term in 
order to get the best possible picture of when and how the Court uses this technique. This is 
an important clarification in terms of methodological starting point. 
     In other words, it is argued that emphasis should be placed on the substance of the Court’s 
judgment rather than the precise terminology used by the Court in each case. This approach is 
motivated primarily by the CJEU’s lack of elaboration of the terminology it will use to 
indicate that a national instance of decision-making will be within a margin of discretion and 
as such incorporated into the CJEU’s process of adjudication.  
     However, since the subject matter is within the CJEU’s jurisdiction and the CJEU is asked 
to interpret the EU law triggered by the case, any deviation from full interpretative authority 
of the CJEU needs to be signalled by the CJEU. Thus the Court needs to communicate that it 
understands an instance of national decision-making to be incorporated into its own process 
of adjudication of the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection.  
    With this background, three criteria have guided the selection of the case law to be 
analysed in the following chapters: the case must involve a fundamental right as qualified by 
the CJEU (1), the case must reference directly or indirectly, through other cases, margin of 
discretion-language as opposed to a specific term (2), and the case must de facto identify an 
instance of national decision-making, which it will incorporate into its adjudicative process 
(3).  
     The first two criteria are instrumental in the work of searching for case law in Curia and 
Eur-Lex. Which means that they provide the key-words necessary to perform the activity of 
searching for case law.  
    The first criterion (1) concerns the definition of “a case involving fundamental rights.” I do, 




considered a fundamental right. In other words, I do not criticise the CJEU’s own labelling or 
include cases in my analysis which by way of argumentation beyond the CJEU’s own 
language might be constructed as containing a fundamental right. This means that the 
criterion encompasses the CJEU’s adjudication of cases involving fundamental rights in the 
operative parts of the judgements (not merely linguistic references) between 1969, when the 
CJEU first referred to fundamental rights, and 2015.  
     This represents a broad group of cases, which means that the second criterion significantly 
reduces the vastness of the material produced by the first. These two criteria furthermore 
represent two different methods, which are used in parallel. While only analysing case law 
which the CJEU itself has qualified as concerning fundamental rights (non-critical approach), 
I simultaneously use a critical approach vis-à-vis the CJEU’s own labelling of the operation of 
a margin of discretion.  
     This means that in the following chapters I critically evaluate the CJEU’s margin of 
discretion-granting language, yet I rely on the CJEU’s own qualifications in terms of what 
constitutes a fundamental right. Therefore this analysis of the margin of discretion-technique 
lives within the premises of what the CJEU itself understands as its world of fundamental 
rights adjudication.  
     The second criterion of case selection is thus decisively more dynamic than the first 
because it challenges the CJEU’s own language. The second criterion therefore address 
straightforwardly the imperfection of the CJEU’s own labelling and confronts the lack of any 
visible commitment to a comprehensive elaboration of the use of margins of discretion and 
the terminology which would indicate that use. 
     In concrete, criterion number two means that in the following three chapters I only include 
cases with a reference directly or indirectly through other cases to margin of discretion-
language as opposed to a specific term.181 By margin of discretion-language I mean the 
following terms: margin of direction; reasonable margin of discretion; wide margin of 
discretion; margin of appreciation; certain degree of discretion; discretion to decide; certain 
degree of latitude; wide freedom of action; the discretion enjoyed by the national authorities 
in determining; measure of discretion; discretion when determining.182 This is an exhaustive 
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list of the labels that appear in this work and which I interpret to plausibly indicate the 
presence of an operational margin of discretion. These are thus the key words used on EUR-
LEX and Curia within the body of case law that handles fundamental rights in their operative 
parts, as categorized by the CJEU itself. 
     In a few clearly highlighted instances I do study cases without any explicit reference to 
margin of discretion-language, where the case thoroughly refers to other cases with specific 
and precise reference to margins of discretion-language. Or alternatively, where the case in 
question has thoroughly served as a point of reference for future margin of discretion-cases 
with explicit references to margin of discretion-language. This is conceptualized as indirect 
reference to margin of discretion-language. 
     In this vein, the notion of a “line of cases” is recurrent in this work. These cases do tend to 
reference each other and form a line of case law involving fundamental rights with similarly 
organized uses of margins of discretion.  
     To summarize, while the use of the second criterion is based on a critical approach to the 
CJEU’s own language, the criterion is simultaneously based on the assumption that deviation 
from the CJEU’s absolute interpretative authority will be signalled by the Court itself. 
Therefore I have adopted the approach of identifying margin of discretion-language and also 
expanded to cases that reference such language indirectly. 
     Criterion (3) may be described as a safety check. It is in line with the critical approach 
embedded in the second criterion, and it ensures that the margin of discretion-language, 
directly or indirectly referred to, indeed signals the presence of an operational margin of 
discretion. In other words, in each case of direct or indirect reference to margin of discretion-
language, I verify the presence of an actual identification of an instance of national decision-
making, which is to be included as such into the CJEU’s process of adjudication.  
     I illustrate the importance of criteria (2) and (3) by using a quote of the CJEU regarding 
institutional deference. In this quote the CJEU is describing the General Court’s language 
compared to its actual performance of judicial review of the Commission’s actions: “It must 
be noted in that regard that although the General Court repeatedly referred to the ‘discretion,’ 
the ‘substantial margin of discretion’ or the ‘wide discretion’ of the Commission, (…), such 
references did not prevent the General Court from carrying out the full and unrestricted 
review, in law and in fact, required of it.”183 
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     This point summarizes the importance of critically assessing whether language and action 
match. Furthermore, this quote also demonstrates the variability in terminology used, in this 
case by the General Court, to describe the granting of discretion to a specific addressee. Thus 
the CJEU identifies the potential for variation within the margin of discretion-language.  
    In sum, the research object of this work has been traced in the massive body of CJEU case 
law using three criteria:  the case must involve a fundamental right as qualified by the CJEU 
(1), the case must reference directly or indirectly, through other cases, to margin of discretion-
language as opposed to any specific term (2), and the case must de facto identify an instance 
of national decision-making, which is to be incorporated as such into the Court’s adjudicative 
process (3).  
     The cases produced by conducting research according to these guidelines have been 
organized in typologies. The following section introduces these typologies and sets out their 
functions and purposes.  
  
 
4.2 Constructing Margin of Discretion-Typologies 
 
4.2.1 Structure  
The typologies constitute a framework for understanding the richness of the technique. In 
particular, they show how the technique is adaptable and how it enables a set of detailed and 
variegated micro-interactions involving different decision-makers and types of decisions. 
Inevitably, by constructing typologies one implicitly argues that the CJEU’s 
operationalization of the margin of discretion-technique is not best understood as an absolute 
where one formula would satisfyingly capture all the dimensions of its operationalization. 
Instead, constructing typologies means that even though a core definition is identifiable, there 
is variability in the use of the technique, which ought to be singled out. 
     Constructing typologies therefore helps to carve out distinct forms and patterns within the 
core definition, which is, to repeat, a method of adjudication whereby the CJEU identifies an 
instance of decision-making within a Member State and where the decision-making body has 
or will have discretion to decide on a shared commitment, such as the protection of 
fundamental rights, even though the CJEU has jurisdiction.  
     Of course typologies are not ends in themselves, but they do help to answer other 
questions. Specifically, the typologies will answer questions about how certain variables 




variables; the type of measure or legal source to which a margin of discretion is analytically 
attached (an administrative decision, an executive decision, a legislative provision, a policy 
area) and the type of decision-making body responsible for it (an administrative body, an 
executive, the legislator). 
     These variables are intertwined and, importantly, conditioned at the outset by the structure 
of the legal claims and the set of legal sources, including the contested measure, involved in 
that legal conflict. In other words, certain legal claims will trigger certain legal sources and 
the margin of discretion will operate specifically in relation to these sources and engage the 
national decision-makers responsible for them. Hence, the margin of discretion is a source-
sensitive technique of adjudication. This last point will be thoroughly evidenced in the 
following three chapters but it is also the starting point when constructing the typologies.  
     I introduce their characteristics in four steps. I will start by first explaining the legal 
conflict (1), which the margins of discretion address. This means understanding the litigant’s 
claim and the legal sources that such claims typically trigger. Second, I will contextualize the 
legal conflict and delineate where in the EU legal system conflicts of this type are found. I 
refer to this as the EU law geography (2). Third, I will highlight the specific technical 
difficulty in the operation of the margin of discretion. I refer to this as the technicality (3).   
     Ultimately, I provide a set of case law examples (4) of the typology of margin of 
discretion-use. The exemplifications are not streamlined and therefore look different. This is 
so especially since they follow the idea of lines of cases. In other words, the structure 
organically follows the evolution of a specific margin of discretion typology. In some 
instances the lines are very clear and consist only of a few cases and in other instances I have 
had to make a selection due to the vastness of the material. The rationale of each 
exemplification is carefully motivated in the beginning of each chapter.    
     With the help of these four steps, the three typologies presented in this work are the 
deviation margin of discretion, the balance margin of discretion and the compliance margin 
of discretion.  
     The deviation margin of discretion is triggered in a setting where a litigant challenges a 
national measure on the grounds that it violates an EU-sourced fundamental right. The 
deviation margin of discretion then functions so as to accommodate a national deviation form 
the EU-sourced right.  
     The balance margin of discretion handles clashes between EU internal market law 




discretion is attached to a national instance of decision-making understood to have achieved 
balance between these two competing interest. 
     The compliance margin of discretion is operationalized when secondary EU legislation is 
challenged on the grounds that it violates fundamental rights. The compliance margin of 
discretion is addressed to the competent national authority to ensure that the secondary EU 
source is applied in a fundamental rights compliant way.    
     This summary account already illustrates how the deviation margin of discretion handles 
EU-sourced fundamental rights as expressed in primary or secondary law, that the balance 
margin of discretion handles a measure which could be understood to embody a clash 
between EU-sourced fundamental freedoms and a fundamental right, and how the compliance 
margin of discretion handles EU secondary legislation accused of violating fundamental 
rights.  
     Thus the labels deviation, balance and compliance all relate to what the national decision-
making, to which a margin of discretion is designated, is supposed to achieve. Deviation, 
balance and compliance thus represent the purposes of the margin of discretion as formulated 
by the CJEU, and concretely, what should be represented in the outcome of specific national 
decision-making. Hence, deviation, balance and compliance answer the question of why the 
CJEU chooses to operationalize the margin of discretion-technique, and what the national 
decision-maker is supposed to do within its designated margin of discretion.  
     Therefore the typologies truly illustrate the richness of the technique in terms of achieving 
certain outcomes, that in and of themselves go well beyond sorting subject-matters as 
belonging either to the European Union or to any specific Member State.  
     The point of this work is not however, to argue that deviation, balance and compliance 
margins of discretions are the only thinkable typologies of margin of discretion-use. Nor do I 
argue that this work covers every possible margin of discretion-case. For instance, I believe 
that Åkerberg Fransson,184 and the body of admissibility decisions rejecting fundamental 
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rights based challenges to the euro zone crisis measures185 could both be areas within which it 
may prove fruitful to look for the construction of other typologies.  
     I do however argue that the deviation, balance and compliance margins of discretion 
represent at this point in time, the main uses of the margin of discretion-technique in the area 
of fundamental rights. In other words, the typologies presented in this work embody the 
central representations of the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion-technique to adjudicate 
fundamental rights.  
     Beyond this hint of further possible typologies, it is important to note the possibilities as 
well as the limits of typologizing. Young captures this tension when framing the operation of 
typologies as working to “classify previously disjointed features, and present clusters of 
analysis that were previously kept apart. Nonetheless, in advancing new clusters, and the 
insights that they deliver, typologies create blind spots and contradictions, or can operate to 
rationalize the status quo.”186  
     In this vein, typologies draw their possible routes of analysis from the research agenda in 
which they are embedded. In this work the central research question is how are margins of 
discretion used by the CJEU in its adjudication of fundamental rights? 
     As explained before, in order to answer this question a variegated group of case law is 
handled, which cuts through several sectorial distinctions, the analysis expands on areas of 
EU law that are distinct from each other, such as the internal market, the secondary law social 
policy acquis, agricultural policy and immigration law, and hence presents clusters of analysis 
that were previously kept apart. Furthermore, these typologies place different fundamental 
right utilities in the same analytical framework: national constitutional rights, EU secondary 
law rights and EU primary law rights, the latter derived from both the Treaties and the 
Charter. 
     The analysis enabled by these typologies, I argue, gives a fuller picture of the use of 
margins of discretion to adjudicate fundamental rights while simultaneously making the 
detection of more complex patterns of interaction more likely. However it is equally 
important to appreciate that this method of creating typologies that I have used, which focuses 
on what the margin of discretion is designed to do with the legal source in question, is only 
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choose a fundamental rights standard as long as this does not challenge the primacy of EU law. The Court 
therefore opens avenues for critique of the instrumentalism famously described by intrusion-narrators.  
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson and Case C-399/11, Stefano Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, 
both published in the electronic reports of cases. 
185 Kilpatrick and De Witte 2014, supra note 144 and Kilpatrick, C 2014, Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social 
Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?, European Constitutional Law Review 10 (3), pp. 393-421. 




one possible focus. For instance, one could imagine constructing a research question and 
accordingly arranging typologies along the lines of: did the use of margins of discretion 
increase between 1979-2009? Or, how is the margin of discretion-technique used in relation 
to specific fundamental rights?  
     I thus maintain that the research question guides the construction of the typologies. In 
contrast with the rationales of these alternative research questions, the typologies presented in 
this work – deviation, balance, compliance – will not provide detailed statistical knowledge of 
the increasing or decreasing use of the technique. Rather the construction of typologies in this 
work will be an exercise in the re-reading of case law, which reconstructs lines of case law 
that traces the use of margins of discretion back to early fundamental rights litigation.  
     Moreover, I will thus not understand the CJEU’s of the margin of discretion-technique in 
relation to specific fundamental rights, for instance each Charter-right, as is a common line of 
inquiry into the ECtHR’s use of the margin of appreciation. I will only use the right-specific 
approach in the exemplification of the deviation margin of discretion, which notably 
originates in a legal conflict similar to that which the ECtHR is constructed to handle. 
Namely, a litigant challenges a national measure on the grounds that it violates a E(U)ropean 
right. This means that the method used in this work for typologizing the CJEU’s use of 
margins of discretion that originates in the structure of the legal conflict may serve as a model 
for a comparative study of a portion of the CJEU’s use of margins of discretions and the 
ECtHR’s use of the margin(s) of appreciation. As already noted in chapter 2.2.2 however, 
such a comparative study will not be conducted in this work.     
     I started this chapter by extracting assumptions of separation of subject matter along 
jurisdictional lines from the core definition. Now, I will set out how the typologies of 
deviation, balance and compliance open up readings of the margin of discretion-material 
selected that centre on the interconnected decision-making enabled by the technique.    
 
4.2.2 Function: Capturing Interconnected Norm-Articulation Beyond the Euro-
National Binary 
I maintain that already at the outset, the three typologies of deviation, balance and 
compliance, by virtue of their construction destabilize the euro-national dichotomy 
underpinning much of the analysis in important strands of legal thinking on the CJEU’s 
adjudication of fundamental rights. The starting point I take when answering the question of 
how does the CJEU use margins of discretion to adjudicate fundamental rights, is centred on 




on an EU fundamental rights source against a national measure, when an internal market 
fundamental freedom clashes with a fundamental right, and when EU secondary law is 
challenged on fundamental rights grounds. These points of departure allow for inquires which 
inevitably depart from the euro-national binary.  
     Indeed as explained above, notwithstanding their merit and importance binary-based 
questions and starting-points tend to lead away from investigations that seek to establish more 
complex patterns of interconnected forms of norm-articulation that cross jurisdictional 
boundaries. 187  As a result, and as illustrated by the dominant narratives of intrusion, 
improvement and diversity, analysis rooted in the euro-national dichotomy produces a 
categorization that exists both ex ante and ex post a European fundamental rights conflict. By 
this I mean looking for and focusing on the potential conflict between a fundamental rights 
standard of protection that is pertinent to the Member State and a fundamental rights standard 
of protection that is pertinent to the EU. Following this form of euro-national, conflict-
oriented line of inquiry, one ends up both sticking to the binary – indeed the conflict depends 
on the binary – and being drawn to frame EU fundamental rights protection as centred around 
its (perceived) perennial conflict between national rights protection on the one hand and 
European Union rights protection on the other.  
     Instead, by carefully detailing how the operation of the margin of discretion relates 
intimately to the legal source in question in order to achieve deviation, balance or compliance, 
received euro-national categories will be questioned. Which in turns opens up the possibility 
of finding new ways of reading the EU’s fundamental rights material. This is the 
methodological ambition underpinning the reconstruction of the three typologies.  
     In the following three chapters, I will present a reading that centres on the detection of 
interconnected forms of decision-making.  
    Looking at this multitude of sources and decision-makers in one analytical framework, 
hence aligning with the architecture of EU law and the set of legal conflicts it produces, helps 
make clear various patterns of interconnection. From the point of view of supranational 
adjudication, these sources and decision-makers create a web of possibilities for a euro-
national, rather than European or national, formulation of the applicable standard of 
protection.  
     In order to convey the importance of departing from the euro-national binary as clearly as 
possible, the narratives of improvement, intrusion and diversity will be interwoven as points 
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of contrast into the construction of the three typologies. I will show how the respective margin 
of discretion typologies, if studied separately, can perhaps more easily support narratives of 
improvement, intrusion or diversity. I will thus highlight when there is a correspondence 
between a narrative and the structure of a typology. However I will also describe how the 
different typologies represent profound challenges to the rationales of the dominant 
narratives. This will serve to fortify my characterization of the margin of discretion technique 
as an enabler of interconnected elaboration of the applicable standards of protection, which ex 
post facto an EU fundamental rights conflict, blurs jurisdictional boundaries. 
     This inquiry has important analogues in literature on transnational law and global 
pluralism. For instance, paralleling this dynamic, Glenn asks the question: “How is the 
transnational hampered by binary thought and logic and how might such a profoundly 
anchored manner of thought be overcome?”188  
     Berman gives one possible answer when he outlines his vision for a research agenda in the 
context of international legal pluralism, namely one that “emphasizes the micro-interactions 
among different normative systems. Such a case study approach would serve as a contrast to 
rational choice and other forms of more abstract modelling, by focusing instead on thick 
description of the ways in which various procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
actually operate as sites of contestation and creative innovation.”189  
     In sum, constructing margin of discretion-typologies along the lines of the legal conflict, 
and consequently the sources triggered, frees the analysis in such a way as to go beyond the 
euro-national binary.  I argue that whatever its relative merit, boundary-driven analysis of the 
EU fundamental rights protection space has overshadowed other possible readings and 
organizational frames. Perhaps most importantly, at the expense of readings that focus on the 
collaborative and interconnected nature of EU fundamental rights protection, where the use of 
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5. The Deviation Margin of Discretion 
 
* 
In this chapter I will look at how national margins of discretion are used to deviate from a 
fundamental right protected in a European Union legal source. The common core of these 
cases is that a litigant argues that a Member State’s measure potentially violates an EU 
fundamental right, and a margin of discretion is used to accommodate that norm-deviating 
national measure.  
     The contested national measure could be a piece of national legislation, national policy or 
acts taken by public employers.190 As such, the margin of discretion is directed towards 
legislative and policy-making bodies within the Member State and covers subject matters or 
broad policy areas, as opposed to for instance, specific administrative decisions.  
     The questions of rights violation that drive this type of case are typically posed by 
individuals who assume that the EU fundamental rights apparatus will give them stronger 
protection then their own state. Indeed, this is the situation cherished by the improvement 
narrators, where a litigant manoeuvres two legal systems to which he or she belongs, aiming 
to let the supranational improve the national.  
     Instead of unilateral EU rights enforcement however, I will consider examples of how 
national discretion is used to formulate acceptable norm-deviations and how the output of this 
national participation becomes an important component in the elaboration of the applicable 
standard of protection of the EU fundamental rights source. In other words, the structure of 
the deviation margin of discretion lives in a symbiotic relationship with the EU fundamental 
rights source. 
     I will study this type of EU fundamental rights conflict using the family of EU sex equality 
rights. This case study has the benefit of being understood as a prime example of EU rights 
enforcement, particularly by improvement narrators. Therefore studying national margins of 
discretion in this context is particularly instructive for laying out how the national is involved 
in formulating the standard of EU fundamental rights protection.  
     The principle of equal treatment is regulated in detail in a set of EU sources, particularly in 
secondary law, and the margin of discretion, as will be shown, relates closely to the wording 
of these directives, in particular their derogation provisions. The source-sensitivity of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




deviation margin of discretion makes the analysis of the form and shape of the margin of 
discretion more complex to detect and, once detected, less generalizable. 
     I have searched for margins of discretion within case law where litigants rely on their 
fundamental right to equal treatment between men and women in employment and 
occupation, as regards matters of social security, pay, the self-employed, in access to and 
supply of goods and services, and to their fundamental rights to maternity and parental leave.  
     Within this material, already extracted from a vast body of sex equality case law, I have 
identified three main lines of case law. I will start by looking at the right to protection from 
direct discrimination and how national deviations excluding women from the sphere of 
violence and men from the sphere of childcare have been accommodated using a national 
margin of discretion (1). These two themes will be discussed separately, albeit they bear a 
close resemblance. Then I will turn to the right to be protected from indirect discrimination 
and study a line of case law where the national social policy with a priori discriminatory 
effects have been constructed as being within a margin of discretion (2). Finally I will 
investigate the way in which a deviation margin of discretion has been used to constrain the 
right to maternal leave and paternal leave (3). 
     In sum, this chapter will show how national decision-makers have been involved, 
throughout the history of EU sex equality rights promotion, in the formulation of the 
applicable standard of protection.  
 
 
5.1 Legal Conflict: A litigant relies on an EU fundamental rights source against a national 
measure 
 
The origin of national margins of discretion, I stated earlier, is the fact of people living in 
overlapping jurisdictions. Here, my interest lies in the type of case where individuals become 
litigants and seek to use this overlap to show that the smaller units in which they live violate a 
right guaranteed by the larger unit.  It is a quintessential supra-national fundamental rights 
conflict, cherished by those who, like the improvement narrators, understand judicial review 
by supranational courts as a possibility for betterment of the individual’s fundamental rights 
protection.191 These cases are therefore important testimonies about the working of EU 
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Revenue Administration, ECR [1963] I-209: ”the vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights 




fundamental rights from a litigant’s perspective - will the EU’s court correct national actions 
and establish that the individual was right in thinking that the EU gives a higher standard of 
protection? Or will it not?  
     This is, as has already been pointed out, a similar legal conflict to that which the ECtHR 
was created to handle. It asks to what extent a national deviation from a European (Union) 
right can be accepted. Hence, it is a similar context of legal conflict to that within which the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation is operationalized.  
    I have outlined the rationales of the mainstream commentary on the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation according to which the technique works to organize subject matters along 
jurisdictional lines. In contrast, and as will be explained below, the CJEU’s deviation margin 
of discretion lives in a symbiotic relationship with secondary legislation in which a grand part 
of sex equality rights, as well as EU fundamental rights in general, are sourced. This detailed 
and source-sensitive operation of the deviance margin of discretion is therefore more intricate 
than the logics of mainstream commentary on the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation. In sum, 
even though the underlying legal conflict is similar, the CJEU’s deviance margin of 
discretion, as distinct from the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation, relates to detailed sources in 
a way that conditions its shape. This point will be developed further in this chapter. 
     The question of rights violation that drives this line of case law, posed by individuals who 
assume that the EU fundamental rights apparatus will give them stronger protection than their 
own state,192 does not mean that the right concerned is not protected on the national level. 
Importantly though, the protection might be formulated in a different way, be perceived by 
the litigant as covering them to a lesser extent and so forth. This means however, that in the 
cases discussed here, the right relied upon by the litigant is an EU-sourced right, derivable 
from primary law, secondary law and the Charter. 193 Hence, the EU fundamental rights 
source is the EU law trigger in the case. 
     Therefore the cases discussed in this chapter concern an area of law where the EU has 
played a visible role in progressively promoting fundamental rights protection.  
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192 Alternatively, the Commission might bring infringement procedures (article 258 TFEU) the CJEU may 
establish that the national decision-maker has a margin of discretion and as such does not violate EU law. 
193 As an exception, however, it should be noted that if a litigant seeks to rely on a Charter right not guaranteed 
in primary or secondary law sources, he or she needs to argue that the Member States implement EU law in the 
conflict-situation concerned. After Åkerberg Fransson implement is equivalent to being within the scope of EU 




5.2 EU Law Geography: The Sex Equality Case Study 
 
Testing the use of national discretion in cases where an individual relies on an EU-sourced 
right to strike down a national measure could be an exercise covering a wide and diverse 
policy area. For instance, immigration law, data protection, environmental law and criminal 
law are fundamental rights areas where there are significant pieces of EU sources that contain, 
inter alia, individual fundamental rights.  
     In this section however, the use of national discretion will be tested within the group of 
rights constituting the EU’s enforcement of sex equality. Namely, the right to equal treatment 
between men and women in employment and occupation, as regards matters of social 
security, pay, the self-employed, and in access to and supply of goods and services. Also 
included in this group of rights aiming to establish equal treatment of working men and 
women are the right to maternity leave and the right to parental leave.194 Craig and de Búrca 
refer to the secondary sources of the above-mentioned sex equality rights as the Gender 
Directives.195 
     The motivation for this choice of case study is that EU law on equal treatment between 
men and women has a solid historic trajectory within the EU’s fundamental rights system (1), 
these rights are sourced multiply and secondary sources are of central importance, which 
reflects the standard EU fundamental rights framework (2), and “equal treatment” has 
triggered narratives of improvement, yet very little on diversity, which would suggest the 
usefulness of reconstructing a trajectory of deference to national decision-makers (3).  
     Beginning with history (1), equal treatment of working women and men is in the DNA of 
EU fundamental rights protection and has determined its development since the 1970s. This 
might seems like a strong claim but when thinking about the EU as a promoter of 
fundamental rights rather than a respecter or incorporator of national constitutional rights in 
particular, equal treatment in employment as well as social rights more broadly, are 
centrepieces. This point is illustrated by the way in which the fundamental right to property 
played an important role in developing the line of case law where the CJEU elaborated on 
how the EU respects fundamental rights and incorporates national constitutional traditions of 
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195 Craig, P and de Búrca, G 2011, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 





protection.196 In contrast social rights, and in particular the right to equal treatment, have been 
the subject of substantial pieces of EU secondary legislation ever since the 1970s and have 
triggered classic rights-promoting cases such as Defrenne.197 In other words, the early right to 
property cases derived the right to property from national constitutions whereas the rights to 
equal treatment were derived from the EU legal material.  
      As such, the sex equality cluster of rights figures as an affirmative project within the EU 
and as a consequence, social rights as minimum protection of workers and equal treatment are 
normatively entrenched, albeit not uncontested,198 within the EU legal order. 
     The law on equal treatment between men and women with EU genesis are formalized in a 
combination of sources (2), albeit centralized in secondary law. Indeed, primary law, 
secondary law and the Charter together constitute the right to equal treatment between men 
and women in employment and occupation,199 as regards matters of social security,200 pay,201 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel ECR [1970] 01125 and Case 44/79, Liselott Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz ECR [1979] Page 
03727. 
197 For secondary legislation consult the following: Firstly, social rights have been a subject of legislation before 
Maastricht, for instance, Council Directive 75/129/EEC of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to collective redundancies, [1975] OJ L 48; Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access 
to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, [1975] OJ L 39; Council Directive 
77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of 
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, [1977] OJ L 61 and Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 
October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in 
the event of the insolvency of their employer, [1977] OJ L 283. See however Bercusson for how the 
insufficiencies of this body of law led to the adoption of the non-legally binding Charter of Fundamental Social 
Rights for Workers: Bercusson B 1990, The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers, The Modern Law Review 53 (5), pp. 624-642.  Secondly, social rights have been a subject of 
legislation between Maastricht and Lisbon, for instance, Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993, 
concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, [1993] OJ L 307; Council Directive 96/34/EC of 
3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, [1996] 
OJ L 145. And both the directives on collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings were amended in the 
pre-Lisbon period: Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to collective redundancies, [1998] OJ L 225 and Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 
on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the 
event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, [2001] OJ L 82. 
Furthermore, social rights feature prominently in the Charter in the chapters on Equality and, especially, 
Solidarity. 
198 For recent examinations of how EU fundamental social rights based challenges, especially with reference to 
the Charter, have failed to challenge the austerity policies taken in the economic crisis see: Kilpatrick 2014, 
supra note 144 and Kilpatrick, C 2015, On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of 
Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35 (2), p. 333ff. Furthermore, writing 
in 2015, this set of social rights features in the British renegotiations of EU membership.  
199 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation (recast), [1996] OJ L 204 has replaced the classic Directive 76/297/EEC. See article 2 TEU and 8 and 
10 TFEU and the Charter’s chapter on equality and especially article 23.  
200 See Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, [1979] OJ L 6 and article 2 TEU and 8 and 10 




the self-employed202 and in access to and supply of goods and services.203 The right to 
maternity leave204 and parental leave205 also feature in secondary law and the Charter.  
      The EU sex equality framework thus represents the form of source-multiplicity that has 
characterized EU fundamental rights protection since its inception. A general evolution in the 
legal framing of sex equality within the EU project is discernable however; from a tendency 
to think about this set of equal treatment law as EU social policy to an increasing use of 
fundamental rights language.206 The reasons for this evolution represent an interesting inquiry 
in its own right. I will however merely focus on the outcome. 
      The centrality of secondary legislation in the EU’s mode of protection of equal treatment 
as a fundamental right inevitably challenges the ordinary understanding of constitutionalism 
as centred on one bill of rights.207  
     Eskridge and Freejohn, writing on US constitutionalism, take issue with the deeply rooted 
standard account of constitutionalism, namely that legislation does not bind and condition the 
way a constitution does. Hence, this is an idea of constitutionalism that gives rise to an 
understanding of legislation as a weaker form of source and as such as a lesser protection.208  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 The right to equal pay is found in Article 157 TFEU (former article 119 EEC and former article 141 EC) and 
article 23 in the Charter. See Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, [1975] 
OJ L 45 and Chapter 1 of Directive 2006/54. 
202 See Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity, 
[2010] OJ L 180 and article 2 TEU and 8 and 10 TFEU and the Charter’s chapter on equality and especially 
article 23.  
203 See Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, [2004] OJ L 373 and article 2 TEU 
and 8 and 10 TFEU and the Charter’s chapter on equality and especially article 23. This protection clearly goes 
beyond the labour market. 
204  Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or 
are breastfeeding, [1992] OJ L 348 and article 33 of the Charter. 
205 Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental 
leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC, 
[2010] OJ L 68 and article 33 of the Charter. 
206See Di Sarcina, F 2010, L'Europa delle donne: la politica di pari opportunità nella storia dell'integrazione 
europea, 1957-2007, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
207 As discussed in chapter 2.3 however, the idea of one bill of rights for every legal order has never been the 
best description of the EU’s system of fundamental rights protection at large. For a formulation of questions 
guiding such discussion see Eskridge’s and Ferejohn’s examination of statutes and constitutionalism: ”The new 
scholarship increasingly integrates the Constitutional doctrine, statutory interpretation, and administrative law in 
ways that call into question the central role that the Constitution of 1789 and judicial review are thought to play 
in American public law.” Eskridge and Ferejohn 2010, supra note 57 at 61. For an argument about how the 
constitution can live in a closer relationship with people (non-lawyers) by popularising the ”thin constitution” of 
aspirational values and principles, see Tushnet, M 2000, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
208  By contrast, Eskridge and Ferejohn, argue that that “an important institutional difference between 
adjudication (courts) and statutes (legislatures) is that the former normally cannot resolve problems that are 




     The type of conflict situation studied in this section within the supranational setting of the 
EU, however, challenges the notion that legislation lacks the higher-law position that binds 
legislatures, governments, official and courts. Within the EU, and especially in line with the 
principle of supremacy, secondary legislation binds national legislatures and decision-makers. 
This means that from a litigant’s point of view, in his or her quest to strike down a national 
measure EU secondary law functions as higher law. However, as will be evidenced in this 
section, national discretion could be operationalized in the process of adjudication in ways 
that renegotiate the precise conditions for supranational norm compliance.209  
     Moreover, secondary legislation has a structure that allows for a more detailed formulation 
of the fundamental right that it sets out to protect. For instance, questions about how 
discrimination should be detected, how long parental leave should be, and what is a 
permissible derogation from equal treatment feature with greater precision in the secondary 
source. This, as will be evidenced further below, affects the discretional space and the 
structure of the margin of discretion. 
     Given this background, it is noteworthy that “equal treatment in the EU” has triggered 
narratives (3) of improvement, yet very little on diversity. This point would suggest that the 
existence of deferential positions by the CJEU, connected to discourses on constitutional 
pluralism and national constitutional identity, is less examined in this area than the idea of 
using European rights to improve national standards of protection. This relative lack of 
interest in national discretion and equality law within the broader fundamental rights diversity 
discourse makes a study on the operation of national discretion more pertinent.  
     Put together, this creates interesting spaces for a study of the operationalization of the 
margin of discretion-technique in the area of EU sex equality law, and in particular on the 
type of conflict-situation examined in this section.210 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rights as being particularly apt for protection in other forms that in “traditional” bill of rights. Eskridge and 
Ferejohn 2010, supra note 57 at 54. 
209 In this same vein, one could frame the issue of national discretion in the process of adjudication of social 
rights, understood broadly, within the rich (not necessarily European) literature on how ”courts can enforce 
socio-economic rights but should do so in a weak-form or dialogical manner, whereby they point out violations 
of rights but leave the remedies to the political branches.” Landau, D 2012, The Reality of Social Rights 
Enforcement, Harvard International Law Journal 53 (1), p. 192. Although the CJEU’s use of national discretion 
is more multi-faceted than merely leaving the question of remedies to the national legislator, the literature on 
weak review is useful because it highlights and problematizes how fundamental social rights in different legal 
settings have been subjected to less rigorous forms of judicial protection, especially with reference to the 
distinction between negative and positive rights and to the realloctional function of social rights. This is a 
contextualization worth making when thinking about the CJEU’s operationalization of national discretion in the 
adjudication of social rights more broadly. See also Young 2012, supra note 186. 
210 In Young’s work on constituting social right she reasons about how the feasibility of social rights goes 
beyond formal law. Arguably, this thinking represents a classic line of critical inquiry but she argues that such 




5.3 Technicality: Versions of Source-Sensitive Norm Departure 
 
This chapter will study departures from the norm of equal treatment. Within the parameters of 
EU law one finds a set of methods for legitimating a wide range of rule departures.211 When 
the CJEU arranges departures from a fundamental rights norm that it is entrusted to protect, 
hence de facto establishing the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection in the 
case at hand, the deviation margins of discretion may be used to facilitate this process of 
constructing norm-departures. 
     In this way, the use of margins of discretion complements departures already formally 
sustained within the legal system.212 These margins of discretions, in other words, live in a 
close symbiosis with the infrastructure for deviations from norms, such as sex equality, which 
are already structured in the EU legal material. This symbiotic relationship with the 
fundamental rights source represents the technical difficulty, indeed the elusiveness, of the 
deviation margin of discretion. This proximity to the sources means that it is more 
challenging to detect the ultimate function, or indeed the added value of the deviations margin 
of discretion.  
     I will present three lines of cases containing departures from the norm of equal treatment 
facilitated by a margin of discretion. These deviation margins of discretion represent a series 
of enterprises with substantial commonalities, albeit modelled in relation to differently 
structured sources and legal reasoning models.  
     The first version of such deviation margins of discretion deals with departures from the 
right to protection against direct discrimination as sourced in the Equal Treatment Directive 
(ETD) form 1976 (1). I will present two lines of cases in which the CJEU has used a margin 
of discretion to deviate from rights to protection against direct discrimination, while 
connecting its reasoning explicitly to the three derogation-provisions contained in the 
directive: occupational activities where sex constitutes a determining factor by reasons of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is necessary to depart from the study of purely formal law (…). Legal artefacts, including constitutions, statutes, 
human rights treaties, and judicial decisions, purport to give economic and social rights the authority of formal 
law. Reason, through providing the means to answer questions of social significance, universal reciprocity, and 
feasibility of the satisfaction of fundamental material interest, is required to sustain arguments that such interests 
amount to fundamental rights. (…) Under this construction, we are invited to explore the contours of 
interpretation, enforcement, and contestation that constitutes economic and social rights (…)” Young 2012, 
supra note 186 at 289. 
211 Kadish, MR and Kadish, SH 1973, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 184. 




their nature or the context in which they are carried out, provisions protecting women as 
regards pregnancy or maternity, and provisions that regulate positive discrimination.  
     In sum, in these cases the CJEU refers to margins of discretion to indicate a prerogative to 
formulate the circumstances that may trigger one of these three grounds for derogation 
sourced in the directive.213 In cases where women ask for equal access to work that might 
entail violence the CJEU grants a margin of discretion for the formulation of the 
circumstances subsequently understood to fit with the directive’s derogation, which holds that 
where sex constitutes a determining factor for carrying out a specific work for reasons of 
nature or context no equal treatment is required (article 2(2) ETD). In the case of men asking 
for equal access to the care of babies, the margin of discretion is instead attached to national 
formulations of how pregnancy and maternity is best protected (article 2(3) ETD).  
     From the point of view of crystalizing the shape of the margin of discretion, the challenge 
lies in understanding the technique’s symbiosis with the source’s structure and how it 
operates so as to allow the Member States to formulate the circumstances, which the CJEU 
deems to fit the wording of the directive’s derogation provisions. This method is more 
intricate than say, the mere establishment of a division of competence. With the use of a 
margin of discretion, compared to no use of a margin of discretion, the national level is 
explicitly consulted on how acceptable deviations should be formulated.  
     The second version of the deviation margin of discretion in this case study deals with 
departures from the protection against indirect discrimination (2). The protection against 
indirect discrimination based on sex has its own logic whereby the Court first establishes 
whether there is a prima facie indirect discrimination. Which is to say, does a certain measure, 
though formulated in neutral terms, affect one sex more than the other? However, and this is 
the second step, the CJEU will accept this condition, the prima facie discrimination, if it can 
be objectively justified. The deviation margin of discretion encompasses the contested 
measure and its aim, which may ultimately be considered by the CJEU to be objectively 
justified. This means that the margin of discretion fits with the reasoning structure the CJEU 
ordinarily deploys to evaluate a litigant’s claim of indirect discrimination. 
     The third and last version of deviation margin of discretion within the sex equality case 
study (3) works so as to accommodate constraints of the EU-sourced rights to maternity leave 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Somek might be interpreted as arguing along these lines: “Whereas in cases of indirect discrimination 
objective factors are considered in the course of a more or less rigorous application of a proportionality test, 
cases of direct discrimination can be disposed of by evoking one special, and wholly diffuse, objective factor, 
namely the difference in situations. The derogating reason is thus presented as though it resided in the facts 




and parental leave. Again, closely formulating the margin of discretion in connection with the 
wording, the CJEU uses the technique to ultimately constrain the material scope of these 
fundamental rights. In other words, the CJEU involves the national decision-maker in such a 
way as to provide a standard of protection that incorporates the Member State’s reading of 
maternity or parental leave into its own adjudication. Thus, as distinct from the second means 
of handling indirect discrimination, the CJEU understands the EU as advancing a general 
policy aim (for instance the protection of women during pregnancy) and the Member State is 
given a margin of discretion to elaborate on the content of the right (for instance maternity 
leave) as long as it respects the policy aim. This means that the litigant who sought to rely on 
the jurisdictional overlap in order to access a higher protection regulated in the EU sources 
ends up with nothing.  
     In sum, the structure of the secondary sources discussed in this work counts on the 
Member State to organize social policy to which rights to equal treatment may be relatable. 
EU law, like legal systems in general, has mechanisms for legitimizing rule departures and the 
deviation margin of discretion operates and is structured in a way that fits with these.  
     The difficulty with deviation margins of discretion being used in the context of these 
source-sensitive norm departures lies in defining on the one hand when a margin of discretion 
is used to accommodate the norm departure, and on the other when the CJEU can satisfyingly 
solve the case by relying solely on the structure of the secondary source.214 
     This closeness to the source structure thus means that there is a fragile distinction between 
the instances where the CJEU experiences a need to resort to a margin of discretion and the 
instances where the structure of the source itself provides the necessary infrastructure for 
norm-departure. Indeed, this might even be said to be particularly problematic in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 For instance in Kreil, a women and violence case, AG La Pergola sums up case law up to that point which 
contains deviations from the norm of equal treatment motivated by the women and violence and men and babies 
paradigms. In this summary one finds operationalized both margins of discretion and the lack thereof, illustrating 
again the difficulty of immediately identifying the criteria guiding the use of deviation margins of discretion in 
the Court’s case law. See Opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola delivered on 26 October 1999, para 18: 
“In Commission v United Kingdom, respect for patients' sensitivities led the Court to regard as justified certain 
restrictions placed on men only in relation to the activity of midwife. In Johnston, the exclusion of women from 
armed units of the British police stationed in Northern Ireland was permitted because the presence of women 
could have created additional risks of their being assassinated and might therefore have proved incompatible 
with the requirements of public safety, thereby causing harm to local people. In Case 318/86 Commission v 
France, the Court held that it was justified, within the meaning of Article 2(2), to recruit male and female staff 
separately, for both the post of prison warder, which involves regular contact with detainees, and the post of 
head warder, with responsibility for running a prison, in view of the professional experience gained in the corps 
of custodial staff, which is useful for the exercise of an activity that involves managing all the other warders. In 
Sirdar, finally, I concluded that, in principle, a policy of men-only recruitment into the élite corps of the Royal 
Marines appeared to be justified since it could not be ruled out that the admission of women could have an 
adverse effect on the morale and cohesion of the soldiers within the commando units, thereby undermining their 




thoroughly regulated (by EU standards), sex equality fundamental rights field. While this 
choice of case study is useful given that equal treatment is a well known fundamental rights 
achievement, it is equally complex because of the multiple and detailed sourcing. 
     Consequently, these lines of cases, which I have carved out in of a vast body of equal 
treatment case law, are still surrounded by case law where the CJEU allows for deviations 
from the principle of equal treatment but where there is no direct or indirect reference to 
margin of discretion language. I will not comprehensively answer the question of why the 
margin of discretion is not used in certain cases. I will only tentatively note that the deviation 
margin of discretion seems to enter as a supplement when the CJEU appears to consider the 
EU sources as not entirely sufficient to motivate the norm departure ultimately accepted in the 
case. However, as stated earlier, perhaps more important is the output where a margin of 
discretion is used, compared to no use of a margin of discretion - the national level is 
explicitly consulted on how acceptable deviations should be formulated. 
     These specificities mean that even though the structure of the legal conflict to which the 
deviation margin of discretion responds is the same as the legal conflict which the ECtHR’s 
margin of appreciation handles, the CJEU’s deviation margin of discretion is modelled to fit a 
detailed fundamental rights source. These EU secondary-sourced rights, compared to the 
vaguely worded European Convention rights, condition the operationalization of the margin 
of discretion by adapting it to the narrow setting of the source structure.  
     As distinct from the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation, the detailed structured of the EU 
sources invite the national decision-maker to contribute to the CJEU’s elaboration of the 
applicable standard of protection within the specific framework of the source. In contrast, at 
the very least according to mainstream commentary on the ECtHR, the margin of appreciation 
does not attach the national practice to any explicit exit route contained in the Convention, 
rather it separates in its reasoning the subject matter from the European Convention’s world.  
     The deviation margin of discretion, because of its source-sensitive nature, provides 
material to the CJEU’s own fundamental rights interpretation, which is relatable and 
attachable to the EU source.  
     In other words, a subject matter that could be characterized a priori as a national matter 
(violence, babies, social policies), becomes the material that motivates lawful departures from 
the enforcement of the protection of a EU fundamental right. This understanding is further 
substantiated by the CJEU’s own vision of these cases as being within the scope of EU law. 
The CJEU regularly returns to the affirmation that since an EU fundamental right applies to 




of the scope of EU law. In addition, these cases frequently contain references to the evolution 
of EU law such as “Community law as it stands” or “Community law in its current state,” and 
hence alludes to the notion that the acceptability of these deviations might be subjected to 
oversight in the future.  
     In sum, I argue that the better understanding of this interaction is not one which centres on 
upholding a jurisdictional dichotomy, but rather interprets the CJEU’s choice to resort to 
margin of discretion language as an invitation to the national decision-maker to participate in 
the formulation of the applicable standard of protection, which is different from the CJEU 
formulating its own view of the outer limits of EU law. The national formulations, through 
the margin of discretion, become incorporated into the CJEU’s reading of its own 
fundamental rights material. The margin of discretion thus incorporates the circumstances 
constituting norm deviation into the framework of the EU source. 
 
 
5.4 Examples of Deviation Margins of Discretion 
 
5.4.1 Direct Sex Discrimination: The Women and Violence-Deviant 
Motivated, he said, by the high number of assassinated police officers in Northern Ireland, the 
Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) decided not to equip women serving 
in the reserve forces with firearms. Since however, a majority of the tasks of the reserve 
police force required the carrying of arms, the chief constable thought it best not to renew the 
contract of his female employees. Marguerite Johnston had been in the full time reserve force 
since 1974 and worked without formal complaint until 1980, when the Chief Constable 
refused to renew her contract. Marguerite Johnston’s case was referred to the CJEU.215 
     Johnston does not contain any margin of discretion-language. However the case introduces 
a method, which becomes a point of reference for subsequent cases in this line of case law on 
derogations from the right to equal treatment triggered by the combination of women and 
violence. In contrast, the subsequent cases do refer to margin of discretion-language. I include 
Johnston in this section because it serves to illustrate how closely the deviation margin of 
discretion is linked to the directive’s derogation provision. Though Johnston appears to be a 
case about the mere application of the derogation clause, in addition one finds a legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




reasoning structure, which in future case law opens up a space for the use of a margin of 
discretion. 
   The Court’s reasoning hinges on the derogation to equal treatment provided for in article 
2(2), which allows Member States to exclude from the field of the directive’s application 
those occupational activities for which by reason of their nature or context the sex of the 
worker constitutes a determining factor.  
     Despite the “exclude from its field of application” formula in the directive, the CJEU does 
not hold that the organization of reserve forces is outside of the scope of EU law. 
Furthermore, the CJEU concludes that merely guaranteeing public safety or general policing 
activities are not sufficiently strong reasons to depart from the principle of equal treatment 
guaranteed in the directive.  
     The CJEU instead continues by referencing the situation in Northern Ireland,216 and states: 
“In such circumstances, the context of certain policing activities may be such that the sex of 
police officers constitutes a determining factor for carrying them out. If that is so, a Member 
State may therefore restrict such tasks, and the training leading thereto, to men.”217  
     The CJEU does not state that the Member State has a margin of discretion to formulate 
circumstances and responding policies which deviate from the principle of equal treatment, 
which fits with the directive’s vaguely formulated derogation provision. Reading this 
paragraph closely however, one notes how the CJEU indicates the Member State’s discretion 
to formulate policies through the wording “may be such” and “if that is so.” Hence, the 
national formulates the acceptable circumstances, which fleshes out the directive’s 
derogation-formulations of “nature” and “context.” This template is reused in subsequent case 
law. 
   In Johnston the Member State participates in formulating the circumstances, which triggers 
the norm departure, but the CJEU does not fully conceptualize it even though, in a sign of 
deference to decision-makers on the national level, it finally left it to the national court to 
decide whether the measure was proportionate. In sum, this case becomes a point of reference 
for future cases with straightforward margin of discretion-language, most prominently Sirdar 
and Kreil.  
     Angela Maria Sirdar had been in the British army since 1983; in February 1994 she was 
made redundant for economic reasons, a decision that affected over 500 people serving in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Johnston, para. 36: “characterized by serious internal disturbances the carrying of fire-arms by policewomen 
might create additional risks of their being assassinated and might therefore be contrary to the requirement of 
public safety.”  




British military forces.218 In July however, she received an offer of transfer to the Royal 
Marines who needed to rehire. The Royal Marines subsequently discovered that she was a 
woman and therefore the offer of service in the “point of the arrow head” was made to her 
erroneously. Her case was referred to the CJEU.  
     With explicit reference to Johnston the CJEU begins by affirming that the subject matter 
of the case (equal treatment applied to the use of force in the context of military service) does 
not fall outside the scope of EU law. 
     Relying on the same article 2(2)-derogation as in Johnston the CJEU this time makes 
explicit reference to margin of discretion-language and states that “depending on the 
circumstances, national authorities have a certain degree of discretion when adopting 
measures which they consider to be necessary in order to guarantee public security in a 
Member State.” 219  The CJEU thereafter states, by referencing the information in the 
documents in the case, that “the organisation of the Royal Marines differs fundamentally from 
that of other units in the British armed forces, of which they are the 'point of the arrow head.' 
They are a small force and are intended to be the first line of attack. It has been established 
that, within this corps, chefs are indeed also required to serve as front-line commandos, (…). 
In such circumstances, the competent authorities were entitled, in the exercise of their 
discretion as to whether to maintain the exclusion in question.”220  
     This time explicitly, the CJEU notes that certain circumstances trigger norm departure and 
that the Member States are given a margin of discretion to formulate these circumstances. 
Subject of course, to proportionality review and the requirement of a legitimate aim such as 
public security.  
     What is the margin of discretion used for? It is used to create a space where the national 
decision-maker can formulate circumstances that will trigger a deviation from the right to 
equal treatment. The CJEU will then accept these circumstances and turn them into the 
applicable standard of protection by defining what is a justifiable derogation, in accordance 
with the 2(2) wording of “nature” and “context,” from the right to equal treatment. The 
margin of discretion does not encompass any question relatable to national security but is 
structured so as to formulate the circumstances (the point of the arrow head), which fits with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Case C-273/97, Sirdar v Army Bd, [1999] ECR 7403. 
219 Sirdar, para. 27. 




the structure of the directive,221 rather than merely excluding the sphere of national security, 
internal and external, from the enforcement of EU sex equality rights.   
     In sum, this national prerogative of interpretation in relation to women in violent and 
extreme circumstances is within the margin of discretion and embodies, as long as the 
measure is proportionate, a justifiable derogation under the directive’s nature and context 
wording. The circumstances thus both motivate the use of margins of discretion and constrain 
the right to equal treatment. 
     These circumstances could however, be too widely conceived,222 as in Kreil, where the 
German military argued that all armed positions should remain male.223 Such an exclusion of 
women, which applied to almost all positions, “cannot be regarded as a derogating measure 
justified by the specific nature of the posts in question or by the particular context in which 
the activities in question are carried out.”224 As such, Germany went outside of its margin of 
discretion by presenting circumstances so broad that they did not fit the 2(2) derogation 
provisions. Consequently, this measure could not be considered proportionate to the aim of 
maintaining public security.225 
     The CJEU, as has been shown, insists on the subject matter as being within the scope of 
EU law but invites the national to formulate a compelling narrative of violence and describe 
why sex discrimination is acceptable in that context. Subsequently, with Kreil and as of late 
Napoli, as exceptions, the CJEU accepts these formulations and fits them into the directive’s 
categories of context and nature.226  
      In other words, we are not looking merely at a division of competence, but rather a local 
or national formulation of a context, which determines the applicable standard of protection of 
the EU right to equal treatment.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 See also, Case 318/86, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic ECR [1988] I-03559, 
where the CJEU found that the French authorities were free to restrict women’s access to certain positions in 
prisons, such as wardens and head prison wardens. This case does not mention margin of discretion but simply 
dismisses the Commission’s claim of violation of the right to equal treatment, as if the reasons were self-evident. 
222 See also in Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECR [2003] I-02479, concerning 
the potentially discriminatory consequences of compulsory military service being imposed only on men, the 
CJEU, drawing on the degree of discretion language in Sirdar and Kreil, concludes that the organisation of the 
armed forces cannot be completely excluded from the application of the EU’s equal treatment protection, 
especially since it relates to employment and occupation. In Dory, the CJEU constructs the question as being 
about military organisation more broadly (not directly related to employment and occupation), and therefore 
“Community law does not preclude” such organizational choices. Overall then Alexander Dory tried, but 
according to the CJEU failed, to show that compulsive military service delayed his career and possibilities of 
employment.   
223 Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECR [2000] I-00069. 
224 Kreil, para. 27. 
225 Kreil, Para. 29: “even taking account of the discretion […] the national authorities could not, without 
contravening the principle of proportionality” adopt the position that the Bundeswehr remained all male. 




     Women and state sanctioned use of violence is the recurring theme of this line of cases, 
which address derogations to the right to protection from direct discrimination. This 
combination – the use of violence and women – introduces a parallel storyline to the theme of 
the EU driven promotion of the right to equal treatment, which is an important source of 
inspiration for the improvement narrative. While potentially susceptible to historicization, it 
still represents an important counter narrative to an often-told story.    
     These cases thus constitute an example of the meeting of a strong EU fundamental rights-
achievement and a subject matter that is traditionally considered an example par excellence of 
state competence, namely legitimate uses of violence for reasons internal or external to the 
state territory. I began with this line of cases because of this a priori separation of the two 
subject matters along territorial lines. Yet this line of cases reveals a shared responsibility for 
norm departure.  
 
5.4.2 Direct Sex Discrimination: The Men and Babies-Deviant 
I will now turn to a line of cases where men seek access to parental leave litigated through 
the right to equal treatment. Essentially, these male litigants argue that they too should have 
access to the leave granted to mothers.  Just as in the case of women in violent contexts the 
CJEU observes how certain “circumstances” trigger national discretion to deviate from the 
principle of equal treatment through the exit-routes provided in secondary sources. The CJEU 
does not unilaterally formulate these circumstances but imports them from the national level.  
     The year is 1983 and the Commission litigates a series of cases against Member States 
who, according to the Commission, had failed to implement the 1976 Equal Treatment 
Directive. The Commission, for instance, challenges an exclusion of men from the midwifery 
profession,227 and an exclusion of adoptive fathers from leave granted to adoptive mothers.228 
In both these cases the CJEU is reluctant to follow the Commission’s lead and enforce the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Case 165/82, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, ECR [1983] 03431, para. 20. In this case, the CJEU accepted that men could be excluded from the 
midwifery profession and therefore did not strike down a systematic rejection of their right to equal treatment by 
stating in paragraph 20: “it may be stated that by failing fully to apply the principle laid down in the directive, 
the United Kingdom has not exceeded the limits of the power granted to the Member States by Articles 9 (2) and 
2 (2) of the directive.” 
228 Case 163/82, Commission v Italy, ECR [1983] 3273, para. 16: “However, the adoptive father does not have 
the right given the adoptive mother of maternity leave for the first three months following the actual entry of the 
child into the adoptive family. That distinction is justified, as the Government of the Italian Republic rightly 
contends, by the legitimate concern to assimilate as far as possible the conditions of entry of the child into the 
adoptive family to those of the arrival of a newborn child in the family during the very delicate initial period. As 





principle of equal treatment and instead the Court accepts these national deviations as fitting 
article 2 ETD.  
     Still 1983, and the Commission turns to Germany to challenge the rules on maternity leave 
which, beyond the 8 weeks following child birth, held that mothers were in addition 
exclusively entitled to remunerated leave following these eight weeks until the child reached 
the age of six months.229 They drop the case however, when Ulrich Hofmann, father of a 
newborn child, decided to challenge the German legislation on the ground that it violated his 
EU-sourced right to equal treatment. 230   
     Ulrich Hofmann, with the consent of the mother of the child and Hofmann’s employer, had 
been at home with the child after the 8 weeks period, however without being paid.   
     The CJEU stated that even though the directive was designed to implement the principle of 
equal treatment, the derogation-provision of article 2(3) stated that the “directive shall be 
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards 
pregnancy and maternity.” The CJEU continues by fleshing out this protection as concerning 
“a woman's biological condition during pregnancy and thereafter until such time as her 
physiological and mental functions have returned to normal” in addition to the protection of 
”the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows 
pregnancy and childbirth.”231  
     The CJEU then goes on to explains how the materialization of these questions are linked to 
the system of social protection and that “the Member States enjoy a reasonable margin of 
discretion as regards both the nature of the protective measure and the detailed arrangement 
for their implementation.”232 
     The “nature of the protective measure” enabling the protection of pregnant women is left 
to the Member State to formulate. This policy area is described as being embraced by a 
margin of discretion. In other words, men and their babies that for equal treatment reasons try 
to enter into the childcare sphere find their circumstance placed within the margin of 
discretion of the Member States. This means that when it comes to men’s equal access to their 
babies the Member State may assist in formulating, through the margin of discretion-
technique, the definition of the applicable standard of the EU-sourced right to equal treatment. 
A definition that is re-applied in Spain 20 years later. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 See Case 248/83, Commission v Germany, ECR [1985] 01459. 
230 Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR [1984] 03047.  
231 Hofmann, para. 24-25. 




     In 2013, Betriu Montull is confronted with a similar situation to that of Ulrich Hofmann.233 
Betriu Montull and Macarena Ollé’s son was born on 20 April 2004. Ollé worked as a self-
employed lawyer and was as such was not entitled to the full 16 weeks maternity leave 
granted to employed people but only to the mandatory 6 weeks immediately following 
childbirth. Betriu Montull, on the other hand, was employed and applied for the subsequent 
10 weeks. His request was rejected on the grounds that he was the father, not the mother of 
the child.  
     Throughout its reasoning the CJEU makes close reference to Hofmann, hence indirectly 
referencing margin of discretion-language, and upholds the essence of that ruling, without 
however making explicit reference to a margin of discretion as in Hofmann. The CJEU states: 
“by reserving to the Member States the right to retain or introduce provisions which are 
intended to protect women in connection with pregnancy and maternity, Article 2(3) of 
Directive 76/207 recognises the legitimacy, in terms of the principle of equal treatment of the 
sexes, first, of protecting a woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy and, 
second, of protecting the special relationship between a woman and her child over the period 
which follows childbirth (…).” A measure such as that at issue in the main proceedings is, in 
any event, intended to protect a woman’s biological condition during and after pregnancy.”234 
     The CJEU upholds the protected policy area “by reserving to the Member States the right 
to retain or introduce provisions” in which the mother’s biological condition and her special 
relationship with the child reside. The state may thus deviate from the right to equal treatment 
in access to parental leave for employed parents if it verifies that it has the purpose of 
protecting maternity leave as a space that celebrates the special connection between mother 
and child.  
     The Member State is in this way permitted to fill this space with regulatory exclusions of 
men and their babies, and accordingly to formulate acceptable deviations to the EU rights to 
equal treatment.  
 
5.4.3 Indirect Sex Discrimination: How To Objectively Justify Departing from Social Policy  
The CJEU stated: “Those principles and objectives form part of a social policy which in the 
current state of Community law is a matter for the Member States which enjoy a reasonable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Case C-5/12, Marc Betriu Montull v Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social (INSS), ECR [2013] nyr. 




margin of discretion as regards both the nature of the protective measure and the detailed 
arrangement for their implementation.”235 
     Here, the CJEU refers to the principles and objectives of national legislation accused of 
violating the EU-sourced right to protection from indirect sex discrimination. In this section, 
the author of the contested measure is the national legislator or a competent national policy-
making body.236 The theme is thus an encounter between social policy, which is a domain 
considered as pertaining first and foremost to the Member States, and the EU-sourced right to 
equal treatment.  
     I will sketch the contours of a method for establishing objectively justifiable departures 
from the right to protection against indirect sex discrimination, namely the way the CJEU 
understands a national measure and the aim of that measure to analytically reside within a 
margin of discretion, albeit subject to review by the CJEU.  
     There is an impressive line of cases on the right to equal treatment as a protection against 
indirect discrimination between men and women, which is the extension from direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 This wording or very similar framings appear in all cases discussed in this section. Apart from the cases 
discussed in some detail below see also, on indirect discrimination in relation to matters of social security: Case 
C-229/89, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, ECR [1991] I-02205, para. 22; 
Case C-226/91, Jan Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, ECR [1992] I-05943, para. 15. On 
indirect discrimination in employment: Case C-322/98, Bärbel Kachelmann v Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG, 
ECR [2000] I-07505, para 30. 
236 In addition to this group one could consider cases regarding private employees who use the EU-sourced right 
to protection against indirect discrimination to challenge decisions by their employers (horizontal relationship). 
No margin of discretion language is used and it is submitted that this is due to the fact that the author of the 
discriminatory measure represents him or her self rather than the Member State. The CJEU use the following 
standard formula to empower the national court in decision-making “it is for the national court, which has sole 
jurisdiction to make findings of fact, to determine whether and to what extent the grounds put forward by an 
employer to explain the adoption of a (…) practice which applies independently of a worker's sex but in fact 
affects more women than men may be regarded as objectively justified (…). If the national court finds that the 
measures chosen (…) correspond to a real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to 
achieving the objectives pursued and are necessary to that end, the fact that the measures affect a far greater 
number of women than men is not sufficient to show that they constitute an infringement (…).”. See Case 
170/84, Bilka - Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, ECR [1986] 01607, para 36. For similar 
constructions see: Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v Kingsgate ECR [1981] 00911 para. 14; Case 171/88, Ingrid Rinner-
Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co. KG, ECR [1989] 02743, para. 15; Case C-281/97, 
Andrea Krüger v Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg, ECR [1989] 1999 I-05127, para 28 – 29 (collective agreement 
excluding people in minor employment from social security). 
The CJEU allows the national court to decide on whether an a priori case of indirect discrimination by a private 
employer is objectively justified. It thus parallels the margin of discretion structure in that it invites the national 
court to handle the assessment of the justifiable. But as distinct from the margin of discretion that indicates a 
decision or a subject matter that is within a national margin of discretion, here the CJEU outsources review and 
fact-finding.  
However, it is important to not be deceived by the “has the sole jurisdiction” formula, Sabine Defrenne 
challenged her employer before the CJEU and won, a case that remains an important centrepiece in EU 




discrimination to such treatments that have the effect, if not the formal language, of 
disadvantaging one of the two sexes.237 
     In the Court’s work on indirect discrimination it first establishes whether there is a prima 
facie indirect discrimination. Which is to say, does a certain measure, albeit formulated in 
neutral terms, affect one sex more than the other? However, and this is the second step, the 
CJEU will accept this condition, the prima facie discrimination, if it can be objectively 
justified by the author of the measure.  
     In this scheme the margin of discretion enters at the stage of determining what is 
objectively justified. This means that the margin of discretion fits with the reasoning structure 
the CJEU ordinarily deploys to evaluate a litigant’s claim of indirect discrimination. The 
margin of discretion is analytically attached to the contested measure and the aim of that 
measure, which is illustrated in the diagram below. This construction with both measure and 
aims enables the CJEU to place broader policy areas within a margin of discretion, rather than 
just specific decision-making.   
     This means that the deviation margin of discretion embraces both the national legislator’s 
definition of the aspiration of its policy, which for instance could be recruitment, budget cuts, 
or framed more loosely as employment and social policy, and the manner in which this should 




The margin of discretion encompasses contested measures and their goals as formulated by a 
national body. A measure accused of violating the right to equal treatment, analytically placed 
within a margin of discretion may also be subjected to review to establish whether it is 
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objectively justified. As illustrated in the diagram, the CJEU may ask whether the measure is 
proportionate and the aim of the measure is legitimate. Importantly, the intensity of the review 
varies and the CJEU can omit these questions and implicitly or explicitly assume that a 
measure is proportionate and the aim is legitimate. This means that the margin of discretion 
varies in terms of what it indicates. It could thus encompass what is instantaneously 
understood by the CJEU to be objectively justified, without any further active review. 
However the deviation margin of discretion could also signal what should be reviewed for 
proportionality and legitimacy in order to ultimately be classifiable as objectively justified.  
     Even though the counterpart is the national legislator, the CJEU does not itself refer to the 
protection of democratic deliberation as a superior value motivating a margin of discretion, 
but merely defines social policy as “a matter” for the Member States. The CJEU talks to 
national constituent power from the position of ultimately having the power to strike down its 
decision.238 It is “a matter” thus not exclusively in the hands of the Member State’s 
democratic institutions.  
     In sum, in this type of case handling legislative decisions, the margin of discretion 
embodies an elusive mixture of classic judicial review prerogatives and a value-neutral 
selective inclusion of democratic choice into the adjudication of EU-sourced rights. The 
CJEU decides when to open up its adjudication of the EU-sourced right by inviting the 
national legislator to participate in the formulation of the applicable standard of protection 
through establishing objectively justifiable deviations. Again, the margin of discretion 
operates as a method for facilitating legitimized norm departures within the EU system of 
fundamental rights protection, rather than to externalize subject matters from one jurisdiction 
to the other. I will now turn to a series of examples illustrating this point. 
     Inge Nolte, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel worked part time cleaning offices a few 
hours each day of the week.239 Under German law under 15 hours of work per week was 
considered minor employment and therefore did not qualify Nolte, Megner and Scheffel for 
basic social security such as old age, invalidity and sickness insurance.   
     Nolte by herself, and Megner and Scheffel together challenged the German legislation on 
the ground that a significantly larger portion of people in minor employment were women and 
therefore the exclusion from basic social security had a discriminatory effect. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 See Young: “In exercising deferential review, courts give credence to the democratic authority and epistemic 
superiority of, and textual conferral of tasks to, the legislative and executive branches.” Young 2012, supra note 
186 at 143.   
239 Case C-317/93, Inge Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, ECR [1995] I-04625, Case C-444/93, 




     This is an emblematic example of a litigant relying on the supranational structure, in this 
case the right to protection against indirect discrimination in matters of social security 
sourced in a directive, to challenge a Member State’s nation-wide policy. The CJEU holds 
that “in the current state of Community law, social policy is a matter for the Member States 
(…). Consequently, it is for the Member States to choose the measure capable of achieving 
the aim of their social and employment policy. In exercising that competence, Member States 
have a broad margin of discretion.”240      
     It is important to start by noting how the CJEU does refer to the treaty provisions that 
“reserve to the Member States the power to define their social policy.”241 However this does 
not alter the application of the directive. In other words, I argue that this use of margins of 
discretion cannot be explained as a way of withdrawing the application of equal treatment 
rights, because they do apply, not only as a general principle but also as specified by the 
directive. The EU right is there, the individual is within its scope, the CJEU has jurisdiction.  
     Instead, the CJEU operationalizes a margin of discretion to establish by legal reasoning 
that social policy that a priori deviates from the norm of equal protection, is indeed 
objectively justified. Here more so than in the two lines of case law on deviations from direct 
discrimination, the margin of discretion operates more independently from the fundamental 
rights source but still within a well-established legal reasoning structure. While the equal 
treatment in matters of social security directive contains a provision that excludes from its 
scope certain aspects of old age pensions and certain derived entitlements (article 7), it does 
not have similar provisions to the equal treatment directive’s fairly open-ended derogation 
provisions establishing sex as a determining factor, dealing with the protection of pregnant 
workers and maternity, and measures promoting positive discrimination.  
     Therefore I argue that the best understanding of this technique is that the margin of 
discretion independently identifies social policy which deviates from the norm of equal 
treatment, and that is ultimately understood by the CJEU to be objectively justified. The 
national legislator’s norm departure that resides within a margin of discretion therefore 
reshapes the neatly European element of the EU-sourced right and opens up the formulation 
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241Se also on the same point: Case C-280/94, Y. M. Posthuma-van Damme v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging 
voor Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen and N. Oztürk v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene 
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cooperation organized by the Commission, and consequently the nature and extent of measures of social 
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that competence, the Member States have a broad margin of discretion (Nolte, paragraph 33, and Megner and 




of its standard of protection to national participation. The national legislature, when included 
in the formulation of the fundamental right to equal treatment, contributes with its 
understanding of what the contours of protection are supposed to look like, which is 
subsequently accepted by the CJEU. 
     Consistent with this last suggestion of intertwined elaboration, there are methods of 
sharpening the CJEU’s scrutiny of what is legitimate and entering into a more detailed 
imaginary discussion with the national legislator, as intimated above.242 
     In concrete, the CJEU can formulate criteria guiding how the proportionality test should be 
constructed in relation to measures accused of violating the right to equal treatment, or as is 
more frequent, the CJEU can engage in an elaboration of what constitutes a legitimate aim of 
national social policy. 
     First, in general terms, in Seymour-Smith and Perez, a challenge to a British rule that 
required two years of employment prior to dismissal in order to have standing to challenge the 
dismissal, the CJEU circumcises the broad margin of discretion used in Nolte and Megner and 
Scheffel by stating that it (the margin of discretion) cannot have the effect of frustrating the 
implementation of a fundamental principle of Community law (equal treatment). 243  In 
Seymour-Smith and Perez the Court continues by reflecting on the social policy aims that in 
previous case law have been constructed as residing peacefully within a margin of discretion. 
“Mere generalizations concerning the capacity of a specific aim to encourage recruitment” are 
not enough to show that the aim is legitimate.244 
     Scrutinizing the aim of the social policy, which resides within a margin of discretion, 
asking questions of its legitimacy and specifically whether it is really unrelated to any 
discrimination based on sex, the CJEU introduces a conversational-styled reasoning about 
what constitutes objectively justifiable departures from the principle for equal treatment.  
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243 Case C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and Laura 
Perez, ECR [1999] I-00623, para 74-75.  
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     In Jørgensen the aim of the policy was put into question once again.245 With reference to 
budgetary constraints, Denmark had reorganised the rules governing medical practices in a 
way that according to Birgitte Jørgensen, had an adverse effect on self-employed women.  
     The Court rejects the idea that a measure with the aim of ensuring budgetary constraint is 
legitimate and therefore would justify discrimination based on sex, but, the Court continues, 
to “ensure sound management of public expenditure on specialised medical care” is indeed a 
legitimate aim of social policy. The Court is essentially holding that the aim of social policy 
measures that deviate from the right to equal treatment have to be modelled somewhat 
narrowly, even though the difference between “budgetary constraint” and “sound 
management of public expenditure” is hard to grasp.246  
     In Kutz-Bauer and Steinicke, the CJEU continues to reflect on the legitimacy of the social 
policy aim covered by a margin of discretion and holds that “mere generalizations” are not 
acceptable.247 Thus social policy aims could be so broadly defined that they do not “fit” 
within the national margin of discretion. This is similar to Kreil, where the violent 
circumstances were defined too broadly to be accepted as a deviation from the principle of 
protection from direct discrimination. In such cases the CJEU will penetrate the margin of 
discretion and declare the rights-violating social policy aim illegitimate.248 Here, needless to 
say, the CJEU does not defer to democratic deliberations in “matters” traditionally connected 
to Member State competence, but operates in a classic judicial review mindset.  
     Lastly and more recently there are two cases worth noting in terms of the way in which the 
margin of discretion covering policy aims and the measures taken to achieve them is brought 
into the 2000s. In Brachner, on indirect discrimination of women in matters of social 
security249 the CJEU refers directly to “margin of discretion,” but omits that explicit reference 
in Leone and Leone, on indirect discrimination of men in relation to pay.250  
     The CJEU in Leone and Leone, referring to the case law discussed in this section, hence 
indirectly referencing a margin of discretion, adds that a measure capable of embodying a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245 Case C-226/98, Birgitte Jørgensen v Foreningen af Speciallæger and Sygesikringens Forhandlingsudvalg, 
ECR [2000] I-02447.	  
246 Jørgensen, para 41. The CJEU admits that the Member State, according to settled case law, enjoys a 
“reasonable margin of discretion” in relation to the nature of social protections provided that they meet a 
legitimate aim of social policy. 
247 Case C-187/00, Helga Kutz-Bauer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECR [2003] I-02741 and Case C-77/02, 
Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, ECR [2003] I-09027. 
248 This is also what happens in Kutz-Bauer and Steinicke, Helga Kutz-Bauer and Erika Steinicke effectively 
litigated their equal protection case against the discriminatory effect of the national legislation on “part time 
work for older employees.” 
249 Case C-123/10, Waltraud Brachner v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt, ECR [2011] I-10003.  
250 Case C-173/13, Maurice Leone and Blandine Leone v Garde des Sceaux, ECR [2014] nyr. The CJEU in 




legitimate social policy aim “requires that it genuinely reflect a concern to attain that aim and 
be pursued in a consistent and systematic manner in the light thereof.”  
     Already in Brachner, but specifically in Leone and Leone another element of a more 
elaborated stringency requirement is added to the formula contemplating legitimacy.251 Still, 
the aim capable of legitimizing an a priori infringement of the right to equal pay is defined by 
the Member States, and even though the CJEU in Leone and Leone suggest that a “consistent 
and systematic manner” is desirable, the structure is clearly recognizable from Nolte and 
Megner and Scheffel twenty years earlier. The CJEU in other words shows a consistent use of 
national margins of discretion in cases where national legislation is accused of violating the 
right to protection from indirect discrimination, specifically in its secondary-sourced 
expressions.  
     In the 2000s with its treaty-based, Charter-based and secondary law-based rights guarantee 
of equal protection, as well as in the early 1980s, the CJEU covers Member States’ policy 
choices with margins of discretion and similarly opens up the creation of the applicable 
standard of protection of the right to equal treatment for the national legislator’s participation. 
 
5.4.4 The Right to Maternity and Parental Leave: Margins of Discretion to Constrain Rights 
Earlier I outlined the way in which national margins of discretion have been used where men 
tried to access maternity leave entitlements by relying on the principle of equal protection. In 
this last section I will turn to the right to maternity leave, guaranteed in secondary EU law 
since 1992, and the right to parental leave, guaranteed in secondary EU law since 1996. Both 
rights are protected since 2009 in the Charter.  
     I will show how margins of discretions are used in the area of sex equality law, particularly 
important for the life/family balance of Europeans. It should be remembered that these 
respective rights to leave 252 are building blocks in the process of promoting the overarching 
goal of equal treatment, as evinced in the preambles: maternity leave is guaranteed for the 
sake of protecting women and not treating women on the labour market unfavourably, and 
parental leave as an important means of reconciling work and family life and promoting equal 
opportunities and treatment between men and women.  
     In the case of maternity leave these secondary sources guarantee “a continuous period of 
maternity leave of a least 14 weeks allocated before and/or after confinement in accordance 
with national legislation and/or practice” with “maintenance of payment or adequate 
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allowance.”253 The right to parental leave guarantees a period of four months, which in 
principle should be provided on a non-transferable basis.254  
       It is clear from the formulation of the secondary sources that national legislation and 
practice is responsible for defining the structure surrounding the entitlement to maternity 
leave and parental leave.255 This means that national involvement takes different shapes in 
terms of establishing the contours of the respective rights to leave, and that again the 
deviation margin of discretion adapts to the structure of the sources. Therefore, it is important 
to make a distinction between the margin of discretion and instances where the CJEU decides 
that the directive does not regulate a specific issue. A good example of the latter in terms of 
maternity leave are rules governing what happens when leave coincides with sickness, or 
pregnancy-related sickness does not coincide with the leave, which are questions of rights-
content that have been left to the Member State because the directive does not address the 
issue straightforwardly.256 
     The operationalization of margins of direction instead happens when it is not possible for 
the CJEU to establish that the question in the case before it is outside of the directive’s 
wording. 
     This means that the CJEU uses national margins of discretion in formulating rights-content 
immediately connected to the minimum criteria governing the leave, not to expand the right 
but to find acceptable ways of constraining the right. In others words, there is no margin of 
discretion to make the protection thicker but national discretion is used to constrain and limit 
what the rights to maternal and parental leave mean in Europe. The following case law-
sequence on payment levels during maternity leave illustrates this point very well.  
     In Alabaster, where back-dated pay increasing imminently before maternity leave was not 
reflected in the level of statutory maternity leave,257 in Parviainen where a flight purser 
transferred to ground duties during pregnancy got reduced pay which subsequently affected 
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254 Clause 2 of Council Directive 2010/18/EU.  
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national practice (…) leaves to the Member States a certain degree of latitude when they adopt rules in order to 
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her maternity leave allowance,258 and in Gassmayr where a doctor sought to argue that on-call 
duty benefits should be included in the calculation of maternity leave allowance, national 
discretion was operationalized in the shaping of the right to maternity leave.259 
     These three women relied on the directive’s formula on “maintenance of a payment to, 
and/or entitlement to an adequate allowance for workers” which have recently given birth.260 
Arguably, this is vague wording, yet it is an EU law requirement that the CJEU is called to 
interpret.  
     In Gassmayr, handed down in 2010, which draws on Alabaster and Parviainen, the CJEU 
holds that the ”exercise by the Member States and, where appropriate, management and 
labour of that discretion when determining the entitlement to income of a pregnant worker 
temporarily granted leave from work by reason of her pregnancy cannot undermine the 
objective of protecting the safety and health of pregnant workers pursued by Directive 
92/85.”261 
     Then the CJEU goes on to agree that the national solution of excluding on-call duty 
allowance does not go against the aim of the directive which is “to protect a woman’s 
biological condition during and after pregnancy and, second, to protect the special 
relationship between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and 
childbirth.”262  
     The structure of the EU fundamental rights clash is the same, a litigant relies on an EU-
sourced right to strike down a national measure, but the CJEU operationalizes discretion to 
involve the national legislator and “where appropriate management and labour”263 more 
explicitly in an elaboration of the content of the right. The aim of the social policy is instead 
set by the European Union. We are therefore looking at the opposite structure to that seen in 
the cases of direct and indirect discrimination where the national policy aims, in different 
ways, are within a national margin of discretion. 
     In Gassmayr the Member State shapes the crucial details and the CJEU accepts them as 
long as they do not jeopardise the EU policy aims, which in this case are the physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Case C-471/08, Sanna Maria Parviainen v Finnair Oyj, ECR [2010] I-06533. To be precise, in part of the 
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in the position to which she has been transferred, although not to her level of pay in at the previous position.  
259 Gassmayr, para 67. 
260 Article 11 of of Council Directive 92/85/EEC.	  
261 Gassmayr, para.68. 
262 These criteria originate from Hofmann. The conclusion in Gassmayr is furthermore motivated by the CJEU’s 
questionable distinction between payment in the directive and the right to equal pay in primary law. 
263 Parviainen, para. 55 and Alabaster, para. 53: ”it is within the discretion of the competent authorities of the 
Member State concerned, provided that they comply with that requirement and with all provisions of 




protection of pregnant workers (equal treatment), and the protection of the special relationship 
between mother and child. The CJEU determines in general terms that it does not violate the 
aim of the policy and goes on to accept the national standard. 
     Importantly, and as already stated, the measures represent a constraint of the content rather 
than an expansion, which would have been allowed in any case as the directive only sets 
minimum standards and therefore accepts that a Member State’s protection is higher. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider that the litigant believes that the Member State is 
violating the EU right in question when challenging the national measure.  
     It should be noted that Parvainen and Gassmayr are handed down after the Charter comes 
into force, even though it is not explicitly referred to by the CJEU. I will now turn to Chatzi, a 
case on parental leave with explicit reference to the Charter, where the national margin of 
discretion is still used to constrain rights-content in such a way as to establish the applicable 
standard of protection.264   
     Zoi Chatzi is a Greek citizen and like many women in Europe, at least before the economic 
crisis, she worked as a public servant. On 21 May 2007 she gave birth to twins and was 
granted nine months of paid parental leave. When that period of parental leave expired she 
applied for a second period arguing that two children should entitle her to a longer period of 
leave from work.  
     The Thessaloniki Administrative Court Of Appeal concluded that the national law was 
clear on this matter, the number of children does not affect the number of months of parental 
leave. However, in line with Chatzi’s argumentation, the Court doubted whether or not 
Directive 96/34 on parental leave read in the light of the Charter would guarantee a more 
generous standard of protection.265 
      First, the CJEU engages in an eleven paragraph-long discussion on whether the directive 
confers an individual right to parental leave on the child. The answer, bypassing both article 
24 and 33(2) of the Charter, is that it does not.  
     Second, the CJEU considers whether the directive states if the number of periods of 
parental leave is equal to the number of newborn children. The language is ambiguous, the 
CJEU says, and so it goes on to reflect on the aim of the directive, which is to facilitate work 
and family balance. The CJEU observes that doubling parental leave for parents of twins is 
not the only way to ensure work and family balance. This observation about the EU aim is 
read together with the fact that the directive’s requirements are “minima.” This is in itself a 
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questionable formula since the issue at stake regarded the core of the right rather than say, 
levels of payment or how to calculate the start-date of the leave.266  The CJEU concludes that 
not adapting parental leave to the birth of twins does not violate the EU right to parental leave 
as expressed in the directive. Again, as in the maternity leave cases above the CJEU tests the 
national measure against the overall policy aim of the EU rights source. However the margin 
of discretion technique is used in relation to the last question.  
     In the final section the CJEU examines whether this practice disturbs the principles of 
equal treatment when considered in relation to parents with and without twins. Interestingly it 
considers this question particularly important since the Charter recognizes the right to parental 
leave as a fundamental social right.  
     However, the CJEU again turns to the directive without returning to the Charter, and 
restates that the Member State has a “wide freedom of action” (which I understand as margin 
of discretion language) when establishing the parental leave regime. Moreover, the CJEU 
ultimately leaves it to the national court to “determine whether the body of national rules 
offers sufficient possibilities to meet, in a specific case, the particular needs of the parents of 
twins in their work and family life.”267 
     Again, the CJEU understands the EU as providing a general policy aim and the Member 
State is given a margin of discretion to elaborate on the content of the right as long as it 
respects the policy aim. Zoi Chatzi is asking a substantial question of the EU right to parental 
leave, assuming that the EU through the CJEU will give a better answer than Greece. Yet the 
CJEU refers to the national court, giving it the opportunity to embed the Greek solution in its 
reading of the EU right to parental leave. Thus, in Chatzi the CJEU both identifies a margin of 
discretion to allow for deviating understandings of the content of parental leave and 
outsources the scrutiny to the national court.   
 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks: Sharing Deviance  
 
Schematically, this chapter has considered EU fundamental rights understood as contrasting 
with the national legal milieu to the potential benefit of the individual. This schema is the 
antithesis of the intrusion narrative’s focus on the damage done to the national system for 
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fundamental rights protection by the CJEU’s adjudication and, as noted above, highly 
emblematic for the improvement narrator’s main analysis of transnational law. 
     I stated at the outset that the diversity narrative has demonstrated little interest in applying 
analytical frameworks such as constitutional pluralism or national constitutional identity to 
this line of case law, despite the fact that the national decision-makers are involved in 
formulating acceptable deviations from EU-sourced rights. Perhaps this could be explained by 
the fact that this type of use of margins of discretion complicates the meaning of nation state-
centred diversity.  
     After all, the margin of discretion in this line of cases ultimately internalizes national 
policy formulations into its system of fundamental rights protection rather than deferring to 
national identity, or what is nationally unique. For example, in the women and violence and 
men and babies line of cases, the litigants in the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Italy 
wanted to strike down measures aimed at separating women from violence and men from 
babies on the grounds that they violated equal treatment. My point is that the pattern of these 
conflicts are so similar that the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and Italy have more in 
common compared to anything that could be described as uniquely German, British, Spanish 
or Italian in the context of this case law.  
     Framed in more legalistic terms, this use of national margins of discretion by the CJEU has 
been examined within this prima facie dichotomy between the EU and the national legal 
sphere, triggered by an individual belonging to both.  
     One way of reconstructing the basic components of these cases is to think of their structure 
as a norm (the EU right) and a reasonably divergent understanding of the norm (contested 
measure). With such a framing, both ex ante and ex post the CJEU’s adjudicative process, the 
EU norm and the national divergent understanding of the norm remains separable. 
     While this understanding might be fruitful ex ante, I have sought to illustrate that where 
deviation margins of discretion are used, the outcome of the adjudicative process is 
intertwined. The CJEU’s use of margins of discretion interlinks the national and EUropean, 
even if there is a detectable underlying split in competence regarding the subject matters and 
an a priori dichotomy represented in the case-structure. With the use of a margin of discretion 
compared to no use of a margin of discretion, the national level is explicitly consulted on how 
acceptable deviations should be formulated.  
     Thus, the CJEU hardly operates as an improver of the national standard of protection but 
instead employs a method whereby the national level is allowed to participate in the 




jurisdiction that deems some rights to be fundamental nonetheless permits subunits to 
constrain and deviate from these norm-commitments.  
     This happens when the CJEU adjudicates by internalizing circumstances and subject 
matters that deviate from the core of the fundamental right and subsequently attaches these 
circumstances and subject matters to the structure of the EU-sourced right. Therefore the 
deviation margin of discretion functions in such a way as to allow a myriad of national, and 
indeed subnational circumstances to become the flesh of the applicable standard of protection, 


























6. The Balance Margin of Discretion 
 
* 
In this chapter I will examine how the margin of discretion-technique has been used in cases 
where the CJEU finds that the protection of fundamental rights clashes with one of the four 
internal market freedoms. The notion of achieving balance between these two competing 
interests is at the heart of this complex use of the margin of discretion-technique.  
     Distinct from the deviation margin of discretion, which is directed towards broadly 
formulated policy areas and subject matters, the balance margin of discretion addresses single 
specific national measures. This could be a specific legislative provision or, and indeed more 
frequently, an administrative decision.  
     The CJEU begins its reasoning by looking at the contested national measure taken to 
protect a fundamental right and asks whether it constitutes a justified restriction of one of the 
fundamental market freedoms. To answer this question the CJEU constructs the national 
measure as the output of a balancing act between the fundamental right and the fundamental 
freedom. This balancing act is better understood as a move in legal reasoning made by the 
CJEU rather than an account of the national decision-maker’s working method. Thereafter the 
CJEU reviews the proportionality of the national measure taken within a margin of discretion. 
     Thus, the national margin of discretion addresses one specific moment in time. The 
balance margin of discretion does not belong to a particular fundamental right, a certain 
policy area (like the deviance margin of discretion), and is not addressed to a decision-maker 
applying a specific provision of EU law (like the compliance margin of discretion). Instead, 
the balance margin of discretion handles composite interests attributed to one instance of 
decision-making.  
    This chapter will aim to show how the balance margin of discretion signals that the original 
contested decision will remain intact, together with the important additional move where the 
CJEU inserts certain EU law considerations into the imagined rationales of the national 
decision-making and ultimately reviews its outcome.  
     The complexity of this typology of margin of discretion-use stems from these modes of 




the applicable standard of protection but the CJEU inserts a balancing act into the decision 
itself and reviews it, in this way maintaining an elaborative role. 
     This reading of an intricate form of micro-interactive elaboration of the applicable 
standard of protection complements the extensive literature on this line of case law, which 
tends to focus on the grand clash of fundamentals.268 Without categorically negating the 
importance of highlighting the fundamental aspects of the interests at play, I will draw 
attention to the local nature of this string of case law and the CJEU’s focus on moments of 
what it understands to be composite decision-making in its legal reasoning.  
     The balance margin of discretion-cases discussed in this section have traction in diversity 
narrative commentary that promotes ideas such as constitutional pluralism to protect the 
national constitution from EU-mainstreaming, and the scholarly quest to operationalize 
“national constitutional identity.” Celebrity cases such as Schmidberger, Omega and Sayn-
Wittgenstein (all featured in this chapter) have embodied the diversity narrator’s interest in 
explaining how “national constitutional traditions” could be protected within the adjudicative 
machinery of the CJEU, especially in the area of the internal market, traditionally the Court’s 
core interest.  
     The reading that I will present of cases containing balance margins of discretion tilts away 
from, though does not discard the conventional wisdom of the diversity narrative. With a 
view to carefully constructing this point challenging the dominant diversity narrative, I will 
present the balance margin of discretion cases under two separate headlines. The first is 
entitled “National Margins of Discretion to Balance Equal Weight,” and features a line of 
cases with no operationalization of the national as a value affecting the balancing act 
attributed to the national decision. In the second section entitled “The National as 
Counterweight in National Margins of Discretion,” I will show how the CJEU highlights the 
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specifically national and accentuates what appertains to the national in its reasoning, without 
abandoning the core structure of the balance margin of discretion.  
     This means that I promote a reading where the balance margin of discretion technique 
provides for interconnected decision-making even in cases where the CJEU features 
nationally unique outputs of a Member State’s constitutional protection in its legal reasoning. 
I will thus maintain that these references to the specifically national quality of decision-
making do not per se affect the discretional space. This line of argumentation challenges the 
narrative of diversity (as well as indirectly the narrative of intrusion) and default favouritism 
of the national legal locus. Interestingly, as has been noted, this favouritism is rarely 
acknowledged as such and several authors claim to merely have an ahistorical interest in 
jurisdictional divides and legal conflicts between different jurisdictions, while actually 
arguing along the lines of classic European fetishization of the national locus and demos.  
     Using this framework focusing on the micro-interactions enabled by the technique, 
constructed so as to enable a critical assessment of the diversity narrative’s rationale, I will 
emphasise the situation-specific nature of this use of margins of discretion rather than 
understanding the use of this technique as aiming to protect a fundamental right understood in 
isolation from the conflict in which it is found. Accordingly, I draw a distinction between a 
situation in which the CJEU would defer in broad terms to the protection of a fundamental 
right as the output of national identity or the uniquely national in general, and a situation in 
which the CJEU addresses the balance margin of discretion to a specific national decision and 
reads it as the output of a balancing act between a fundamental right and an internal market 
fundamental freedom. 
     I am thus promoting an interpretation holding that a narrow national discretional space is 
carved out within the premises of an adjudicative method where the CJEU remains an active 
participant in the elaboration of the applicable standard of protection.   
 
 
6.1 Legal Conflict: An Internal Market Fundamental Freedom Clashes with a 
Fundamental Right   
 
In this line of case law the CJEU identifies a clash between an internal market fundamental 
freedom and a fundamental right. Within the EU law structure the four internal market 
fundamental freedoms, and EU fundamental rights are equal but different. Equal, because 




has been thoroughly cemented in the case law of the CJEU and at the same time equally 
carefully criticized by those who question this non-hierarchical relationship on normative 
grounds.269 A good example of the latter would be the critique advanced by intrusion 
narrators who hold that fundamental rights sourced in national constitutions and legislation 
should be superior to EU internal market law. 
     Different, at the same time, because the internal market fundamental freedoms and 
fundamental rights have distinguishable functions within the legal order. Whereas the former 
constitute the internal market, the function of fundamental rights is decisively more 
variegated. This condition is mirrored in the different sourcing. The four fundamental 
freedoms traditionally feature prominently in EU primary law, and as of late in relation to the 
case of persons and services, also in the Charter. Whilst EU fundamental rights, as already 
described, are characterised by their derivability from a vast set of national, EUropean and 
international sources.  
     In the case law discussed in this section these sets of norms clash within the framework of 
the question of whether a national measure embodying the protection of a fundamental right 
constitutes a justified restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms.270  
     I have thus extracted the series of cases discussed in this chapter from a very broad group 
of cases rooted in the classic EU law question of whether a national measure constitutes a 
justified restriction of an internal market fundamental freedom. Due to the vastness of this 
material it is important to clearly identify which legal clashes between fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms I am interested in analysing. 
     Essentially, and in line with the method of case selection presented earlier, I am interested 
in cases with two specific features: cases that operationalize a national margin of discretion 
(1), and cases that according to the CJEU involve a fundamental right (2).  
     This means that firstly (1) I am looking at cases that deviate from the reasoning structure 
often adopted by the CJEU to handle restrictions on internal market freedoms, by which I 
mean the template whereby the CJEU identifies the existence of a restriction, the possibility 
of a justification and then performs a proportionality analysis. In the following I will thus only 
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look at cases that add a national margin of discretion to this reasoning structure.271 This 
follows the basic method that I have used for the other two typologies for margin of discretion 
use, however it is important to note that in this instance I am carving out a string of cases that 
share similarly structured legal clashes from a very broad body of case law. 
    The second criterion (2), which is used for all the typologies but is particularly problematic 
and artificial in relation to the balance margin of discretion as this line of cases is extracted 
from a vast corpus within which one could also note an evolving understanding of what is to 
be considered a fundamental right.272  
     The reason for this selection-method whereby I will only analyse cases with clear 
references to fundamental rights sources, stemming from European legal material, national 
legal material, or both, is my desire to crystalize this use of the margin of discretion-technique 
in this prototype of an EU internal market fundamental rights conflict.273 To be clear however, 
cases without explicit reference to fundamental rights sources might indeed contain 
fundamental rights by way of argumentation.  
     Taking the CJEU’s own qualification of what constitutes a fundamental rights case as a 
starting point, I will furthermore highlight how these very often simultaneous readings of 
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fundamental freedom and a fundamental right, the CJEU ultimately holds that EU law does not require the 
Member State to make changes to their legal system. 
272 For examples where this distinction might be somewhat artificial, i.e. cases where national legislation aimed 
at social protection clashes with a fundamental market freedoms and/or competition law, see Joined Cases C-
180/98 and C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten ECR [2000] I-
06451 (pensions); Case C-12/08, Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis and Others ECR [2009] 
I-06653 (collective redundancies/workers right to action); Joined Cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Poucet and 
Pistre v Assurances Générales de France and Others [1993] ECR I-637 (social security); Case C-244/94, 
Fédération Française des Sociétés d’ Assurance [1995] ECR I-4013 (social security); Case C-55/96, Job Centre 
[1997] ECR I-7119 and Case C-222/98, Hendrik Van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord ECR [2000] I-7111 
(collective agreement). 
     Also, cases on the expansion of freedom to provide service into national broadcasting and media markets 
triggered a series of questions in the 1980s and 1990s, some explicitly involving freedom of expression and the 
protection of media pluralism, but at the outskirts, related but not explicitly connected one finds considerations 
such as cultural policy, and cultural expressions as a connection to that right. See Case C- 148/91, Vereniging 
Veronica Omroep Organisatie v Commissariaat voor de Media ECR [1993] I-00487 (media pluralism) and 
Joined cases C-60/84 and C-61/84, Cinéthèque and others v Fédération nationale des cinemas française, ECR 
[1985] 2605 (protection of the cinema as an cultural expression). 
273 There are two exceptions to this approach. I have included Spanish Strawberries, which lacks margin of 
discretion language. Its inclusion is motivated by the fact that in subsequent case law the CJEU qualifies is as a 
case about fundamental rights protection, Case, C-265/95, Commission of the European Communities v French 
Republic (Spanish Strawberries), ECR [1997] I-06959. Moreover, I have excluded the extensive body of case 
law handling environmental protection, even when it is qualified as a fundamental right. For an overview of this 




differently sourced fundamental rights, affect the discretional space. To be clear, this will also 
involve addressing how the mirroring of specific rights in a variety of sources, national and 
EUropean, does not significantly alter the operation of the margin of discretion-technique. In 
other words I will trace the interplay between the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion 
technique and the genesis of the fundamental rights source.  
      
 
6.2 EU Law Geography: The Internal Market 
 
As outlined above, this group of clearly qualified fundamental rights cases constitutes a 
subgroup of a broad and well-researched set of case law that deals with restrictions of the 
internal market. I will therefore succinctly contextualize the origin of, and the narratives 
triggered by, this subset of case law.  
     The internal market is the classic epicentre of the European Union integration process. Its 
expansion through the elimination of what have been considered obstacles to the free 
movement of people, goods, services and capital, has been the historic setting of core EU law 
achievements, and conflicts. Like, for example, the one between national social protection and 
the internal market, highlighted as a centrepiece of the intrusion narrative.  
     One might argue that this centrality was to be expected since the expansionist internal 
market has been the meeting point between core EU law and what have been conceived as 
national particularities. How some people buy and sell alcohol, 274  how some people 
gamble,275 how some people buy and sell sex,276 and, which is the focus here, how the EU and 
European peoples protect fundamental rights according to the CJEU, and what happens when 
that protection clashes with the internal market’s fundamental freedoms.  
     Fundamental rights as trade barriers however, could be understood as a more recent 
development triggered by, in the words of Weatherill “ingenious and well-funded litigants, 
able to exploit the ambiguous outer reach of EU trade law.”277 A perspective that is worth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Case C-458/06, Skatteverket v Gourmet Classic Ltd, ECR [2008] I-04207. 
275 Case C-275/92, Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v Gerhart Schindler and Jörg Schindler, ECR [1994] I-
01039. 
276 Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, ECR [2001] I-08615. 
277 Weatherill states that the “obvious – physical, discriminatory – trade barriers get tackled first, leading then in 
time to the excavation of and challenge to more subtle trade barriers. But the process is driven by ingenious and 
well-founded litigants, able to exploit the ambiguous outer reach of EU trade law, and strengthened further by 
the constitutional principles of direct effect and supremacy which ensure easy access to national courts in pursuit 
of their quest to liberalise the EU market.” See Weatherill, S 2013, From Economic Rights in Fundamental 
Rights, in de Vries, S, Bernitz, U and Weatherill, S (eds.), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU After 




keeping in mind since some of the cases discussed in this section may strike the reader as 
eccentric, rather than emblematic of European 21st century fundamental rights violations.   
     We are thus looking at a subset of a group of cases where the example par excellence of 
EU-unification, namely the internal market, meets something that could be constructed as 
nationally unique. Because of this set-up the diversity narrative finds inspiration in this type 
of case. According to the lines of argumentation of some of these commentators, if there is 
national discretional space within the internal market, clearly the CJEU takes national 
particularities seriously. In other words, there is a presumption in diversity commentary about 
this line of case law as examples of legal reasoning that uphold jurisdictional divides. This 
commentary understands the CJEU as sculpting the borders of national fundamental rights 
protection within the internal market, and as a consequence making the national separable 
from the EUropean.  
     In contrast to the diversity narrative, the way in which the unified European market clashes 
with the protection of fundamental rights will be studied as in the closest possible quarters. By 
this I mean a focus on the micro-interactions within the decision-making rather than 
understanding this line of case law as a choice between one out of two modes of protection 
offered by separable legal entities.  
    This chapter will discuss eight cases where the classic core of European integration meets 
fundamental rights sourced in different places, and where a margin of discretion is used to 
handle this encounter. The aim of this re-reading of frequently read case law is the 
deconstruction of the complex interconnected decision-making enabled by the use of national 
margins of discretion. 
 
 
6.3 Technicality: Imagined Balancing  
 
When studying the reasoning in this line of case law, where a margin of discretion is used to 
handle what the CJEU understands as a clash between a fundamental freedom and a 
fundamental right one feature stands out as distinct, namely the way in which the margin of 
discretion covers a decision where a balancing act is imagined to have taken place.  
     Imagined is used here to highlight how the act of balancing the competing interests of 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is attributed to a moment in time that has 




nothing in the case files suggest that the method used by the various national decision-makers 
was an act of balancing fundamental freedoms against fundamental rights in the strict sense.   
     The attribution of balance is done in the following way; first the CJEU identifies a clash 
between a fundamental freedom and a fundamental right in a specific legislative provision, or 
more frequently in an administrative decision. These identified interests are generally in line 
with the litigant’s claim. Specifically, the measure is understood by the CJEU as restricting 
one of the four fundamental internal market freedoms. Second, the CJEU attributes a 
balancing act to the contested national measure, which means that the national decision-maker 
is understood to have conducted a weighing of the competing interests at play. Third, the 
CJEU holds that the decision imagined to be based on a balancing-act is within a national 
margin of discretion. 
     Is the restriction justified, the CJEU subsequently asks? It then conducts a proportionality 
review of the decision placed within a margin of discretion, or alternatively and less 
frequently, the CJEU instructs the national court on how the proportionality principle should 
be handled. Accordingly, through the operationalization of the margin of discretion technique 
the national participates prior to the ultimate call on justifiability. By way of contrast, the 
CJEU could have simply reviewed the national decision, without inserting a balancing act. 
     The notion of imaginary balancing could be contrasted with the CJEU’s use of the 
deviation margin of discretion, which covers broadly constructed policy areas or subject 
matter.  
     The balance margin of discretion is restricted to the instance of balancing (or the presumed 
instance of balancing) which as such limits the discretional space in time. In the deviation 
margin of discretion-cases by contrast, the CJEU internalizes national policy choices and 
renders them the applicable standard of protection, which are not limited in time despite being 
potentially subject to revision. For instance, think about the example of the exclusion of 
women from military service as a CJEU-accepted deviation from the EU-sourced right to 
equal treatment between men and women. In that instance broadly constructed circumstances 
such as public security and violence are the triggers of the margin of discretion-technique. 
This comparison might help make clear how the balance margin of discretion is attached to a 
specific decision and not a certain type of right or a specific topic.  
     Arguably, within this adjudicative method where the balance margin of discretion is 
operationalized there is a set of complex temporal constructions, enabling interaction between 
the national and the European level. The CJEU’s interlocutor is the referring national court 




competing interests is supposed to have been conducted by the public official or by the 
legislator. This supposed encounter between a fundamental freedom and a fundamental right 
is in turn placed within a margin of discretion. The national, or indeed subnational decision is 
woven in this way into the net of internal market law and within that context constitutes the 
applicable standard of EU fundamental rights protection. What is imagined is thus not void 
but facilitates the participation of the national decision-makers in establishing the applicable 
standard of protection. 
     Moreover, this imaginary balance-construction allows for interesting moves in perspective 
– from the detailed, usually local decision that triggered the case in the first place (micro-
perspective), to the attributed balancing act between norms of high importance such as 
fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms (wide-perspective). However, it is not the aim 
of the fundamental rights protection per se that is placed within a margin of discretion (such 






This is a method that differs from the diversity narrator’s reading of these cases, which 
centres on deference directed to the nationally unique output of national fundamental rights 
protection. The picture I intend to draw sketches a more complex form of interaction.  
     I therefore divide the construction of the balance margin of discretion into two separate 
sections to better deconstruct the national element in this typology of margin of discretion. In 
The	  National	  Constitution	  
and	  the	  EU	  FR	  Material	  	  
An	  administrative	  decision	  taken	  
on	  the	  basis	  or	  for	  the	  protection	  
of	  a	  fundamental	  right	  guaranteed	  
in	  the	  national	  constitution	  or	  
some	  other	  applicable	  EU	  FR	  
source	  
The	  CJEU	  attributes	  
balance	  with	  a	  FF	  
through	  a	  margin	  of	  
discretion	  
Legislative	  provision	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  
protecting	  a	  fundamental	  right	  
guaranteed	  in	  the	  national	  constitution	  
or	  in	  some	  other	  applicable	  EU	  FR	  
source	  	  
The	  CJEU	  attributes	  
balance	  with	  a	  FF	  





particular, I use this presentation method to illustrate that the balance margin of discretion 
technique in the Schmidberger-line does not draw on the homogeneously national in its legal 
reasoning (1), and even when the national outputs of a Member State’s constitutional 
protection features in the CJEU’s legal reasoning, as in the Omega-line, the margin of 
discretion technique continues to enable interconnected decision-making (2).  
 
 
6.4 Examples of Balance Margins of Discretion 
 
6.4.1 National Margins of Discretion to Balance Equal Weight 
The CJEU’s ruling in Schmidberger received much attention when it was handed down in 
2003. And it continues to be a centrepiece in any analysis of the CJEU’s legal reasoning when 
adjudicating fundamental rights.278 The case sets out what appears to be a method of how to 
handle straightforward clashes between a fundamental freedom and a fundamental right. 
Eugen Schmidberger, the owner of a transport undertaking, accused a lawful environmental 
demonstration on the Brenner motorway in Austria of limiting his right to free movement of 
goods. The enjoyment of a fundamental freedom is contrasted with the enjoyment of the 
fundamental rights to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. 
     In Schmidberger for the first time the CJEU transparently places a fundamental freedom 
on one side of the scale and a fundamental right on the other and operationalizes a margin of 
discretion. However it was not the first time the CJEU was asked to handle a conflict 
structured in a similar fashion and formulate a comparable legal solution.279 In particular in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Case C-112/00, Eugen Schmidberger Internationale Transporte v Republik Österreich ECR [2003] I-05659. 
279 Danish Bottles from 1988 and Familiapress from 1997 frequently serve as reference points for case law in the 
Schmidberger-line and have very similar structures. Danish Bottles lacks both fundamental rights language and 
references to a margin of discretion. However, so as to structure the free movement of goods clashes with 
environmental protection (not qualified as a fundamental right) embodied in the particular Scandinavian version 
of designing bottles to facilitate their recycling, the Court states that the protection of the environment is “one of 
the Community central objectives, which may as such justify certain limitations to the free movement of goods,” 
but ultimately the measure is deemed disproportionate. Case 302/86, Commission of the European Communities 
v Kingdom of Denmark, ECR [1988] 04607, para 8. Familiapress, which explicitly rejects a margin of discretion 
but is however a straightforward fundamental rights case, addresses the question of whether or not provisions 
aimed at protecting press diversity could constitute an overriding requirement justifying a restriction of the free 
movement of goods and, simultaneously, an acceptable limitation of freedom of expression as guaranteed in 
article 10 ECHR. In this case the Court rejects the use of a “degree of latitude to determine what is required” in 
terms of protection. Instead, the CJEU asks the national court to perform a proportionality review (“it is for the 
national Court to determine whether those conditions are satisfied on the basis of a study of the Austrian press 
market”) and gives detailed instructions as to what should be taken into consideration when performing the test. 
Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag ECR 
[1997] I-03689, paras. 28-31. It is a deferential case that outsources the proportionality principle but its does not 
operationalize a margin of discretion. However, because of the broadly constructed proportionality test, I find 




Spanish Strawberries from 1997, the CJEU uses a margin of discretion but omits reference to 
fundamental rights.280 In Schmidberger however, the CJEU retroactively requalifies the 
conflict in Spanish Strawberries as one between the free movement of goods and the right to 
assembly and freedom of speech, and therefore I include this case in this chapter.281 
     In Spanish Strawberries, the European Commission accused France, and especially its 
police force, of not safeguarding the free movement of goods by not preventing French 
farmers from hindering the entry of Spanish strawberries into France by means of (at times) 
aggressive demonstrations.  
     The significance of Spanish Strawberries lies in its comparability to Schmidberger and the 
Court’s statement that the Member States must take all necessary and appropriate measures to 
ensure that that fundamental freedom is respected in that territory. In the latter context, the 
Member States, retaining exclusive competence as regards the maintenance of public order 
and the safeguarding of internal security, unquestionably enjoy a margin of discretion in 
determining what measures are most appropriate to eliminating barriers to the importations of 
products in a given situation.”282  
     In other words, the CJEU understands the activity (or lack thereof) of French police as 
being guided by the respect for fundamental freedoms on the hand, and appropriately handles 
barriers, that is to say demonstrations, on the other. This weighing of interests is placed within 
a margin of discretion.   
     However, it falls on the Court to verify whether “the Member State concerned has adopted 
appropriate measures.”283 In other words, the actions of the French police will be ex post 
facto reviewed by the CJEU.  
     This structure is largely upheld in Schmidberger. But the reasoning in the latter case is 
more transparent and concerns one decision, whereas Spanish Strawberries concerns series of 
decisions.  
     In Schmidberger the CJEU starts by stating that a demonstration, which embodies the right 
to freedom of speech and the right to assembly, may be a justifiable a restriction of one of the 
four economic freedoms. 284  This affirmation that a fundamental right can restrict a 
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demonstrations, Schmidberger, paras. 84 -88. 
282 Spanish Strawberries, para. 32-33 (emphasis added). 
283 Spanish Strawberries, para. 33 and 35 (emphasis added). 




fundamental freedom by virtue of being qualified as a fundamental right is what makes 
Schmidberger novel. 
     More importantly for present purposes however, in reconciling freedom of expression and 
the right to assembly with the free movement of goods, a fair balance must be struck between 
the two, and “the national authorities enjoy a wide margin of discretion in that regard.”285 In 
other words, the administrative decision that allowed the demonstration was within a margin 
of discretion, and according to the Court this decision embodied a balancing act between the 
freedom of movement of goods and the rights of freedom of speech and assembly. 
     Subsequently, the Court states that it is its responsibility to “determine whether the 
restrictions placed upon intra-Community trade are proportionate in the light of […] the 
protection of fundamental rights.”286  
     Consequently, the Court gives a series of arguments in favour of the proportionality of 
Austria’s “omission” of not banning the demonstration or restricting it, and concludes that 
“the national authorities were reasonably entitled, having regard to the wide margin of 
discretion which must be accorded to them,” to consider that the aim of the demonstration (to 
demonstrate against air pollution), could not be achieved by measures less restrictive of intra-
Community trade.287   
     What does the Court achieve by referring to a margin of discretion? The national decision 
in the hands of the CJEU is transformed into a) a balancing act between equally weighing 
interests, and b) by way of ex post facto review the applicable standard of EU fundamental 
rights protection.  
     This template crafted in Schmidberger is micro-interaction within the framework of an 
adjudication process. As such, this case interestingly allows one decision to embody a 
massive clash but in order to rein in the scope of national discretion to handle such clashes the 
margin of discretion encompasses only the specific decision. This move, which I have 
labelled the balance margin of discretion, is the method that the CJEU uses to allow the 
national level to participate in the elaboration of the applicable standard while simultaneously 
defining the legal considerations of the decision-making (imaginary balancing) and reviewing 
the outcome. 
     This later proportionality review by the CJEU is not formulated as a question of whether or 
not the Member State went outside of its margin of discretion when deciding how to handle 
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the respective demonstrations, rather the CJEU elaborates on criteria and examines if the 
measure was reasonable (Schmidberger), appropriate (Spanish Strawberries), and 
proportionate (both cases). This illustrates how the Member State’s margin of discretion in 
these cases, although described as wide and unquestionable, can be coupled with a 
proportionality test that limits the actual discretional space. It is not, which should be 
underlined, a margin of discretion to protect freedom of speech and the corollary rights that 
come with it in whatever way the national level seems fit. It is thus not deference to a 
fundamental right in its national expression. It is deference to a national decision that 
presumably balanced a fundamental right and a fundamental freedom.  
     Staying with the free movement of goods, the CJEU applies the Schmidberger balance in 
the slightly differently styled Karner, where free movement of goods and free speech (for 
commercial purposes) on the one hand clashes with a legislative provision aimed at ensuring 
the right to consumer protection in the context of advertisement.288  
    Here the CJEU is attributing balancing to a piece of legislation addressing consumer 
protection, not an administrative decision, and it states: “It is common ground that the 
discretion enjoyed by the national authorities in determining the balance to be struck between 
freedom of expression and the abovementioned objectives varies for each of the goals 
justifying restrictions on that freedom and depends on the nature of the activities in question. 
When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to a discussion of public interest and, in 
addition, arises in a context in which the Member States have a certain amount of discretion, 
review is limited to an examination of the reasonableness and proportionality of the 
interference. This holds true for the commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in 
a field as complex and fluctuating as advertising.”289  
     The CJEU thus places a legislative provision within a margin of discretion and performs a 
loose review, which is motivated primarily by the fact that the freedom of expression at stake 
is merely for commercial purposes. 
     I will now turn to a case where the CJEU uses a margin of discretion to handle legislation 
and administrative decisions in a more complex fashion. In United Pan-Europe 
Communications freedom of services encounters cultural policy aiming at maintaining media 
pluralism. In meticulously bi-lingual Belgium, four broadcasting companies challenged a 
must-carry provision, which required these companies (carriers) to broadcast programmes 
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decided by the Belgian authorities.290 In other words, these companies could not choose freely 
what to broadcast (nota bene, not an exceptional practice in the 20th century).  
     The CJEU concludes that media pluralism (embodied in the state guaranteeing bi-lingual 
television) is connected with the freedom of expression guaranteed by both the ECHR and the 
EU legal order. The Court subsequently examines whether the national legislation could 
justify a restriction on the free movement of services and states that “while the maintenance 
of pluralism, through a cultural policy, is connected with the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression and, accordingly, that the national authorities have a wide margin of discretion in 
that regard (…) measures designed to implement such a policy must in no case be 
disproportionate (…).”291 
     However, the CJEU continues by saying that “such legislation cannot render legitimate 
discretionary conduct on the part of the national authorities which is liable to negate the 
effectiveness of (…) a fundamental freedom (…).” The CJEU concludes that the award of 
must-carry status must be based on transparent criteria “to ensure that the discretion vested in 
Member States is not exercised arbitrarily.”292 
     Since the dispute originates in a legislative provision the margin of discretion is both 
arranged differently compared to Schmidberger, which concerned a specific decision, and in 
contrast to Karner it encompasses future balancing-acts based on the legislative provision. 
Indeed, what seems to be a limitation of the discretional space is a construction whereby the 
CJEU gives the national level a margin of discretion in the specific future instances when 
their competent national authorities award a must-carry status. 
     It should be clarified that with this structure of designating the margin of discretion to 
cover the balancing act taken by administrative bodies, the legislative provision is kept in 
place and will not be altered. In other words, the CJEU is not satisfied with merely stating that 
the provision in itself, textually and without application, is within the margin of discretion of 
the Member State. The margin of discretion is clearly more carefully and narrowly 
constructed.  
     An underlying distinction is emblematic of this typology: the margin of discretion is 
triggered by the provision’s aim of protecting a fundamental right but the margin of discretion 
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is understood to be operationalized in every decision on the award of must-carry status. These 
future decisions should balance the interest of protecting the right to freedom of expression 
whilst not “negating the effectiveness” of the fundamental freedom of services. It is thus not a 
margin of discretion placed around the right to freedom of expression but instead it is a 
margin of discretion to balance the right to freedom of expression (understood as the 
maintenance of media pluralism) against freedom of services in future administrative 
decisions on the award of must-carry status.  
     Moreover, the CJEU also gives careful instruction on how the proportionality of these 
decisions should be reviewed ex post facto by the national courts. The Court’s detailed 
remarks are again a sign of a close review by the CJEU of the Member States’ actions within 
their ascertained area of discretion.  
     In 2010, Pérez and Gómez follows up on the United Pan-Europe Communications-
structure. In this case, a Spanish legislative provision regulated where pharmacists could open 
pharmacies, in particular concerning minimum distance vis-à-vis other pharmacies.293 José 
Manuel Blanco Pérez and María del Pilar Chao Gómez, both pharmacists, challenged the 
legislation on the grounds that it violated the freedom of establishment.  
     Without much eloquence, the CJEU starts by explaining that “the health and life of 
humans rank foremost among the assets and interests protected by the Treaty.”294 It then 
operates as usual by affirming that the provision constitutes a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment, which could be justified by the protection of public health. The CJEU then 
goes on to argue, and this is how Pérez and Gómez becomes a case structured as a rights clash 
type of case, albeit hesitantly, that the interest of public health is reinforced by the Charter, 
where it is affirmed in article 35. In other words, the interest of public health is guaranteed in 
the Charter and the CJEU makes a point of establishing this connection. As stated earlier, the 
CJEU may omit such references even though the Charter per se provides ample textual space 
for drawing such connections.  
     The margin of discretion (the wording in the case is “measure of discretion”) is organized 
in the same way as the one granted in United Pan-Europe Communications.295 The right to 
public health triggers the use of a margin of discretion, but as always, it is not broadly placed 
around this subject matter but operationalized in the licencing procedure for opening new 
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Consejería de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios and Principado de Asturias, ECR [2010] 2010 I-04629.  
294 Pérez and Gómez, para. 44. In french ”il doit être tenu compte du fait que la santé et la vie des personnes 
occupent le premier rang parmi les biens et les intérêts protégés par le traité (..).” 




pharmacies provided for in the legislation, which will be carried out by the competent 
authorities.296  
     The Court essentially resolves the case by accepting the legislative provision, adding 
however that the competing interests at play must be balanced when according licences in 
future cases. It is for the national court to decide whether or not this is done and will be 
proportionate. In other words, just like in United Pan-Europe Communications, the CJEU 
states that it is for the national court to review these decisions taken by the competent national 
authorities while performing a balancing act. 
     Looking at Spanish Strawberries, Schmidberger, Karner, United Pan-Europe 
Communications and Pérez and Gómez, it is important to note the judicial construction 
whereby the CJEU understands the national decisions to contain, or as containing in future 
decisions, a balancing act where different interests of equal legal value are weighed against 
each other. This means that the CJEU organizes its reasoning so that the national discretional 
space is limited to a decision or a specific legislative provision, not an area of national policy 
or a fundamental right per se. The balance margin of discretion thus signals that the original 
decision, which was challenged by the litigant, will remain intact. 
     As to the rhetoric of the margin of discretion, the motivation for using the technique is 
drawn from the fundamental rights status of the legal source that is at stake. The fundamental 
rights are traced back to the mirroring EU-source in all of these cases. This could be done in 
addition to a national fundamental rights source or without an additional national source 
having been relied upon by the litigants in the case. In other words, the margin of discretion is 
not attached to the nationally unique in the fundamental rights source at stake. Rather, it is the 
national reading of a fundamental right that the CJEU qualifies as also stemming from EU 
sources, which is given space to exist within the parameters of the CJEU’s adjudication. This 
rhetoric might thus indicate the significance of the CJEU qualifying a case as being about a 
fundamental right compared to when it does not.297   
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and even substantial adverse consequences, for certain operators. Secondly, according to the file, the competent 
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6.4.2 The National as Counterweight 
So far I have highlighted instances of national decision-making being understood as 
embodying a balance between equally weighted interests. Without attributing more weight to 
a fundamental right than a fundamental freedom, the CJEU has nevertheless signalled the 
importance of fundamental rights status for triggering the use of a margin of discretion. 
     In this section the national quality is added to this picture. It could be argued that the 
uniquely national feature of the protection of the fundamental right serves as an accumulative 
criterion to the source’s fundamental right-status. According to the Court, these qualities 
together then motivate the use of a margin of discretion and the national quality adds weight 
to the fundamental right in its confrontation with the fundamental freedom.  
     However, notwithstanding the CJEU’s emphasis on the national quality, the structure 
whereby a fair balance is struck within the closed context of one specific national measure 
remains. This means that the pattern whereby the margin of discretion enables interconnected 
elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection is one that recurs. 
While the national considerations are given more weight, they are still understood as having 
been made compatible with the interests of a specific internal market freedom of movement. 
     In Omega, the starting point of this line of case law, the Bonn police authorities in early 
autumn of 1994 issued a prohibition order which read that Omega Spielhallen, which 
organized laserdrome games in part imported from the United Kingdom, was forbidden from 
“facilitating or allowing in its […] establishment games with the object of firing on human 
targets using a laser beam or other technical devices (such as infrared, for example), thereby, 
by recording shots hitting their targets, “playing at killing” people […].”298 The police 
authorities supported their decision on the basis of the maintenance of public order through 
prohibiting insults on the constitutional value of human dignity.  
     Omega Spielhallen appealed the decision, and 10 years later the CJEU had to give an 
answer to the question of whether the restriction of the free movement of services for reasons 
arising from the protection of human dignity was compatible with EU law.  
     Essentially, the margin of discretion is motivated, as distinct from its location in 
Schmidberger, as a consequence of the fact that recourse to the concept of public policy, such 
as establishing the essence of human dignity, may vary from one country to the other.  
     This first part of the judgement leading up to the margin of discretion could fruitfully be 
broken down into smaller units of legal reasoning to better illustrate how the CJEU shares 
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interpretative authority. First, the CJEU states that the protection of public policy is an 
acceptable derogation from the right to freedom of movement of services regulated in primary 
law. Since it is uncontested that the Bonn police authority’s order was taken with the aim of 
guaranteeing the right to human dignity and ultimately averting threats to public policy, the 
CJEU could have moved directly to the proportionality test. However it does not. This is an 
important point in terms of identifying what the use of the margin of discretion technique is 
signalling. At this point the Court states that it retains the power to perform judicial review of 
the contested police order, especially since the Member State cannot determine the scope of 
freedom of services unilaterally.299 Thus, the CJEU must remain involved in determining the 
scope of freedom of services. However, directly following this statement, the Court opens up 
its judicial review process by affirming that the “fact remains, however, that the specific 
circumstances which may justify recourse to the concepts of public policy may vary from one 
country to another and from one era to another. The competent national authorities must 
therefore be allowed a “margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.”300  
     In issuing that prohibition order limiting the free movement of services for the sake of 
protecting the right to human dignity, the policy authorities of Bonn were operating within a 
margin of discretion. If human dignity is not protected, to use the language of the CJEU, a 
danger is posed to public policy. The margin of discretion is explicitly constructed with 
reference to the primary law provision on public policy. Yet this does not alter the structure of 
the margin of discretion as addressing one decision, which in the understanding of the Court 
has found a balance between competing interests. However, the national or indeed sub-
national (the Bonn precinct) qualities of the human dignity consideration are given a lot of 
weight in the CJEU’s subsequent proportionality review of the order, ex post facto understood 
as having been taken within a margin of discretion. 
    When the CJEU performs the proportionality review it maintains that the contested 
decision corresponds to “the level of protection of human dignity which the national 
constitution seeks to guarantee in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.”301 This 
correspondence, albeit unconvincingly evidenced, emphasises how the national works as a 
counterweight when the CJEU ex post facto reviews the justifiability of the decisions that the 
Bonn police authority took within its margin of discretion. Subsequently and more in line 
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300 Omega, para. 31. This formula is re-used in Case C-208/09, Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann 
von Wien, ECR [2010] I-13693, para. 87. 




with orthodox proportionality review, the CJEU underlines that the Bonn police authority 
only prohibited the variant of laser game where the simulated target is human.   
     In sum, unlike in Schmidberger, there is an identification of the national dimension of the 
rights protection, not only a focus on aligning with Union-law rights sources.302 Beneath this 
deceivingly emphasized identification of the uniquely German way of protecting human 
dignity I maintain that one finds the core of the balance margin of discretion. This is 
especially so since the margin of discretion is constructed as addressing one specific 
administrative decision understood to guarantee the protection of the human dignity of the 
people of the Federal City of Bonn in harmony with the freedom of movement of services. 
This decision, which embodies an acceptable compromise between competing interests, 
becomes the applicable standard of protection. As such the national authorities participate 
dominantly in the formulation of the EU’s standard of protection, but the CJEU both blends 
EU law considerations into the national decision and performs a proportionality review. 
Indeed, the margin of discretion does not belong simply to the right to human dignity but to 
the specific decision-making by the Bonn police authority that restricted the free movement of 
services.  
     In Dynamic Medien the CJEU continues in the same vein and asks the question whether or 
not the rights of the child constitute a justified restriction of the free movement of goods.303 
The Germany media distribution-company Dynamic Media complained that its competitor 
Avides Media, by mail order sales in Germany of Japanese cartoons bearing only an age-limit 
label from British authorities, acted in breach of the provisions of the German legislation on 
the protection of young persons. 
     The CJEU examines a set of fundamental rights sources and finds that the EU Charter 
protects the rights of the child and that there are significant United Nations sources 
identifying the rights of the child. Here, the CJEU might appear to open up a common 
European reading of the rights of the child.  
     Instead, the CJEU draws a distinction between the shared concept of the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the child, and what it understands as the various national conceptions 
by affirming that: “As that conception may vary from one Member State to another on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 See Omega, para 34 and, by contrast Schmidberger, para. 75. Indeed the laserdrome equipment was imported 
from the United Kingdom, without being stopped by any police authority, and so the CJEU de facto 
accommodates two different visions of human dignity, stemming from two different Member States.  




basis of, inter alia, moral or cultural views, Member States must be recognised as having a 
definite margin of discretion.304  
     So, like in Omega but without a link to treaty based public policy derogations, the Court 
affirms that the difference in fundamental rights protection between the Member States may 
motivate the use of a national margin of discretion. Unlike both Schmidberger and Omega, 
the CJEU does not simply move from qualifying the rights of the child as a legitimate interest 
to reviewing the proportionality of the contested legislative provision. Instead the Court opens 
up the judicial review process and operationalizes a margin of discretion. 
     In Dynamic Medien, the margin of discretion is understood to demarcate a legislative 
provision which allows the free movement of goods to live “in conformity” with the German 
conception of how the rights of the child is best guaranteed. 305  Hence, the Court 
operationalizes the core structure of the balance margin of discretion. Again, the technique 
does not embrace a specific fundamental right but it belongs to a specific legislative provision 
in which the CJEU ex posto facto identifies that a certain conception of the rights of the child 
is fairly balanced (“in conformity”) with the requirements stemming from the free movement 
of goods.  
    Subsequently, the weight of the national quality resonates in the criteria guiding the 
proportionality review of this provision, which is within a margin of discretion. Indeed the 
proportionality review is constructed very loosely. The Court concludes that the measure to 
require a label indicating the suitable age for image storage media is a suitable means of 
obtaining the goal of protecting children and that it appears that the rule is necessary to attain 
the objective concerned. Thereafter it allocates the ultimate evaluation of proportionality to 
the national court.306 
     It is important to note that notwithstanding the similarity in reasoning, the discretional 
space in Dynamic Median is arguably broader than in Omega. This is so since within the 
reasoning of the former case the margin of discretion is operationalized in the context of a 
legislative provision applicable throughout Germany, whereas the administrative decisions at 
issue in Omega only bind a limited geographical area, despite the CJEU affirming that the 
decision appears to reflect the standards of the German constitution.  
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     In Sayn-Wittgenstein the applicant was born during WW2 in Vienna, and in 1991, when 
she was 47 years old, the German citizen Lothar Fürst von Sayn-Wittgenstein adopted her and 
she was subsequently given the name Ilonka Fürstin von Sayn-Wittgenstein.307 During the 
period of time of her adoption and at the time of the proceedings before the CJEU she lived in 
Germany.  
     On 27 November 2003, the Austrian Constitutional Court held that, as summarized by the 
CJEU, “the Law on the abolition of the nobility, which is of constitutional status and 
implements the principle of equal treatment in this field, precludes an Austrian citizen from 
acquiring a surname which includes a former title of nobility by means of adoption by a 
German national who is permitted to bear that title as a constituent element of his name: in 
accordance with the Law on the abolition of the nobility, Austrian citizens are not authorised 
to bear titles of nobility, including those of foreign origin.”  
     This ruling in turn triggered the State Governor of Vienna to write a letter to the applicant 
in the main proceeding stating that he would proceed to correct her surname in the Austrian 
civil status registry to Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein. She questioned the lawfulness of this 
decision. This conflict eventually ends up before the CJEU and the Court has to decide 
whether or not this decision by the State Governor, which according to the applicant restricts 
freedom of movement, is justifiable on the grounds that the Austrian abolition of formal 
nobility embodies the fundamental right to equal treatment. 
     At the outset of the CJEU’s reasoning, the national functions as a counterweight in a 
balancing act, which the State Governor of Vienna is understood to have conducted when 
writing the letter ordering Sayn-Wittgenstein’s name to be changed. The CJEU states “in the 
context of Austrian constitutional history, the Law on the abolition of the nobility, as an 
element of national identity, may be taken into consideration when a balance is struck 
between legitimate interests and the right of free movement of persons recognised under 
European Union law.”  
     Subsequently, the CJEU follows Omega and qualifies this form of equal treatment as 
public policy and states that “the concept of public policy may vary from one Member State 
to another and one era to another. The competent national authorities must therefore be 
allowed a margin of discretion within the limits imposed by the Treaty.”  
     The CJEU immediately follows this affirmation by stating that equal treatment is a general 
principle of EU law that is inter alia protected by the Charter. However, to be clear, the CJEU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




does not provide an EU-general reading of equal protection but uses the margin of discretion-
technique to turn the Austrian reading of equal treatment in the specific instance of the State 
Governor’s order of name change, into the applicable standard of protection 
     Notwithstanding the heavy national rhetoric manifested in the rich references to national 
constitutional law, to national identity, to article 4(2) TEU, and to the de facto preserved 
difference in standard of protection between Austria and Germany, the CJEU ultimately does 
not leave any part of the proportionality review to the national court but unilaterally answers 
that question of proportionality in the affirmative.308 
     Sayn-Wittgenstein represents an example of how a balance margin of discretion is 
addressed to a decision that is ex post facto understood to contain a balancing act between 
competing interests. The CJEU thus intervenes in what prima facie appears to be national 
dominance in term of interpretative authority. Firstly, by ex post facto inserting EU law 
considerations into the State Governor’s decision-making, and secondly by conducting a 
proportionality review of the decision taken within the margin of discretion. Both legal 
reasoning interventions are emblematic of this line of case law.  
     Just as in Spanish Strawberries, Schmidberger, Karner, United Pan-Europe 
Communications, and Pérez and Góme, there is a visible judicial construction whereby the 
CJEU understands the national decisions to contain, or to contain in future decisions, a 
balancing act or an act of making different interests compatible, and where this decision or 
provision, which embodies the outcome of this weighing of interests, is subsequently placed 
within a margin of discretion. The CJEU accordingly organizes its reasoning so that the 
national discretional space is limited to this decision or a specific legislative provision, not an 
area of national policy or a fundamental right per se.  
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     Omega, Dynamic Medien and Sayn-Wittgenstein have the added distinct feature that they 
handle two different ideas of one specific conception of fundamental right protection (human 
dignity, the right of the child, and equal treatment). I have highlighted this acceptance of 
national, or indeed sub-national difference in relation to each case. I have also underlined how 
this approach, taken together with the use of a margin of discretion to signal that the contested 
decision or legislative provision represents a balanced approach to a fundamental 
right/fundamental freedom-clash, embodies an interactive form of elaboration of the 
applicable standard of protection rather than a choice between one of two modes of protection 
offered by separable EUropean and national legal entities.    
     Moreover the way in which the CJEU couples these references to national conceptions to 
the “mirroring” EU fundamental rights source should be noted.309 This exercise underlines 
how the applicable standard of protection, with its core in the national reading placed within a 
margin of discretion, is connected to EU law sources. In other words, the CJEU affirms that 
the applicable standard of protection is connected and not alien to the EU law sources, even 
though the CJEU does not aim to provide a unified or autonomous reading of the EU source.  
 
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks: Signalling Balance 
 
I have delineated how a paradigmatic clash between two often-analysed sets of norms turns 
into micro-interaction with peculiar temporal twists. In particular, I have shown how this 
process has been facilitated by a balance margin of discretion.  
     The margin of discretion signals that the contested national, or perhaps sub-national 
decision aimed at guaranteeing the protection of a fundamental right remains intact. However, 
the CJEU participates in establishing the applicable standard of protection by ex post facto 
formulating the motivation of the decision by attributing an act of reconciliation of competing 
interests. In addition, the CJEU participates in the elaboration by conducting a more or less 
strict proportionality review.  
     This adjudicative scheme moves the legal events both in time and in perspective from a 
local decision to a grand clash of EU fundamentals, only to land in a carefully carved out 
discretional space where the rationales of the contested decision are determined retroactively 
and its outcome is reviewed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




     This picture contrasts with ideas that could be associated with the diversity narrative’s 
vision of how clashes between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights traceable to 
national constitutions should be resolved along jurisdictional lines, by which I mean handled 
as a choice between one out of two modes of protection offered by separable legal entities.  
     In contrast to these categories received by the diversity narrative however, the balance 
margin of discretion does not belong to a specific fundamental right. Instead, the balance 
margin of discretion belongs to a decision or a specific provision representing a composite set 
of interests.  
     Therefore despite the fact that the diversity narrators often return to this group of cases, I 
have aimed to show how notwithstanding the national rhetoric, the CJEU handles the national 
decision by constructing its motivations and EU rationales, which enables a common 
elaboration of the applicable standard of protection. Thus, importantly, the national decision-
maker does not unilaterally formulate what ends up being the applicable standard of 
protection.  
     Given this picture, one could think of the margin of discretion as a device which signals 
that the original contested national measure will remain intact, even though its rationales will 
be elaborated by the CJEU. This perspective is particularly useful for this margin of discretion 
typology since it is derived from a vast body of internal market case law. In other words, it is 
a useful way of understanding the difference in outcome between when a margin of discretion 
is used and when it is not used.  
    As is well known, Viking and its sister-case Laval have been the subject of criticism in 
commentary for, among other reasons, the CJEU’s failure to use a margin of discretion as it 
did in Omega and Schmidberger.310 Most importantly, and as explained earlier, this criticism 
has been developed by intrusion narrators who hold that these cases are emblematic examples 
of the intrusiveness of the Court’s adjudication of fundamental freedoms. Understood in the 
context of the interconnected decision-making enabled by the margin of discretion-technique, 
Viking and Laval might be better understood as exceptional, rather than emblematic, examples 
of how the CJEU handles clashes between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. 
Still, Viking and Laval represent an opportunity to reflect on the difference between the use 
and the non-use of a balance margin of discretion.  
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     In Viking the right to take collective action clashes with the freedom of establishment, and 
in Laval with freedom of services. The clash-creating trade union whose action is accused of 
restricting the freedom of establishment and services respectively, is not ascribed a balancing 
act. Instead the EU as a whole, according to the Court, aims to achieve balance. 311 In Laval 
the CJEU concludes straightforwardly that the strike constitutes a disproportionate restriction 
and is therefore not allowed under EU law. In Viking the referring English Court is given the 
task of deciding on the proportionality of the collective action governed by Finnish law, under 
the close supervision of the CJEU.312 
     This chapter has aimed to show that the balance margin of discretion ultimately functions 
as a legal reasoning method through which the CJEU involves the national decision-makers, 
while remaining involved itself. In Viking and Laval that possibility of an interactive 
establishment of the applicable standard of protection was not used. The result is arguably 
two of the most criticized rulings in the history of the CJEU. 
     Perhaps the imaginary balancing would have been taken to its extreme in Viking and 
Laval. How can a trade union, which functions to preserve and promote the interests of its 
members, be understood as having been conducting a balance between the equally weighted 
rights to strike and one of the internal market freedoms?  
     As unreasonable as such a question may seem, the CJEU has indeed attributed such 
balancing to trade unions and collective agreements, namely in Commission v Germany, 
without however subsequently operationalizing a margin of discretion.313  
     With these examples of non-uses of the technique in mind, when analysing the method 
running through the cases in this chapter it is important to appreciate the way in which the 
balance margin of discretion facilitates interaction between the national decision-makers and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 The proportionality test in Viking is closely supervised by the CJEU through its formulation of detailed 
criteria. It should be observed that the Court in the following statement is British and the legislation is Finnish, 
see para. 85: ”it must be pointed out that, even if it is ultimately for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction 
to assess the facts and interpret the national legislation, to determine whether and to what extent such collective 
action meets those requirements, the Court of Justice, which is called on to provide answers of use to the 
national court, may provide guidance, based on the file in the main proceedings and on the written and oral 
observations which have been submitted to it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment in the 
particular case before it.”.  
312 This case was later settled outside of court. 
313 See Case C-271/08, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, ECR [2010] I-07091, para. 85. 
The ”TV-EUmw/VKA” is the contested provision of a collective agreement, please take note of the reference to 
Schmidberger: ”Answering this question entails verification, in the light of the material in the file, as to whether, 
when establishing the content of Paragraph 6 of TV-EUmw/VKA, which is referred to by the Commission in its 
action inasmuch as that paragraph served as the basis for the contract awards at issue, a fair balance was struck 
in the account taken of the respective interests involved, namely enhancement of the level of the retirement 
pensions of the workers concerned, on the one hand, and attainment of freedom of establishment and of the 
freedom to provide services, and opening-up to competition at European Union level, on the other (see, by 




the CJEU. The original encounter between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights (ex 
post facto) embodied in the contested national measured is preserved in its core and the CJEU 
remains involved since it attributes balancing and, to varying degrees, performs a 
proportionality test.  
     This is what the balance margin of discretion signals, which is distinct from a scenario 
with a similar legal conflict but without an operationalization of a margin of discretion. The 
balance margin of discretion is not a mechanism that predictably turns on when certain 
conditions are met. This is an important point for individual litigants. Indeed, because of the 
national margin of discretion being thoroughly tied to specific moments, provisions and 
decisions, these cases do not necessarily serve as a roadmap for subsequent litigants. It is the 
CJEU alone that signals when it will share interpretative authority through the use of a 



























7. The Compliance Margin of Discretion 
 
* 
In this chapter I will show that the margin of discretion-technique has been used by the CJEU 
to ensure compliance between secondary EU legislation and fundamental rights protection. At 
the heart of this type of case one finds a litigant who argues that provisions of a directive or a 
regulation violate a fundamental right.        
     This is a distinct type of use of the method in the area of fundamental rights because it is 
not designed to handle a decision embodying a clash between internal market law and 
fundamental rights like the balance margin of discretion, or to accommodate deviations from 
EU fundamental rights like the deviation margin of discretion. Rather, the CJEU answers by 
giving a margin of discretion to enable the competent national authority to apply EU law in 
compliance with fundamental rights. Here, in contrast to a more classical judicial review 
scenario where the CJEU either nullifies the challenged piece of secondary legislation or 
declare it fundamental rights compliant, the compliance margin of discretion, operating at the 
stage of application, represents a third way.  
     As a consequence of these characteristics the technique has limited traction within the 
three dominant narratives. Take the intrusion narrative. The notion that the CJEU is reluctant 
to nullify EU secondary legislation on fundamental rights grounds (hence not taking right 
seriously) is central to the critique formulated by intrusion narrators and fits, on the face of it, 
with the compliance margin of discretion-method that ultimately saves EU law from 
nullification.  However, the intrusion narrative’s main act of intrusion is linked to the CJEU’s 
expanding adjudication and authoritatively overriding of national courts over both ordinary 
legislation and constitutions. In contrast to this fear held by intrusion narrators, the 
compliance margin of discretion leaves the competent national authorities a margin of 
discretion to independently handle EU sources.  
     At the same time, improvement narrators find very little worth appreciating in a system 
where the CJEU outsources the responsibility for diligently reviewing the EU legislation’s 
fundamental right compliance. Moreover, the compliance margin of discretion allows for non-
unitary application of EU law, which disrupts the idea of the EU as a potentially progressive 
fundamental rights standard-setter. 
     Equally, the diversity narrators, albeit in principle appreciative of non-unitary 




unique. Instead, the reader of this strand of margin of discretion-use is confronted with a 
strikingly functionalist approach, where the competent national authorities are engaged in 
avoiding the nullification of EU legislation. 
     The mapping of this use of national discretion will start with Stauder from 1969,314 the 
first case in which the CJEU recognized fundamental rights, but perhaps also the first step 
towards the operationalization of national discretion for fundamental rights compliance. 
Thereafter, the in-depth inquiry into the use of this technique begins with a substantial re-
reading of the Wachauf-case from 1989.315 I will argue that Wachauf is not only about judicial 
review of a Member State’s action but also contains a margin of discretion to ensure that EU 
law is fundamental rights compliant.  
     Continuing this same line of inquiry, I will turn to the Parliament v Council-line of case 
law, which reconnects explicitly with the method used in Wachauf,316 and thereafter turn to 
Lindqvist,317 where the CJEU gives the competent national authority discretional space to 
interpret EU law in compliance with fundamental rights.  
     All of this will suggest a way of reformulating the possible routes in a supranational 
fundamental rights-based judicial review scenario.318 This reformulation, though traceable to 
case law dating back to 1969, defies the dominant narratives of improvement, intrusion and 
diversity, ultimately because of the compliance margin of discretion’s profound reliance on 
collaboration, which destabilizes the binary logic operationalized by dominant narrators.  
 
 
7.1 Legal Conflict: EU Secondary Law Challenged on Fundamental Rights Grounds 
 
In the deviation margin of discretion scenario a litigant seeks to use an EU fundamental rights 
source to strike down a piece of national legislation. In this section in contrast, an individual 
litigant or an institution seeks to argue that EU secondary legislation is in breach of a 
fundamental right protected by the European Union legal order.   
     This legal conflict is historically important in the development of the CJEU’s fundamental 
rights case law. Once it became evident in the late 1960s that EU legislation would trigger 
fundamental rights based challenges rooted in national constitutions, the CJEU responded by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – Sozialamt, ECR [1969] Page 00419. 
315 Case 5/88, Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft ECR [1989] 02609. 
316 Case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, ECR [2006] I-05769. 
317 Case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, ECR [2003] I-12971. 




reviewing the legislation itself, and formulated the way in which the EU legal order also 
protected fundamental rights. This piece of the EU law canon is at the heart of the intrusion 
narrator’s preoccupation that EU legislation which potentially violates national constitutional 
rights would not be reviewed and later, if reviewed, that the challenge would be rejected in 
the absolute majority of cases. 
     The expectation of a certain set of outcomes of judicial review and indeed, as pointed out 
by intrusion narrators, the tensions between EU and national legal authority that this legal 
conflict represents within the EU legal space have perhaps overshadowed the third way 
represented by the compliance margin of discretion. While the conflict is well researched, the 
operationalization of national discretion to solve it has not received the same attention.  
     Furthermore, because of this structure of the legal conflict the litigant may rely on a set of 
sources within the EU fundamental rights material. In the early cases the litigant will typically 
turn to their national constitutional text, which is the prototype set-up for the intrusion 




7.2 EU Law Geography: Fundamental Rights-Sensitive Secondary Law 
 
Any piece of EU secondary legislation – regulations or directives – may potentially be the 
subject of a fundamental rights-based challenge. Some pieces of secondary legislation 
however, are particularly likely to be challenged, mainly because they handle subject matters 
that by their nature, directly or indirectly, are linked to the protection of fundamental rights. 
     In this chapter I will discuss three different sets of EU secondary legislation that have been 
challenged and where margin of discretions have been used. 319 Firstly, the regulation of milk 
quotas and a cluster of regulations seeking to spell out the mechanics of this type of 
agricultural governance, which have mainly been challenged on property rights-grounds. 
Indeed, this is a typical example of early EU fundamental rights litigation. 
     Secondly, I will look at how the compliance margin of discretion-technique has been used 
to address challenges to the family reunification directive, which directly handles the right to 
family life. This represents, I would argue, a particularly important area of EU rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Notably, even though the compliance margin of discretion is used in one case challenging a specific piece of 
secondary legislation, there is nothing that binds the CJEU to allowing similar national discretion when 




protection since it may be relied upon by minor children and, in general, directly shapes the 
way in which people, particularly those newly arrived from elsewhere live their personal lives 
in Europe. 
     Thirdly, I will discuss the data protection directive, which on several occasions has been 
subjected to challenges rooted in the right to freedom of expression, and which is furthermore 
a rapidly developing policy area.  
     Importantly, this does not mean that the margin of discretion has not been used in a similar 
fashion to address challenges to other pieces of secondary legislation.320 However, the above 
selection illustrates both that the method dates back to the origins of EU fundamental rights 
adjudication and also that the technique, in the Court’s own understanding, is apt to handle 
different, and from a societal perspective important, fundamental rights subject matters. 
     As has already been stated, the CJEU does not nullify the contested provision, nor does it 
dismiss the challenge in the closed context of the case before it.321 Rather, the Court instructs 
the competent national authority to ensure compliance between the contested EU legislative 
source and the protection of the fundamental rights triggered in the case.  
     Put more generally, the main characteristic of this use of the margin of discretion-
technique is that both the CJEU and the competent national authority participate in creating 
the fundamental rights compliance of secondary law. In this vein, Craig and de Búrca describe 
the technique used in Lindqvist and Parliament v Council, both discussed in this chapter, as a 
means of saving the EU legislation.322  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 See for similar lines of reasoning; Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v 
Telefónica de España SAU, ECR [2008] I-00271 on secondary legislation concerning electronic commerce and 
intellectual property rights: “the authorities and courts of the Member States must /…/ also make sure that they 
do not rely on an interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights.”  
321 Crucially, it is the EU Courts and not the courts of the Member States, which have exclusive jurisdiction to 
review the legality of the acts of the EU institutions. National courts do not have power to declare such acts 
invalid, see Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, ECR [1987] 4199, paras. 12-20. 





     The method for achieving this aim of compliance lives in close symbiosis with the piece of 
legislation that is challenged. There is a tendency towards a difference between directives and 
regulation in terms of the breadth of the discretional space. However, there is no absolute rule 
by which a certain “amount” of discretion follows a specific type of secondary source. The 
following however do cast light on the Court’s inclination:  
     If a regulation is challenged, because of its directly binding nature without the need for 
additional national implementing legislation the CJEU tends to give more careful guidance as 
to where the discretional space is located within the source. Indeed, the CJEU may define 
how and under what circumstances the source may be re-read and therefore creates a narrower 
compliance margin of discretion. 
     In the case of a challenge to a directive, which in their construction tend to be reliant on 
discretionary choices by the Member States as to the precise manner of implementation, the 
discretional space tends to be wider.323 This is because rather than formulating narrow 
possibilities of re-reading, the CJEU calls on the competent national authorities to interpret 
the directive’s rules at the stage of application in a fundamental rights compliant way.  
     In other words this latter compliance version of the margin of discretion, which focuses on 
the interpretation, especially of directives, is more opaque. This is mainly because discretional 
space to interpret the source in a fundamental rights compliant way at the stage of application 
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may to varying degrees be interlaced with the discretional space to implement the legislation. 
Even if we align our thinking with the idea that law requires interpretation all the time and 
everywhere, I am concerned here with identifying certain moments of interpretation,324 and 
particularly focus on the moment when the legislation is applied in a specific instance within 
the Member State. Crucially, where the CJEU cannot construct the fundamental rights based-
challenge as purely a question of national implementation legislation, but has to accept that 
the challenge concerns rules in EU secondary law.325  
 
 
7.3 Technicality: Unitary Application Interrupted 
 
Interestingly, in this line of case law the CJEU separates the application-phase from other 
moments in which the legislation is handled, namely the legislative-phase where the content 
and wording is formulated and the implementation-phase where, especially in the case of 
directives, the competent national authorities transpose EU secondary legislation into the 
national legal system.  
    The latter distinction, as noted above, between the Member State’s legislative action and 
the EU’s legislative action is emblematic of the operation of EU law. In contrast, the former 
distinction between secondary law “in itself,” 326 which directs responsibility at the legislative-
phase, and on the other hand, the application-phase is more a characteristic of this typology 
of margins of discretion than of EU law as a whole.  
     By constituting its legal reasoning on this distinction between different phases, the CJEU 
understands the compliance margin of discretion as operating exclusively at the application-
phase. In the previous section I delineated the two ways in which the CJEU opens the 
possibility of competent authorities within the Member States independently handling the EU 
secondary sources: first, by allowing the competent national authorities to re-read the source, 
and second, with an explicit instruction to interpret the source.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
324 Dworkin, R 1982, Law as interpretation, Critical Inquiry 9 (1), pp. 179-200. 
325 For affirmations that when adopting measures to implement EU legislation, national authorities must exercise 
that discretion in compliance with the general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights, see, inter alia, 
Wachauf, para 19; Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others, ECR [2011] I-
12533, para. 105; Case C-313/99, Gerard Mulligan and Others v Minister for Agriculture and Food, Ireland and 
Attorney General, ECR [2002] I-5719, para. 35; Joined Cases C-213/00 and C-451/00 Cooperativa Lattepiù and 
Others v Azienda di Stato per gli interventi nel mercato agricolo, ECR [2004] I-2869, para 57 and Case C-
496/04, J. Slob v Productschap Zuivel, ECR [2006] I-8257, para.41. 
326 ”In itself ”or “in themselves” is the CJEU’s own wording, see for instance Lindqvist, para. 90 and Parliament 




    As has already been pointed out, the CJEU’s act of analytically separating the application-
phase for the purpose of operationalizing national discretion enables the CJEU to avoid 
nullifying the contested provision by affirming that the secondary legislation in itself is not in 
breach of fundamental rights since it will be applied in a fundamental rights compliant way. 
     Furthermore, and still enabled by the same separation of phases, since the discretional 
space is not constructed as addressing one specific national measure but rather tied to the 
secondary source’s application, it is not limited in time as such. Rather, subsequent competent 
national authorities are mobilised to ensure compliance between the specific legislative 
provision and a fundamental right at every instance of its application. This temporal open-
endedness is a distinctive feature of the compliance margin of discretion when compared to 
the other two typologies.  
     Consistent with these observations, the scheme whereby an EU source is made 
fundamental rights-compliant through the use of the margin of discretion-technique 
destabilizes the notion of unitary application of EU law. Put differently, rather than the CJEU 
reviewing the secondary law in itself and as a consequence formulating a unitary meaning of 
its wording, it allows the competent national authorities within the Member State to interpret 
the source in a way which in itself is not predefined, but that will guarantee the predefined 
outcome of fundamental rights compliance. 
     Therefore, in this typology, the work of how compliance should be done is left to the 
competent authorities, even though the degree of freedom of elaboration varies. This means 
that people subjected to this legislation will have to accept its fundamental rights compliance 
despite the possibility that the exact shape of this compliance may vary from case to case.  
     In the context of the discretional space opened up by the compliance margin of discretion, 
the CJEU might insert certain criteria aimed at structuring the definition of the fundamental 
rights source. For example this could include stating what would constitute a proportionate 
infringement, or references to earlier case law where the fundamental rights have been 
interpreted. In this way the CJEU may participate in the elaboration of compliance. 
Alternatively, the competent national authorities might handle the reading and interpretation 
of the fundamental rights source, the other side of compliance in respect of the secondary 
source, independently. This is a variable within this typology. 
     The Court’s method in the compliance margin of discretion poses a challenge to any 




unitary interpretation of EU sources. 327  Instead one finds a common project between 
competent national authorities and the CJEU of maintaining fundamental rights compliance of 
the EU source. While this process is clearly initiated by the CJEU, the interpretative authority 
is divided.  
     It remains unitary in the sense that the outcome still lies in the predestined end result of 
compliance. But the content of compliance might vary between geographically different 
applications and different moments in time. This interruption of the unitary application of EU 
sources sheds new light on the question of the standard of protection the CJEU applies when 
reviewing EU sources.  
    For instance, on the CJEU’s handling of secondary sources Weiler states that: “In its 
dialogue with its national counterparts its claim is jurisdictional: only the European Court is in 
a position to make the determination on the compatibility of a Community measure with 
fundamental human rights.”328 This observation comes across as much too reliant on a notion 
of the inviolable interpretative authority of the CJEU. While I am not arguing that the 
compliance margin of discretion equals an inactive Court of Justice of the EU, it does rely on 
a technique that instrumentalizes national interpretation of EU sources and hence shares 
interpretative authority.   
     Ultimately, the compliance margin of discretion suggests that a distinction could be drawn 
between unitary application as a method solely administrated by the CJEU and an integrated 
system of adjudication in which different EUropean and national actors together engage in the 
unitary outcome of fundamental rights compliance. This distinction highlights a way of 
thinking about unitary application that goes beyond the CJEU. The compliance margin of 
discretion illustrates a process in which the CJEU trusts national decision-makers to 
participate and share interpretative authority in what ultimately becomes fundamental rights 
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7.4 Examples of Compliance Margins of Discretion 
 
7.4.1 Prelude: Stauder 
The year is 1969 and the Court of Justice, for the first time, holds that it guarantees 
fundamental rights because these are general principles of EU law. For this reason alone it 
qualifies as a significant piece of case law. In addition, which is interesting in its own right, 
Stauder contains a method of legal reasoning similar to a compliance margin of discretion.329   
     Stemming from the infancy of the EU, Stauder concerns a Commission decision from 
1969 taken in pursuance of Regulation No 804/68 on a common organization of the market of 
milk products, which authorized Member States to make cheap butter available to selected 
categories of consumers who received certain social security payments.330 Article 4 of the 
Commission's decision provided, in its (literally translated) German version: “Member States 
shall take all measures necessary to ensure that /…/ those entitled to benefit from the 
measures laid down in Article 1 may only receive butter in exchange for a coupon issued in 
their names.” In the French version the last portion of that article was phrased bon 
individualisé and, in Italian, buono individualizzato. In other words, the French and Italian 
language versions did not necessarily require a name but could refer to, for instance, a 
number. Thus people with the cheap-butter benefit were required to show coupons with 
different types of information depending on which Member State they lived in. 
     The German citizen Erich Stauder was a recipient of a war victim’s pension and as such 
entitled to the cheap-butter benefit. He considered it to be discriminatory that he had to 
present a coupon that identified him by name when he bought cheap butter and therefore 
made a constitutional complaint to the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on 22 April 1969. 331 
     The CJEU subsequently solves this case by holding that: 
 
In a case like the present one, the most liberal interpretation must prevail, provided 
that it is sufficient to achieve the objectives pursued by the decision in question. /…/ 
 
It follows that the provision in question must be interpreted as not requiring—
although it does not prohibit—the identification of beneficiaries by name. Each of 
the Member States is accordingly now able to choose from a number of methods by 
which the coupons may refer to the person concerned. 
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330 Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common organisation of the market in 
milk and milk products, [1975] OJ L 148.  
331 Opinion of Advocate General Roemer delivered on 29 October 1969 in Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of 




Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing 
the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law 
and protected by the Court.332 
 
Naturally, this ruling must be read in the less coordinated multi-lingual context of the history 
of early European Union integration. The different languages versions specifying how to 
individualize a butter coupon allows the Court to ascertain that Member States have sufficient 
discretion to interpret the Commission’s decision in a fundamental rights compliant way. 
Thus, at first glance the CJEU uses linguistic confusion rather than legal construction to 
achieve fundamental rights compliance. Moreover, the Commission’s decision was, by the 
time it reached the Court, amended to reflect the French and Italian versions. A fact the CJEU 
highlights in its reasoning. 
     Having said this, Stauder, which is the first fundamental rights case in the history of the 
CJEU, represents a method of ensuring fundamental rights compliance by giving the 
competent national authority discretion to conduct “the most liberal interpretation.” As such, 
Stauder is constructed as discretion for interpretation rather than a re-reading of the sources, 
despite the fact that the interpretation consists of an act of choosing the most liberal language 
version out of a set of language versions, which arguably limits the reach of the discretional 
space. 
     What I wish to highlight with Stauder, a case lacking explicit margin of discretion 
language, is that when reading subsequent sections of this chapter it should be borne in mind 
that the idea that the national level can accommodate, by means of interpretation, compliance 
between EU law and fundamental rights, dates back to 1969. 
 
7.4.2 Crying Over Spilt Milk: Re-reading Wachauf 
What began with a legal claim traceable to the bad relationship between a milk farmer and a 
landlord ended up being a cornerstone in the EU fundamental rights architecture. The 
dominant narrative of Wachauf is that the case established the principle that: “Member States 
are obliged, as a matter of Community Law, to observe fundamental rights whenever they 
implement EU law.” This in turn prompted intrusion narrators to criticise the CJEU for an 
offensive and expansionist use of fundamental rights adjudication.333  
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L (eds.) The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome 
Treaty, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 133. 
For a different version of the same point; in 1992 Coppel and O’Neill described Wachauf as expressing the 




     Writing about metaphor, narrative and time Ricoeur states that: “narrative attains its full 
meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.”334 In line with that logic 
Wachauf, twenty years after it was handed down, defines the scope of application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The Explanation on Article 51 of the 
Charter stipulates that, just like in Wachauf, the Charter applies when the Member State is 
implementing EU law.335 
     I will not challenge this dominant reading of Wachauf as false as such. However, I will 
deconstruct the facts and the chain of events in this twenty-four-paragraph case and argue that 
the standard focus on the CJEU’s handling of national implementation rules represents only 
half of the chain of events and only half of the legal questions posed by Wachauf. I will argue 
that Wachauf is about two separate sets of rules, the national implementation rule and a 
cluster of provisions (stemming from Council Regulation No 857/84 and Council Regulation 
No 1371/84),336 both these sets of rules have the effect of breaching Hubert Wachauf’s right 
to property. Crucially though, these sets of rules are dealt with differently; whereas the 
national implementation rule is nullified, the CJEU uses the compliance margin of discretion 
to handle the provisions of the EU regulations.  
     It would be inaccurate however, to state that Wachauf has never been conceived as a case 
about a national implementation-rule and a set of community rules. Indeed Coppel and 
O´Neill concluded that: “Once again the problem was said to lie in the Member State’s 
implementation provisions and not in the Community regulations” - even though the authors 
never explain in depth what that means.337 Furthermore, the idea that Wachauf is pointed 
more towards a form of dialectic between the CJEU and the Member State than is normally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rights principles to national acts formulated in implementation of Community legislation.” See, Coppel and 
O'Neill 1992, supra note 30 at 676. Striking a slightly different note, Weiler in 1999 contextualized the case in a 
broader constitutional setting as “agency review.” He described Member States as the executive branch of the 
Community and therefore the CJEU, when it strikes down a Member State implementation rule, is engaging in 
agency review. See, Weiler 1999, supra note 85 at 120. “Member States as agents of the EU” is also the way in 
which Craig and de Búrca frame the Wachauf ruling, See: Craig and de Búrca 2011, supra note 195 at 382. For 
recent commentary in this tradition see: Kühn, Z 2010, Wachauf and ERT: On the Road from the Centralised to 
the Decentralised System of Judicial Review, in Maduro, M and Azoulai, L (eds.) The Past and Future of EU 
Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart Publishing, Oxford; 
Portland; Kaila, H 2012, The Scope of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
in the Member States, in Cardonnel, P, Rosas, A and Wahl, N (eds.), Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System, 
Essays in Honour of Pernilla Lindh, Hart Publishing, Oxford; Portland. 
334 Ricœur, P 1984, Time and narrative, Vol.1, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, p. 52. 
335 EXPLANATIONS RELATING TO THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Official Journal of 
the European Union C 303/17. 
336 Council Regulation (EEC) No 857/84 of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for the application of the levy 
referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 in the milk and milk products sector, [1984] OJ L 90 
and Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1371/84 of 16 May 1984 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of the additional levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68, [1984] OJ L 132.   




assumed, has been discussed, albeit not in detail, by Cruz Villalón under the title “Wachauf: A 
Common Task.”338  
     Moreover, the Court itself has subsequently referred to Wachauf in cases where discretion 
is used to mandate the competent national authorities to ensure compliance between EU law 
and fundamental rights.339 This is in itself a reason to properly map the Wachauf ruling in 
order to understand its function as a point of reference in contemporary fundamental rights 
case law.  
     The aim of this chapter is to carefully re-construct the chain of events and the content of 
the applicable provisions, because if Ricoeur is right and a dominant narrative in itself creates 
meaning, this justifies re-visiting the original text yet another time to investigate if a different 
interpretation is possible. Hence in the following a different reading of Wachauf will be 
presented, which focuses on the second part of the judgement that deals with the EU 
regulations. This reading represents the first step towards the construction of the compliance 
margin of discretion.   
* 
Hubert Wachauf carried out dairy farming at Kückenhof farm in Germany.340 He did not own 
the farm himself but leased it from Princess Sayn-Wittgenstein.341 Being a second-generation 
dairy farmer at Kückenhof (he had inherited the lease from his parents) all the tools needed to 
produce and store milk and all the cattle were Hubert Wachauf’s property, not the landlord’s.  
     In connection to the expiry of the lease, on 6 June 1984 Hubert Wachauf342 applied for 
compensation from the German authorities for giving up milk production and surrendering his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
338 Cruz Villalón, P 2010, ‘All the guidance’, ERT and Wachauf, in Maduro, M and Azoulai, L (eds.) The past 
and future of EU law: the classics of EU law revisited on the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaty, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford; Portland, p. 164. 
339 Furthermore, there is quite an impressive list of recent AG opinions that refer to the relationship between 
Wachauf, EU fundamental rights and Member States discretion: Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak 
delivered on 22 September 2011 in Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department et M. E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform; Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 8 September 2011 in Case C-282/10, Maribel 
Dominguez v Centre informatique du Centre Ouest Atlantique and Préfet de la région Centre; Opinion of 
Advocate General Bot delivered on 2 September 2010 in Case C-232/09, Dita Danosa v LKB Līzings SIA; 
Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 1 June 2010 in Case C-570/08 Symvoulio 
Apochetefseon Lefkosias v Anatheoritiki Archi Prosforon. 
340 Paragraph 6 of the Wachauf-ruling states: “Reference is made to the Report of the Hearing for a more detailed 
account of the facts of the case, the applicable Community and national provisions, the course of the procedure, 
and the observations submitted to the Court, which are mentioned or discussed hereinafter only in so far as is 
necessary for the reasoning of the Court.” The facts of the case are reconstructed on the basis of the CJEU’s 
account and the referring courts recapitulation, see Re the Küchenhof Farm, (Case I/2-E 62/ 85) Before the 
Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Frankfurt Am Main, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 289.  
341 The CJEU and AG Jacobs incorrectly refer to the landlord as a he.	  	  
342 It is unclear exactly when the lease expired. The referring Court, AG Jacobs and the CJEU have three 




milk quotas to the German agricultural authorities. EU Council Regulation No 857/84 and 
Council Regulation No 1371/84 enacted in March and May 1984 respectively provided for 
this procedure. Importantly, the overall aim of these regulations was to minimize the 
production of milk in the European Community.  
     Ultimately, Wachauf did not receive any compensation because the national 
implementation legislation, section 3(2) of the Milk Production (Cessation Payments) Order 
[1984] I Bgb1. 1023, required a written consent from the landlord before surrendering the 
lease, which Wachauf did not have. Crucially, the EU regulations did not provide for such a 
written consent-rule, it was a purely national initiative.  
     The lease expired and the milk quotas, on the basis of article 5(1) and 5(3) of Council 
Regulation No 857/84, automatically returned to Sayn-Wittgenstein and subsequently her new 
lessee, without any compensation having been paid to Wachauf.  
     In this brief recapitulation of the events lies one important fact - Hubert Wachauf did not 
fit with the rationale of the milk quota regulations. The reality pictured by the Community 
legislator was one where the landlord enabled the milk production by investing in all the 
necessary equipment (hence meriting the milk quotas upon the expiry of the lease as provided 
for in the automatic transfer-rule), or where the dairy farmer wanted to continue milk 
production upon the expiry of his or her lease (as provided in article 7(4)). Instead, the dairy 
farm was Hubert Wachauf’s independent lifework and he and his parents had invested in all 
the necessary equipment, but he did not want to continue dairy farming, he wished to receive 
compensation. 
     On 10 January 1985 Hubert Wachauf started legal proceedings claiming that he was 
entitled to economic compensation. 
     The Court and Advocate General Jacobs evaluate five different provisions in order to 
resolve the Wachauf case.343 Both the CJEU and the AG deal with these provisions in the 
same order by dividing their reasoning into four main steps. In the following, the Wachauf-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
detailed account of the facts it seems like Wachuaf tried to have the lease extended several times. This might be 
an explanation for the different versions. 
343 AG Jacobs concludes, on this point: “Although the Court' s case-law has hitherto been concerned with respect 
for property rights by the Community legislator itself, the same principles must in my view apply to the 
implementation of Community law by the Member States, since it appears to me self-evident that when acting in 
pursuance of powers granted under Community law, Member States must be subject to the same constraints, in 
any event in relation to the principle of respect for fundamental rights, as the Community legislator. /…/ In such 
a case the requirement in the national scheme of the landlord' s consent might be contrary to the principle of non-
discrimination.” See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 27 April 1989 in Case 5/88, Hubert 




ruling will be picked apart in the same order, as summarized in this diagram and as developed 
under the section headings 1, 2, 3 and 4: 
 













Written consent from 
the landlord in order 
for Article 4 (1) 
Regulation 857/84 
to apply. 
(p. 2-3 + 16)  
Article 7 (4) of 
Regulation 
857/84 
Keep the quotas 
upon the expiry 
of the lease if 
milk production 
is continued.  





is discontinued.   




But margin of 
discretion to not 
apply it to cases such 
as Wachauf’s (self-
made dairy farmer 
with a lease) if 
“justified” by 




rules would be 
incompatible with 
EU FR. Same 
requirement for MS 
when implementing 
= Incompatible 
with EU FR. (p.19) 
Margin of discretion to partially 
apply these provisions and not 
apply article 5(1) of Regulation 
1371/84 to cases such as Wachauf’s 
(self-made dairy farmer with a 
lease) if “justified” by 
circumstances of the case  
(21-23) 




Applies.  Applies.  Incompatible with 
EUFR (non-
discrimination). 




As a first step, the CJEU establishes that Kückenhof farm is to be considered a “holding” 
within the meaning of article 12(d) of Regulation No 857/84, which signifies that regulation 
No 1371/84 is applicable. This might seems like a straightforward question but since Sayn-
Wittgenstein did not provide any milk production equipment the CJEU needed to spend some 








The second step is to determine whether the so-called automatic transfer-rule, article 5(1) and 
3 of Regulation No 1371/84 applies to the Wachauf situation. Importantly, this is one of the 
central questions of the case.  
     The effect of the automatic transfer-rule is that: “Where an entire holding is sold, leased or 
transferred by inheritance, the corresponding reference quantity shall be transferred in full to 
the producer who takes over the holding.”344  
     The technical legal issue at stake is that “leased” in article 5(1) refers to the granting of a 
lease. So the CJEU has to decide whether an expiry of a lease has “comparable legal effect” to 
granting.345 Thus, importantly, if an expiry of a lease is not covered, the automatic transfer 
rule does not apply to Wachauf and “his” milk quotas should never have been automatically 
transferred to Sayn-Wittgenstein.  
     Both AG Jacobs and the CJEU conclude that the automatic transfer-rule is applicable to 
the expiry of a lease and thus to Hubert Wachauf,346 which meant that the quotas he acquired 
as a milk producer at Kückenhof could be automatically transferred to Sayn-Wittgenstein 
when the lease expired. 
 
3. 
At this point the Court reaches the third question  – the national implementation rule that was 
not in the EU regulation. This question is at the centre of the classic reading of Wachauf as a 
case where the CJEU strikes down national legislation.  
    As stated above, Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 857/84 reads that a milk farmer could 
get economic compensation by surrendering his or her milk quotas to the German authorities. 
Section 3(2) of the German Milk Production (Cessation Payments) Order, hereinafter the 
written consent-rule, added the requirement that the landlord had to give written consent 
before the lessee could access the article 4(1) compensation scheme.  
     The CJEU deals with this by firstly, in paragraph 16, framing the German court’s position 
as: If the automatic transfer-rule applies (which it does), this would mean that a lessee (such 
as Wachauf) would not be able to get economic compensation according to article 4(1) if the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1371/84. 
345 Article 5(3) of Regulation No 1371/84. 
346 The Court’s straightforward reasoning in paragraph 15 seems influenced by the teleological conclusion that 
the Community legislator, as a principle, intended that the quotas should stay with the land as opposed to 




landlord does not consent.347 This would be a fundamental rights violation if, as in Wachauf’s 
case, the lessee worked and invested to earn the milk quotas.  
     By reading paragraph 16 together with paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment we know that 
the requirement of the lessor’s consent is a German construction. Thus, these paragraphs are a 
slightly opaque affirmation that the written consent rule in this case breaches a national 
constitutional right. 
     In paragraph 17 and 18 the CJEU refers to Hauer and concludes that German fundamental 
rights protection is mirrored in the EU legal system.348 Subsequently and crucially, in 
paragraph 19, the Court comes to the part where it binds the Member State to the same criteria 
to which the EU is bound:  
 
“Having regard to those criteria, it must be observed that Community rules which, 
upon the expiry of the lease, had the effect of depriving the lessee, without 
compensation, of the fruits of his labour and of his investments in the tenanted 
holding would be incompatible with the requirements of the protection of 
fundamental rights in the Community legal order. Since those requirements are also 
binding on the Member States when they implement Community rules, the Member 
States must, as far as possible, apply those rules in accordance with those 
requirements.” 
 
Decoding this paragraph reveals how it represents the crux of the Wachauf-ruling. The Court 
deals in parallel with the application of EU milk quota rules and the national implementation 
rule. In other words it separates the different phases, as discussed earlier. 
     As to the implementation rule, which has received most attention in commentary: It is 
clear from paragraph 16 that the written consent-rule violates national constitutional 
guarantees if applied in conjunction with the automatic transfer-rule. It is also clear from the 
first sentence of paragraph 19 that such a Community rule would violate fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the EU. The second sentence of paragraph 19 therefore means that the Member 
State could not avoid its fundamental rights obligation only because it is implementing EU 
law. If one follows the dominant reading of Wachauf, the legal difficulties posed by the case 
would end with this conclusion - the national implementation rule is struck down on 
fundamental rights grounds.  
     Crucially though, the Court makes a parallel move in paragraph 19 when it states that 
Community rules which have the effect of “depriving the lessee of the fruits of his labour,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
347 Reading paragraph 16 of the CJEU’s judgement it is difficult to detect the written consent-rule, however it is 
hiding in the formula “if the lessor is opposed to it.” 
348 Whereas Advocate General Jacobs considers the written consent rule as being a question of discrimination in 
treatment between a person who owns land and one who does not, the CJEU sees a potential breach of the right 




would violate fundamental rights and pairs that with stating: Member States must apply these 
Community rules “as far as possible” in accordance with fundamental rights.349 
     The words would be incompatible mean if applied in the present case these rules would 
violate fundamental rights. That is why, as a consequence of that conclusion, the second 
sentence states that the Member States are required to “as far as possible” apply the EU 
regulations in a fundamental rights compliant way. In the following section I will show how 
the CJEU goes on to explain how the competent national authorities have a margin of 
discretion to apply the community rules in a fundamental rights compliant way.  
 
4. 
It is submitted that, the national written consent implementation rule aside, the last four 
paragraphs of Wachauf are equally important. However most commentary stops after 
paragraph 19, even though the Court itself clearly does not consider the case to be solved 
merely by nullifying the written implementation rule. 
     But before deconstructing these last paragraphs, a brief recap is needed to clarify the 
stakes. It is clear that the automatic transfer rule applies to Hubert Wachauf. Whether or not 
he fruitlessly tried to access the economic compensation scheme the fact remained that when 
the lease expired all milk quotas returned to Sayn-Wittgenstein - a result that the CJEU 
qualified as a breach of fundamental rights in paragraph 19. Indeed, the CJEU is mandated to 
tackle the milk quota regulations so as to make sure that Hubert Wachauf’s right to property is 
not breached.  
     Moreover, what about all the other potential Wachauf-like self-made dairy farmers 
conducting their work on a piece of leased land, how should their cases be resolved? How 
should the milk quota regulations be applied to them?  
     The Court starts by looking at the compensation-provisions in the regulations. It notes that 
Article 7(4) of Council Regulation 857/84 states that when a rural lease is due to expire the 
competent national authorities may decide to allow the departing lessee to keep all or part of 
the milk quotas if he or she decides to continue milk production.  
     Alternatively, the CJEU states, Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 857/84 provides that the 
competent national authorities could grant compensation to a producer who discontinues milk 
production and surrenders their quotas to the national milk quota reserve.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 The ”as far as possible” is repeated in Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Booker Aquaculture Ltd, trading as 
Marine Harvest McConnel and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd v The Scottish Ministers, ECR [2003] I‑7411, para. 88 




     Clearly, article 7(4) is not applicable to Hubert Wachauf because he wants to quit milk 
farming and article 4(1) does not fit the chain of events at Kückenhof farm. It is at this point 
that the compliance margin of discretion comes into play, the CJEU states:  
 
21 However, that conclusion does not preclude the possibility for a departing lessee 
to obtain compensation calculated on the basis of all or part of the relevant reference 
quantity when that is justified by the extent of the lessee's contribution to the 
building-up of milk production on the holding. In that event, the quantity taken into 
consideration for the purposes of calculating the compensation must be treated as a 
freed quantity and, consequently, may not be put at the disposal of the lessor who 
repossesses the holding. 
22 The Community regulations in question accordingly leave the competent national 
authorities a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to enable them to apply those 
rules in a manner consistent with the requirements of the protection of fundamental 
rights, either by giving the lessee the opportunity of keeping all or part of the 
reference quantity if he intends to continue milk production, or by compensating 
him if he undertakes to abandon such production definitively. 
23 The submission that the rules in question conflict with the requirements of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order must therefore be 
rejected  
 
The CJEU states that when it is “justified by the extent of the lessee’s contribution to the 
building up of the milk production” the competent national authorities can decide not to apply 
the automatic transfer-rule and instead apply article 4(1) (compensation if milk production is 
discontinued) in the same way as 7(4) (keep the quotas upon the expiry of the lease) would be 
applied. 350  Hence, to give economic compensation upon the expiry of a lease for 
discontinuing milk production.351  
     In paragraphs 21-23 the CJEU allows the competent national authorities to re-read the EU 
regulation when the situation of the milk farmer so requires. Put differently, national 
discretion is granted to assert whether compensation is justified based on the facts of a 
particular case and if so the national authorities are authorized to re-read the EU secondary 
sources to ensure fundamental rights compliance.352 The official at the national agricultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 It should be noted that AG Jacob’s solution that the national legislator, as a positive obligation, should adopt 
national measures to remedy the effect of the automatic transfer-rule is not followed by the CJEU. See the 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, paras. 29 -30. 
351 Gehrke, writing on milk quota regulations in 1993, describes de lege lata as: “the tenant quitting the holding 
only enjoys protection under exceptional circumstances. The application of this rule is purely at the discretion of 
the Member States.” Gehrke, H 1993, The implementation of the EC milk quota regulations in British, French 
and German law, EUI WP LAW NO. 93/8. 
352 In Demand the Court is reusing this technique in the area of milk quota regulations, this time concerning 
Council Regulation No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy scheme in the milk production sector. Simply 
put, the case concerns the competent national authority’s reallocation of additional milk quotas that Stefan 
Demand considered as breaching his right to property. 
 The Court concludes that: “Therefore, it is incumbent on the Member State, in exercise of that authorization, to 




authority will have to make such a decision based on the extent to which the landlord and the 
lessee respectively have been involved in the creation of the dairy farm and its milk 
production.353  
     Because of this construction, the compliance margin of discretion used in Wachauf is 
narrow since the competent national authorities are only allowed to exit the ordinary reading 
in specific pre-defined circumstances (self-made dairy famer), and the CJEU defines the 
rereading which would be allowed (compensation upon the expiry of a lease). It is thus not a 
question of a broader discretional space to interpret the regulation. 
     This discretional space does however allow the national authorities to determine when and 
according to who the regulations could be re-read and compensation could be paid in future 
cases. The margin of discretion is notably directed to future agricultural officials encountering 
similar situations and therefore goes beyond the task facing the referring court.354  
     Because of the use of the compliance margin of discretion, the EU automatic transfer rule 
is not nullified. Even though the Court in paragraph 19 declared a rule with such a result a 
violation of fundamental rights. The Court instead defines the right to property in this way – 
the written consent rule is an infringement of the right to property and therefore nullified and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
principle and fundamental rights upheld in Community law by decisions of the Court of Justice […] and, in that 
context, to rule whether or not any payment must be made in consideration of the reallocation.” 
The Court subsequently applies the proportionality test to the additional levy scheme and concludes that a 
definite reduction without compensation is not per se a measure disproportionate to the aim of reducing market 
surpluses and hence does not breach the right to property. To nullify the regulation altogether, on the ground that 
it breaches the right to property, is thus not an option. Instead the Member State is given a margin of discretion 
to ensure compliance between the two. See Case C-186/96, Stefan Demand v Hauptzollamt Trier ECR [1998] I-
08529, para. 35 ff, (brackets added). 
353 AG Jacobs in para. 30 of his opinion: “It is of course for the national court to determine in the concrete case 
whether and to what extent account should be taken of the tenant' s interest in the quota. It is not in my view 
appropriate for this Court to seek to spell out in the framework of the present case the kinds of circumstances 
which the national courts will need to take into account; it must be sufficient for the Court to indicate in general 
terms the applicability of the principles of non-discrimination and of respect for the right to property in this 
context.” 
354 However it is important to note that several milk farmers unsuccessfully tried to rely on Wachauf for 
compensation, See for instance, Case C-2/92, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte 
Dennis Clifford Bostock ECR [1994] I-00955; Case C-186/96, Stefan Demand v Hauptzollamt Trier ECR 
[1998] I-08529; Case C-63/93, Fintan Duff, Liam Finlay, Thomas Julian, James Lyons, Catherine Moloney, 
Michael McCarthy, Patrick McCarthy, James O'Regan, Patrick O'Donovan v Minister for Agriculture and Food 
and Attorney General ECR [1996] I-00569; Case C-275/05, Alois Kibler jun. v Land Baden-Württemberg, ECR 
[2006] I-10569 and Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert  v 
Land Hessen, ECR [2010] I-11063, para. 86-87.  
Most notably, in Bostock the CJEU limits the potential implications of Wachauf in the dairy-farming sector: 
Dennis Clifford Bostock was a tenant farmer who surrendered his lease and subsequently sought compensation 
from the national authorities. He had invested in the dairy farm, albeit not built it up entirely as Hubert Wachauf.  
Regardless of these differences, the CJEU could have simply followed its own ruling in Wachauf and stated that 
the Member State has a “sufficiently wide margin of appreciation” to examine whether the lessee’s contribution 
to the building up of the milk production justifies compensation. In any event the Court did not agree and said 
that the method used in Wachauf is not applicable simply because it concerned a surrender and not an expiry. 




the automatic transfer rule could not be applied to a dairy farmer such as Hubert Wachauf 
without giving him economic compensation, which is enabled through the use of a 
compliance margin of discretion.  
     Lastly, the Court concludes by affirming that the “submission that the rules in question 
conflict with the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal 
order must therefore be rejected.” This therefore means that the CJEU has introduced a new 
way of making secondary EU law fundamental rights compliant though the operationalization 
of national discretion to reread EU sources in narrowly defined instances.355  
     This deconstruction of the different moves of the CJEU amplifies the implications of 
Wachauf beyond the classic reading focusing on judicial review of national provisions, and 
instead lays out a method for constructing a compliance margin of discretion. 
 
7.4.3 The Parliament v Council Roadmap  
Parliament v Council from 2006 on the right to family reunification is a great case study of 
how national discretion is operationalized to ensure fundamental rights compliance.356  
    The European Parliament issued an action for annulment of three paragraphs of the 
proposed Council Directive 2003/86 arguing that it violated the right to family reunification, 
derivable from the right to family life. In essence the contested provisions, all providing 
exceptions to the rule of reunification, held that children over the age of twelve who arrive 
independently of the rest of the family may have to verify that they meet certain conditions of 
integration provided for by existing legislation, that requests for reunification must be 
submitted before the age of fifteen in accordance with existing legislation and a provision 
containing time limits to family reunification, and in particular that Member States may 
provide for a waiting period of no more than three years.   
     The CJEU answers the Parliament’s challenge unsympathetically by holding that the 
contested provisions in themselves correspond to ECHR-standard (1), and by constructing a 
roadmap for how the directive can be applied without breaching fundamental rights by using 
a national margin of discretion (2).357  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 It should be noted that the “keyword” of the case is, inter alia, “Alternative offered to Member States.” 
356 Council Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification for third country nationals residing lawfully in 
the territory of the Member State, [2003] OJ L 251. 




     The first analytical move relies on the following rationale: the discretion contained in the 
construction of the directive mirrors the standard provided for by the ECHR-system.358 In 
other words, the ECtHR accommodates derogations from the right to family life by using its 
margin of appreciation-technique and the EU is merely doing the same by providing for 
derogations from the right to family reunification within the directive.  
     By noting how the ECtHR uses the margin of appreciation technique to accommodate 
derogations to Convention rights, the CJEU argues that the construction of the EU directive 
cannot be held to violate EU fundamental rights a priori. However, the ex ante review in 
Parliament v Council remains a review by the CJEU of EU law, as opposed to the ECtHR’s 
scrutiny of national law. The notion of Member State discretion within the directive is used as 
an autonomous concept contained in a derogation clause, not, as with the ECtHR’s margin of 
appreciation, a judge-created case-by-case evaluation of acceptable variations in human rights 
protection. This does not exclude that the standard of protection is in effect the same. 
     Thus the CJEU, purely in abstracto, concludes that the construction of the directive, and 
particularly the contested provisions are fundamental rights compliant.  
     In a second move the court holds that the directive when applied will be compliant with 
fundamental rights, because the Member State has a (compliance) margin of discretion. This 
second move is central to my analysis and is to be found in the vary last paragraphs: 
 
In the final analysis, while the Directive leaves the Member States a margin of 
appreciation, it is sufficiently wide to enable them to apply the Directive’s rules in a 
manner consistent with the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental 
rights (see, to this effect, Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609, paragraph 22). 
 
It should be remembered that, /…/, the requirements flowing from /…/ fundamental 
rights, are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules, 
and that consequently they are bound, as far as possible, to apply the rules in 
accordance with those requirements (see Case C-2/92 Bostock [1994] ECR I-955, 
paragraph 16; Case C‑107/97 Rombi and Arkopharma [2000] ECR I-3367, 
paragraph 65; and, to this effect, ERT, paragraph 43).359 
 
The CJEU dusts off the Wachauf-rationale – national discretion can ultima ratio make a piece 
of EU-legislation compliant with fundamental rights. Notably, this is the first fundamental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 For instance, in respect of the rule that Member States can require a certain level of integration in the host-
state before accepting a request for family reunification if the applicant is over the age of twelve, it states, in 
para, 62, that: “In so doing, the final subparagraph of Article 4(1) of the Directive cannot be regarded as running 
counter to the right to respect for family life. In the context of a directive imposing precise positive obligations 
on the Member States, it preserves a limited margin of appreciation for those States which is no different from 
that accorded to them by the European Court of Human Rights, in its case-law relating to that right, for 
weighing, in each factual situation, the competing interests.” 




rights case that explicitly reconnects with the compliance margin of discretion-technique used 
in 1989 in Wachauf.360  
     Yet Parliament v Council represents a challenge in terms of carving out how the CJEU 
operationalizes the margin of discretion-technique. Firstly, this challenge arises because of the 
reference to the ECtHR’s margin of appreciation as a way of arguing that the Convention 
system accepts derogations to the right to family life. It is important to note how the CJEU 
references the margin of appreciation-technique as a way of constructing the ECHR-standard 
of protection, arguably as minimally as possible. It is only in the second move, when the 
CJEU had already disqualified the challenges to the three provisions that it activates the idea 
of a national margin of discretion to ensure fundamental rights compliance at the stage of 
application of the directive. 
     As a result of this roadmap for how fundamental rights based challenges will be 
understood by the CJEU, no rewriting of the directive is required, or indeed nullification. 
     Instead, every time the national immigration authorities apply the directive to a person 
seeking a resident permit on the ground of family reunification, beyond the specific 
derogations provided for in the directive, the competent national authorities have a latent 
margin of discretion to apply the directive’s rules in a fundamental rights compliant 
manner.361 
     To sum up, the abstractness of Parliament v Council makes the CJEU a priori rule out the 
possibility of rights violation inherent in the construction of the directive itself. As to the 
application, the CJEU holds that the margin of discretion ultimately guarantees fundamental 
rights compliance. This is a significant discretional space and an acceptance of European 
variability (non-unitarity), in an area where children travelling alone or spouses separated for 
years may ultimately be reliant on the protection offered by this legislation. In other words, 
this reasoning stands at some remove from any narrative of the EU as an improver of 
European standards of fundamental rights protection.  
     In 2012, the roadmap constructed in Parliament v Council is applied to people.362 In O and 
S the question is whether a person who is married to a lawfully residing third country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 In Case C-166/98, Société critouridienne de distribution (Socridis) v Receveur principal des douanes, ECR 
[1999] I-03791, the CJEU, in my opinion uses Wachauf inaccurately since the wide margin of appreciation was 
not used transpose the directive but to reread it: “Next, the Court has consistently held that directives do not 
infringe the Treaty if they leave the Member States a sufficiently wide margin of appreciation to enable them to 
transpose them into national law in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Treaty (see to that effect 
Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, paragraph 22).”  
361 However, in fairness, the preliminary reference system is highlighted in that context. See para. 106.	  
362 Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11, O. and S. v Maahanmuuttovirasto and Maahanmuuttovirasto v L, 




national, who in turn has a child that is a Union citizen, is entitled to a residence permit on the 
grounds of family reunification? Essentially, what to do with the stepfather? Suffice to cite 
the CJEU’s conclusion:  
     
It is true that Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter /…/ cannot be interpreted as depriving 
the Member States of their margin of appreciation when examining applications for 
family reunification (see, to that effect, Parliament v Council, paragraph 59). 
 
However, in the course of such an examination /…/ the provisions of that directive 
must be interpreted and applied in the light of Articles 7 and 24(2) and (3) of the 
Charter, /…/. 
 
It is for the competent national authorities, when implementing Directive 2003/86 
and examining applications for family reunification, to make a balanced and 
reasonable assessment of all the interests in play, taking particular account of the 
interests of the children concerned. 
/…/ 
It is for the referring court to ascertain whether the decisions refusing residence 
permits at issue in the main proceedings were taken in compliance with those 
requirements.363 
 
In O and S the CJEU follows the roadmap formulated in Parliament v Council. The 
competent national immigration authorities have a margin of discretion to ensure that the 
directive is interpreted and applied in the light of the Charter and to make a balanced and 
reasonable assessment of the interests at play. Ultimately the national court is authorized to 
review the fundamental rights compatibility of the decisions taken by those authorities. 
     In addition to O and S and Parliament v Council and in line with the distinction between 
national and EU law which constantly resurfaces in the context of this typology of margin of 
discretion, there are important examples of how the CJEU nullifies national implementation 
law that it considers incompatible with the directive 2003/86 on family reunification.364 Yet 
again, the Court nullifies national implementation law of a directive that in itself, following 
Parliament v Council, is fundamental rights compliant.  
     Similarly it should be noted that, in contrast to Wachauf, the Parliament v Council-line and 
the Lindqvist-line (which I will turn to next), the compliance margin of discretion does not 
encompass rereading of the secondary source but is instead given to interpret the legislation 
to secure fundamental rights compliance. Therefore the margins of discretion discussed here 
are wider and the outer limits of the discretional space are more intangible. Particularly since 
the intersection between the discretional space inherent in the construction of the directive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 O and S, para. 79 – 82. Emphasis added. 




and the discretion to interpret the rules at the stage of application is more opaque, albeit 
distinguishable. 
     Again we see a collaborative mode of ensuring fundamental rights compliance, which 
arguably comes across as an elusive system of adjudication for a litigant seeking to engage in 
a fundamental rights-based challenge of EU legislation, while at the same time being 
profoundly functional in terms of avoiding nullification. 
 
7.4.4 The Lindqvist Imperative 
In a small parish in rural Sweden Bodil Lindqvist helped in the preparations for confirmation, 
which is a ceremony where at age fourteen, members of the church confirm their Christian 
belief. 365 In an attempt to reach out to these young people Bodil Lindqvist set up a webpage 
with humorously written short texts about the employees of the church, with personal 
information such as age, family circumstances, telephone number and, in one instance, health 
status. 
     As soon as Bodil Lindqvist realized that this initiative was not appreciated by all of her 
colleagues she removed the web page in question. By then, however, the Supervisory 
Authority for the Protection of Electronically Transmitted Data had been informed about the 
web page and its content. She was subsequently charged with breach of the 
personuppgiftslagen, which is the legislation implementing Directive 95/46/EC on data 
protection.366 
     The fundamental rights question referred to the CJEU is whether this hands-on application 
of the law implementing directive 95/46 is compatible with freedom of speech, enshrined 
inter alia in article 10 ECHR. 
     The Court answers this question by affirming that the directive itself includes rules with a 
large degree of flexibility and therefore the national legislator has a margin of manoeuvre in 
implementing the directive, and that nothing suggests that the directive’s provisions in 
themselves violate fundamental rights.367 Again, the same rationale as in the cases discussed 
earlier.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365 Case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, ECR [2003] Page I-12971. 
366 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ L 
281. 
367 Lindqvist, paras. 83-84. For a more elaborate account of the discretionary powers contained in the directive 
itself, see Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito 
(ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v Administración del 




     Accordingly, at the stage of application, the discretion accorded at the implementation 
stage would not be sufficient to avoid conflicts between the free movement of data, the 
protection of private life and the protection of freedom of speech. The CJEU concludes: 
 
Thus, it is, rather, at the stage of the application at national level of the legislation 
implementing Directive 95/46 in individual cases that a balance must be found 
between the rights and interests involved. 
/…/ 
Consequently, it is for the authorities and courts of the Member States not only to 
interpret their national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/46 but also to 
make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with 
the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order or with the other 
general principles of Community law, such as inter alia the principle of 
proportionality.368 
      
This means that the CJEU makes a distinction between the principle of consistent 
interpretation and369 the formula “make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of it which 
would be in conflict with the fundamental rights,” which I reconstruct as an example of a 
compliance margin of discretion.  
     Regardless of its negative phrasing, the formula contains two imperatives directed to the 
competent national authority or court.370 The first imperative is - You interpret! The second 
imperative, however, limits the first – The outcome must be fundamental rights compliance! 
     While it is important to note the lack of direct and indirect margin of discretion-language, 
as defined earlier when I outlined the method for case law selection, I exceptionally include 
Lindqvist because the Court identifies a discretional space at the stage of application in which 
the Member State may elaborate the applicable standard of protection in a similar fashion to 
Wachauf and the Parliament v Council. Thus, in Lindqvist I argue the formula: make sure 
they do not rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental 
rights, is a description of a compliance margin of discretion. However, this formula does not 
automatically refer to an operational compliance margin of discretion. The use of this formula 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Lindqvist, paras. 85 and 87.  
369 The idea that if the wording of secondary EU law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should 
be given to the interpretation that renders the provision consistent rather than incompatible with the Treaties, is 
perennial. See Case C-218/82 Commission v Council, ECR [1983] 4063, para. 15 and Case C‑135/93, Spain v 
Commission, ECR [1995] I‑1651, para 37.  
370 For an interesting example of the formula being used as a rebuttable presumption, arguably operationalizing a 
very limited compliance margin of discretion, see Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department et M. E. and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform, ECR [2011] I-13905. Essentially there is a presumption that the Member 
State applying the discretion accorded in art. 3(1) of regulation 343/2003, by which they may choose whether or 
not to return an asylum seeker to the responsible Member State, (i.e. the MS in which he or she first entered the 
EU), is acting in compliance with FR only as long as the MS cannot be unaware of systemic deficiencies in the 




must be analysed in the context of judicial intervention in which it appears. Specifically, two 
criteria must be met. Firstly, it must be secondary EU law, not national law that is challenged 
on fundamental rights grounds, since this formula has also been used in cases declaring 
national legislation or a national court decisions incompatible with secondary EU law and/or 
fundamental rights. In such cases, however, the CJEU reviews national law and does not 
operationalize national discretion to solve the conflict.371 The second criterion is that the 
CJEU remains silent in response to the fundamental rights challenge itself. In other words, if 
the CJEU declares that the piece of secondary law does not violate fundamental rights – there 
is no compliance margin of discretion in the case. Since there is no question to be answered at 
the national level, no compliance to obtain, the CJEU interprets by itself.372 
     This version of margin of discretion-technique, which is reliant on interpretation and 
interconnected to the discretional space inherent in directives,373 represents the potentially 
broadest discretional space. Its outer limits are defined by the outcome of the interpretative 
act – fundamental rights compliance.374 Indeed, the CJEU ultimately rules that: 
 
The provisions of Directive 95/46 do not, in themselves, bring about a restriction 
which conflicts with the general principles of freedom of expression or other 
freedoms and rights, /…/. It is for the national authorities and courts responsible for 
applying the national legislation implementing Directive 95/46 to ensure a fair 
balance between the rights and interests in question, including the fundamental 
rights protected by the Community legal order.375   
 
This conclusion is an excellent illustration of how the CJEU, much like in Wachauf and 
Parliament v Council, makes the directive immune to nullification by drawing a distinction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 See Case C-403/09 PPU, Jasna Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia, ECR [2009] I-12193 and Case C-461/10, 
Bonnier Audio AB and Others v Perfect Communication Sweden AB, Published in the Electronic Reports of 
Cases, para. 66. 
372 Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others v Conseil des ministers, ECR 
[2007] I-05305 and Case C-400/10, PPU, J. McB. v L. E., ECR [2010] I-08965. 
373 To illustrate, article 1 of Directive 95/46 on data protection directive holds: ”In accordance with this Directive, 
Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right 
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.” Article 5 is worded as follows: ‘Member States shall, 
within the limits of the provisions of this Chapter, determine more precisely the conditions under which the 
processing of personal data is lawful.’ 
374 Going forward, the formula, or a version of the formula, that the Member State has to “make sure they do not 
rely on an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights” is reused in the area of 
data protection: Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, ECR 
[2008] I-09831, para 54: “the object of Article 9 is to reconcile two fundamental rights: the protection of privacy 
and freedom of expression. The obligation to do so lies on the Member States;” Case C-403/09 PPU, Jasna 
Detiček v Maurizio Sgueglia, ECR [2009] I-12193, paras. 35 and 43; Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, 
Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) and Federación de Comercio 
Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v Administración del Estado, ECR [2011] I-12181. 




between the construction of the directive (EU) and its application (Member State) and 
attaches a margin of discretion to interpret at the latter stage.  
     However, the CJEU remains involved in the standard of fundamental rights protection, 
which will also be applied in future cases. The CJEU formulates general criteria for when the 
protection of private life constitute a proportionate limitation of freedom of speech.376 These 
are thus the criteria that limit the discretional space because it does not leave the Member 
State the choice of completely autonomously elaborating on the standard of fundamental 
rights protection. Instead, these standards are sketched out, albeit broadly, by the CJEU.  
     In sum, just as in Parliament v Council, the compliance margin of discretion lies ultima 
ratio in its construction – beyond the discretional space inherent in the directive in terms of 
national implementating legislation, the competent national authority must interpret in 
accordance with fundamental rights protection.  
 
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks: Entangling Compliance  
 
This reconstruction of the compliance margin of discretion illustrates a division of labour 
between the CJEU and the competent national authorities. The technique has been traced from 
Stauder, through Wachauf, Lindqvist and Parliament v Council, up to very recent judgments. 
These cases have illustrated a distinctly functional use of the margin of discretion-technique 
in cases involving wide-ranging fundamental rights subject matters.  
     The compliance margin of discretion has thus emerged as a third way of dealing with 
fundamental rights challenges to EU secondary law, as opposed to either nullification on the 
grounds that the contested provision violates fundamental rights, or alternatively, dismissing 
the challenge. This finding shows that the supranational context, through the 
operationalization of national margins of discretion, may generate new methods for achieving 
fundamental rights compliance in the context of a classic judicial review scenario where 
legislation is challenged on fundamental rights grounds.  
     While the use of the compliance margin of discretion is functional, it also contains an 
important tension: it authorizes the national level to make important decisions on the 
application of EU law, yet it insulates EU law from fundamental rights challenges. Put 
differently, the use of the compliance margin of discretion empowers the competent national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




authorities to handle EU law, but the outcome (fundamental right compliance), is prescribed 
by the CJEU. This method therefore interrupts the notion of unitary application of EU law and 
induces flexibility at the stage of application through the operationalization of national 
discretion. 
    The compliance margin of discretion therefore introduces a framework for thinking about 
the distinction between unitary application executed and guaranteed by the CJEU’s 
interpretative authority, and an adjudicative method where an integrated system involving 
both national and EUropean actors guarantees a unitary outcome.   
     In this vein, this method interestingly contains a rule of law problematique by enabling the 
CJEU to surpass judicial review for predestined compliance while simultaneously revealing 
an adjudicative system built on trust between the CJEU and a series of competent national 
decisions-makers.   
     This method therefore unsettles the reliance of the dominant narratives on the euro-
national dichotomy since it helps to make clear the patterns of euro-national interconnection 
in establishing the applicable standard of protection in yet another legal clash involving 
fundamental rights in the EU system.  
     In particular, this typology represents a margin of discretion whose structure contrasts with 
ideas about the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication as either catering to the preservation 
of what is perceived as the uniquely national in constitutional protection, or alternatively, 
overriding national constitutional authority. Instead, discretional space is utilized by the Court 
to handle the compatibility between European legislative acts and fundamental rights 
















8. Exploring Interconnectedness: Concluding Remarks 
 
* 
My interest in this work has been to investigate the shape and effects of the CJEU’s use of the 
margin of discretion-technique in cases involving fundamental rights. The three typologies of 
margin of discretion-use evince an elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental 
rights protection that is interconnected.  
    Essentially, I have argued over the course of the last three chapters that rather than 
“simply” deferring to the national, the CJEU engages in a series of fairly complex 
interactions with the national decision-maker within the context of a given process of 
adjudication. This means that the three typologies of deviation, balance and compliance 
constitute a web of interconnectedness, and explaining this web has been one of the main 
purposes of this work.  
     This last section initiates the exploration of interconnectedness as a legal pattern within 
important strands of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication, but perhaps more 
importantly, it also serves to suggest strands of further inquiry, in relation to which I argue 
that the analysis conducted in this work constitutes a baseline.  
     In order to solidify this baseline I will begin by explaining the different components of 
interconnectedness. First, I will outline the structure of the sharing of interpretative authority 
within the process of adjudication, and secondly I will show how the process by which the ex 
ante separability along jurisdictional lines of standards of fundamental rights protection turns 
into interconnectedness ex post the process of adjudication.  
     After explaining these components of interconnectedness I will point to three layers of 
representations of interconnectedness. Rather than providing answers, this last section will 
direct the reader towards possible further inquiries. This final section is thus a forward-
looking exercise that begins to explore the representations of the logics of the 
interconnectedness produced by the margin of discretion-technique when used in fundamental 
rights cases. 
     I will start from the bottom, and investigate how the legal patterns of interconnectedness 
destabilize the prescriptive morals underpinning the dominant narratives. The aim is one of 
illustrating how interconnectedness might represent a challenge to the values guiding these 
strands of discourse. Second, I will describe how interconnectedness is represented in the 
mechanics of fundamental rights adjudication. In other words, what the presence of 




I will point to the potential negative implications for people seeking to engage with the 
CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication and finding themselves in front of an intricate 
interconnected adjudicative set-up. 
 
 
8.1 Components of Interconnectedness 
 
8.1.1 Sharing Interpretative Authority 
The argument developed in this work holds that the margin of discretion, as used by the CJEU 
to adjudicate fundamental rights, is a method that enables the sharing of interpretative 
authority. The margin of discretion is not in the strict sense an interpretative method 
conducted by one interpreter only, but a method that opens the door to sharing that work. This 
means that within a given process of adjudication where the margin of discretion-technique is 
used to address a legal conflict involving fundamental rights the authority to interpret can 
reside with more than one actor.  
     The core claim of this argument contrasts with the respective rationales of the three 
dominant narratives formed around the logics of the CJEU’s adjudication of fundamental 
rights. The narratives of improvement and intrusion presume the singularity of interpretative 
authority, which resides with the CJEU. The narrative of diversity, on the other hand, relies 
on the notion that interpretative authority may shift from one jurisdiction to the other. 
Importantly however, this shift from one jurisdiction to the other is clearly distinguishable 
from the idea of sharing, which in contrast presumes more than one interpreter within a given 
moment of adjudication.  
     In terms of the mechanics of sharing, the EU treaties establish a hierarchy between the 
decision-makers discussed in this work. As pointed out in chapter 2.2.1, the CJEU is above 
the national courts, the national legislators, and various national administrative bodies when it 
comes to the power to interpret the EU’s fundamental rights material. As a result, the CJEU 
has the power to initiate the operationalization of margins of discretion and the shared 
decision-making that this entails. This starting-point is one of the baseline commonalities of 
the three margin of discretion-enterprises, which I have outlined and categorized.  
     Following the CJEU’s initiative in operationalizing the technique, the detailed mechanics 
of this sharing look different within the structure of the three typologies. When the CJEU 




process of adjudicating the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection, the shape 
and content of this moment of national interpretation varies.  
     These variables in the sharing of interpretative authority could fruitfully be thought of as 
the temporal aspects (1), as the questions of content (2) and the methods of constraint (3). 
Ultimately these variables help answer the question of what is internalized in the CJEU’s 
process of adjudication through the use of the margin of discretion-technique. In other words, 
how the sharing of interpretative authority happens.  
   The temporal aspects (1) I refer to are essentially embodied in the question of whether the 
margin of discretion identifies a future decision or a decision that has already taken place. 
Here the CJEU varies the reach of its sharing of interpretative authority. If, as in the main 
uses of the balance margin of discretion and the deviation margin of discretion, the CJEU 
identifies decisions and formulations of subject matters or policy areas existing at the time of 
adjudication, the interpretative authority is shared ex post facto with the national decision-
makers. This means that the margin of discretion is accredited after – perhaps even years after 
– the decision was taken. This could also be framed as the CJEU opening up part of the 
adjudicative process and filling it with the output of national decision-making that has already 
taken place. Ultimately, this national reading becomes part of what constitutes the standard of 
protection pertaining to the EU legal material. 
     The compliance margin of discretion and a few examples of the balance margin of 
discretion are instead constructed as authorizing future decision-making relatable to identified 
national or EU-sourced legal provisions. Again, the CJEU opens up discretionary space this 
time only in future instances of decision-making where national decision-makers perform 
interpretative work, which ultimately becomes the applicable standard of fundamental rights 
protection. 
     The questions of content (2) concern the work of interpretation or formulation requested, 
or when moments of decision-making are incorporated ex post facto, “sequestrated” by the 
CJEU. The questions of content address what type of activity is ultimately embraced by the 
margin of discretion.   
     Within the use of the balance margin of discretion it is typically administrative decision-
making, frequently of a strikingly local character that is retroactively understood to have been 
a moment in which the national enjoyed interpretive authority.  
     In the deviation margin of discretion-scenario the CJEU instead identifies a space in which 
the national decision-maker, often the legislator, can formulate acceptable deviations from 




much broader in scope, especially when compared to the balance margin of discretion, and 
they may concern more comprehensive sets of ideas about the character of violence, of what 
constitutes the connection between a mother and her child, or how a budget should be 
managed. These formulations are then fitted into the CJEU’s interpretation of the EU 
fundamental rights source.  
     In the compliance margin of discretion-scenario in contrast, the CJEU identifies a moment 
of application of EU legislation in which the national decision-maker is free to formulate how 
that piece of legislation can be applied in a fundamental rights compliant way. The content of 
the moment of decision-making that the compliance margin of discretion is embracing is by 
far the most indeterminate, especially from the CJEU’s vantage point. Indeterminacy arises 
since it embraces a moment of interpretation that is controlled only in terms of its predestined 
outcome of compliance, and not what constitutes compliance in a specific case. However this 
last point leads me to the third variable, concerning differentiation in the means of 
constraining the sharing of interpretative authority.  
     The method for constraining the space opened for national interpretative participation may 
be constrained in a second move of legal reasoning (3). I have shown how, with varying 
intensity, the CJEU has performed proportionality reviews of measures constructed as 
residing within a margin of discretion. Indeed this is the most important method for 
constraining the interpretative space opened by the margin of discretion.  
     In addition however, there are also more subtle methods by which the CJEU might 
constrain or reduce the discretional space. In the balance margin of discretion-scenario the 
CJEU identifies a national decision as residing within a discretional space but subsequently 
formulates the rationales, particularly the EU law considerations, which the decision-making 
body was understood to have pondered before reaching the decision. The CJEU thus reins in 
the interpretative and elaborative act from within, by inserting a set of decision-making 
motifs. 
     In the compliance margin of discretion-scenario the constraining feature is present at the 
outset, and indeed is the main characteristic of the typology, namely that the outcome of the 
interpretative act allowed within the margin of discretion is “compliance.”  
     Ultimately, the constraining feature in the deviation margin of discretion-scenario is of a 
different character and perhaps more of a modelling exercise than an actual constraint. Here, 
the CJEU ties the national level’s deviations to the structure and wording of the EU 




     The CJEU identifies moments in which it shares interpretative authority and these 
moments may have different characteristics, as outlined above. The common core of this 
sharing act however, is that it creates dynamism on both sides, which sends impulses to what 
ultimately becomes the construction of the applicable standard of fundamental rights 
protection.377   
     Depending on the structure of the margin of discretion and the character of the moment of 
national decision-making it has defined, the national decision-makers and the CJEU may be 
said to perform different filling-in functions.378 In the balance-scenario the CJEU might fill-in 
the rationales of the decision-making to various degrees, albeit preserving the decision and 
accepting its effects. In the compliance-scenario the CJEU sets the outcome of the act of 
interpretation and the national administrative body perform the act of filling in what 
constitutes fundamental rights compliance in the case at hand. In the deviation-scenario the 
national decision-maker instead, generally the legislator, fills-in what constitutes the 
acceptable deviations from and constraints of EU-sourced fundamental rights. This is a 
helpful way to think about the sharing using a different terminology.   
     Furthermore, the interconnectedness that I aim to illustrate, and the component of this 
which I have referred to as “shared interpretative authority” in the specific context of the 
forms of interaction that the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion techniques enables, finds 
different parallels in literature.  
     Harding, using mostly Canada and the US and their respective uses of foreign law, has 
written about “shared responsibility of constitutional interpretation,” by which she is thinking 
about how more than one court could develop interpretations of the same constitutional 
right.379 
     Furthermore, with the CJEU in mind, Azoulai writes about “interpretative 
decentralisation” as a way of thinking about the margin of discretion-technique.380 However, 
Azoulai links (with scepticism) this rise in decentralization to an increase in the 
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operationalization of morals and values pertaining to the national legal locus (along the lines 
of the views promoted by diversity narrators).  
     Both “shared responsibility of constitutional interpretation” and “interpretative 
decentralisation” are valuable and conceptually neighbour “shared interpretative authority.” 
Still, I aim to illustrate a type of sharing that happens within one adjudicative process, and 
therefore differently from the shared responsibility of constitutional interpretation between 
different superior courts, which Harding is describing in a transnational, non-EU setting. 
Moreover, I am trying to describe a process that is always at the very least momentaneously 
interconnected within a given instance of adjudication, whereas decentralization points away 
from the participation of the CJEU. 
     In terms of sharp contrast to the explanation of shared interpretative authority developed in 
this work, an often used notion to describe interaction between decision-makers, especially 
courts, is that of judicial dialogue. I will draw a distinction between the rationale of this 
concept, vague as it is, and what I am trying to capture by using the terminology of shared 
interpretative authority.381 
     Paralleling this desire to frame and discard the concept of judicial dialogue, Jackson 
understands the discourse on judicial dialogue as implying ”felt obligations of reciprocity,” by 
which she essentially means the expectation of response.382  This is an important and 
clarifying framing of dialogue, which helps, by way of contrast, to clarify the patterns of 
interconnectedness established by the CJEU’s use of margins of discretion.  
     The uses of margins of discretion are not question and answer-exercises but more of an 
opening of space within an adjudicative process for the participation of several interpreters. 
As I have already outlined above, on the one hand the CJEU shares interpretative authority by 
singling out moments of decision-making that have already taken place and where for 
temporal reasons there is no expectation of response. On the other hand, in terms of using the 
margin of discretion technique to single out moments of decision-making that will take place 
in the future, the CJEU prescribes the answer to the legal question, which is then to be 
elaborated within a margin of discretion. Specifically, I refer to the legal answer of balance 
between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights and the legal answer of fundamental 
rights compliance. The notion of dialogue does not capture this dynamic.  
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     Beyond the specific temporal aspects, which make dialogue inapt to describing the 
processes triggered by the use of margins of discretion, the mere state of being interconnected 
is different from the back-and-forth presumed by dialogue, which ultimately relies on separate 
entities throughout the conversation. 
     In sum, the sharing of interpretative authority is a central component of the CJEU’s 
operationalization of margins of discretion in the adjudication of fundamental rights. This 
sharing enables the CJEU to interconnect a set of moments of interpretative activity and this 
act of joining them together, to which I will now turn, ultimately creates the applicable 
standard of fundamental rights protection.     
 
X. Elaborating the Standard of Fundamental Rights Protection: From Ex Ante Separability to 
Ex Post Interconnectedness 
Interconnectedness in this work refers to the blurring of the boundary between what pertains 
to the national legal locus and what pertains to the EUropean legal locus in terms of the 
applicable standard of fundamental rights protection. Interconnectedness thus refers to the 
euro-national rather than EUropean or national status of the applicable standard of 
fundamental rights protection. I argue that to various degrees this interconnectedness appears 
and destabilizes the possibility of separation of legal spheres in cases where the CJEU 
operationalizes a margin of discretion to adjudicate fundamental rights. 
     The identification, as outlined above, of shared interpretative authority in the process of 
adjudicating cases involving EU fundamental rights material creates the infrastructure 
necessary to argue that the margin of discretion ultimately enables an interconnected 
elaboration of the applicable standard of protection.  
     The sharing is thus capable of enabling a move from an instance in which it is possible to 
identify and carve out the distinctly national or EUropean standard of fundamental rights 
protection to another instance, ex post the process of adjudication, in which this binary 
characterization of the standard of protection is no longer apt. Illustrating this move to an ex 
post condition where the jurisdictional divide is no longer reflected in the applicable standard 
of protection is one of the main insights produces by the three typologies. I will now examine 
this dynamic in more detail. 
     In the deviation margin of discretion-scenario, in the opinion of the litigant, the challenged 
national measure violates the EUropean standard of protection. The national measure, ex ante 
the process of adjudication, thus embodies a potentially lower standard of fundamental rights 




sharing of interpretative authority, the CJEU incorporates the deviating national standard and 
attaches it to the EU-sourced fundamental right. The interconnectedness therefore lies in how 
the national deviation ties into and gives meaning to the EU-sourced right, an act that 
ultimately formulates the applicable standard of protection.  
     In the balance margin of discretion-scenario we find a national measure (an administrative 
decision or legislative provision) engaging or enforcing a fundamental right protected at the 
national level and mirrored, the CJEU holds, in the EU fundamental rights material. This 
measure, in the opinion of the litigant, triggers a clash with internal market law. The CJEU 
inserts EU law considerations into the original national decision-making and understands it as 
having achieved balance between an internal market fundamental freedom and a fundamental 
right. The applicable standard of protection in the case at hand ultimately lies at a juncture 
between the requirements of the fundamental freedom and the original national reading of a 
fundamental right, which the CJEU accepts as being mirrored in the EU law material. In 
contrast then, the balance margin of discretion does not enable the separation between on the 
one hand internal market fundamental freedoms, and on the other hand national decision-
making embodying fundamental rights in some form. Instead it uses the margin of discretion 
to formulate a standard of protection that allegedly balances both sets of norms. 
     In the compliance margin of discretion-scenario a piece of EU legislation, in the opinion of 
the litigant, violates a fundamental right. Differing from the other two typologies due to the 
compliance margin of discretion’s future-orientation, the CJEU opens up a space within the 
moment of application of EU law in which the national decision-maker plays a dominant role 
in elaborating the content of the standard of protection. The CJEU has already qualified the 
contested legislation as being fundamental rights compliant. The interconnectedness of the 
applicable standard of protection thus manifests itself in the fact that the sharing of 
interpretative authority allocates the definition of the outcome to the CJEU, and the 
elaboration of the precise content constituting that outcome to the national decision-maker.  
     Importantly, the CJEU does not want to distinguish and isolate the circumstances, 
measures and decisions discussed in this work as wholly national concerns alien to the EU 
system. Rather, the CJEU engages these interpretations on the part of national decisions-
makers so as to formulate the applicable standard of protection. It is thus not only a question 
of allowing for lesser protection through deference, or giving a fundamental rights protection-
discount to the national legal loci.383 It is more of an exercise in merging different readings.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




     At this point it may be useful to contrast the traditionally intricate relationship between the 
Member States’ systems of fundamental rights protection and the EU’s fundamental rights 
material. Indeed, within the European Union, the notion that fundamental rights protection is 
understood in relation to national legal sources is not novel. It is traceable to the idea that the 
CJEU (more explicitly in the early days), adjudicates on fundamental rights derived from the 
“common constitutional traditions of the Member States.” The CJEU’s source searching 
within the national legal milieu to find its own legal material signals a recurrent and intricate 
relationship between the EUropean and the national in this area. Kumm described this as a 
rationalist rather than legalist approach to fundamental rights.384 In connection with this 
observation Kumm points towards the need for a better understanding of the intricate origins 
of the fundamental rights sources used by the CJEU. 
    However, as distinct from this classic CJEU method of mirroring fundamental rights 
sources using the “common constitutional traditions” line, the margin of discretion 
interconnects the very elaboration of the applicable standard of protection. Thus, this method 
engages the national reading of fundamental rights in particular cases in a more robust 
manner, rather than simply acknowledging that the EU also protects the same rights as a 
particular national constitution.  
     This interconnectedness established in the context of the use of the margin of discretion-
technique to adjudicate fundamental rights destabilizes the notion that individuals simply 
“have a choice of which source to plead, and judges have a choice of which right to 
enforce,” 385  or that inquiry can satisfactorily separate “the pluralism of human rights 
themselves” and “the pluralism of human rights’ interpretations.”386 
     In sum, the interconnectedness produced ex post the use of margins of discretion in cases 
involving fundamental rights is a rejection of the problematique relating to the higher/lower 
standards as mapped onto jurisdictional lines and goes beyond the mere observation of 
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8.2 Representations of Interconnectedness 
 
* 
I argue that the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion-technique produces an interconnected 
form of elaboration of the applicable standard of protection. I have outlined the mechanics of 
the foundational components of interconnectedness – the sharing of interpretative authority, 
which enables a common elaboration of the applicable standard of protection.  
     This final section will identify the representations of this interconnectedness. This will be a 
way of illustrating the repercussions of interconnectedness and, to borrow from Jackson, the 
postures of interconnectedness.387   
     These representations of interconnectedness have the distinct characteristic of not taking 
sides. The representations of interconnectedness are therefore reproductions of the non-one-
sided legal condition, especially as these sides pertain to jurisdictional divides. 
Interconnectedness operates within a set of overlapping jurisdictions that are open to the 
possibility of both harmony or dissonance of national and European self-understandings of the 
EU fundamental rights material.388 
     Investigating these echoes of interconnectedness, as opposed to cementing the constant 
separability of jurisdictional divides is, I argue, a choice that opens up new ways of thinking 
about important strands of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication. These are new ways 
of thinking about empirical understandings of what the CJEU does when it operationalizes the 
margin of discretion-technique, but also about what is overlooked by commentary that 
focuses too one-sidedly on the euro-national binary in its various forms.  
     In this last section I will formulate starting-points for further inquiry based on the detection 
of interconnectedness. These starting-points are three distinct representations of 
interconnectedness, concerning different aspects of the totality of the CJEU’s fundamental 
rights adjudication. I will examine what the legal pattern of interconnectedness does to the 
values guiding discourse, and especially the three dominant narratives about the CJEU’s 
adjudication (1). Then I will consider the representation of interconnectedness within the 
structure of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication (2). Lastly I will pose a set of 
questions for further inquiry along the lines of how a person’s legal orientation changes when 
faced with interconnectedness, and how people may use their knowledge of that condition to 
possibly formulate viable projects of social change (3). 
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8.2.1 Countering the Value of Improvement, the Value of Non-Intrusion and 
 the Value of Diversity 
The exercise of showing how the margin of discretion-technique opens up spaces for an 
interconnected elaboration of the fundamental rights standard challenges the binary 
opposition relied on, and reproduced by the narratives of improvement, intrusion and 
diversity. This is a point I have argued throughout this work. Indeed, throughout the chapters 
outlining the different typologies I have interwoven points of contrast between this 
elaboration and the three dominant narratives. 
     In this last section, reaching beyond the more empirical point that the dominant narratives 
do not describe the operation of the margins of discretion, I would like to highlight how the 
interconnectedness that this technique produces destabilizes the quest for realization of the 
underlying values upon which the narratives rest. It destabilizes, in other words, the 
prescription of certain moral standpoints favoured by the narratives. This follows Cover’s 
writing on how: “Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse – to 
be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose. And every 
narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive point, its moral.”389 
     The question becomes how these morals, which celebrate the binary and hold 
improvement, non-intrusion and diversity as values, are affected by the legal pattern of 
interconnectedness. While this inquiry first and foremost seeks to counter the moral 
prescriptions of the dominant narratives, it is also a way of better understanding the 
implications of the interconnectedness produced by the CJEU’s use of the margin of 
discretion-technique in cases involving fundamental rights. As such, this is a preliminary 
investigation, which ultimately suggests the usefulness, beyond a critical study of the 
dominant narratives, of further critical investigation into the value of interconnectedness in 
the world of EU fundamental rights adjudication.390 For the time being however, I will relate 
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the legal patterns of interconnectedness to the value of improvement, the value of non-
intrusion, and the value of diversity.  
      The narrative of improvement, which promotes the importance of, and potential for the 
European and supranational in improving people’s lives is perhaps the narrative which is most 
attuned to interconnectedness. Akin to the narrative of improvement, interconnectedness takes 
collaboration between overlapping jurisdictions seriously and appreciates that the national and 
EUropean develop techniques of mediation to that end. There is thus a commonality between 
the improvement narrative’s reliance on the potential constructiveness of the supranational in 
enforcing fundamental rights through adjudication, and the constant involvement of the 
supranational in arranging the mediation between overlapping jurisdictions 
(interconnectedness).  
     Still, the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries through the incorporation of national 
decision-making that was contested by the litigant in the first place (in the balance margin of 
discretion-scenario, but especially in the deviation margin of discretion-scenario), hampers 
the momentum, which the improvement narrators very often rely on.  
    The deliberative capacity of interconnectedness to engage multiple interpretative acts 
within one given process of adjudication is more complicated then the unilateral rights 
enforcement-capacity imagined by improvement narrators.  
     In sum, interconnectedness suggests inclusion of national desires as communicated in 
interpretative acts potentially to the extent that forward movement in terms of fundamental 
rights enforcement is very limited (the deviation margin of discretion provides important 
examples). What I mean here is that improvement narrators imagine a more straightforward 
striking down of the national measure where instead interconnectedness, to varying degrees, 
incorporates the reading of fundamental rights that is implied in the measure which the 
litigant originally challenged.  
     It should be pointed out that improvement through EUropean involvement may look 
different, may be slower and more composite than the binary version held out as an ideal by 
improvement narrators. This latter point suggests that interconnectedness does not preclude 
improvement but that the supranational court’s interpretative activity in fundamental rights 
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enforcement takes a different shape. Thus the prescriptive moral force of the EU as a 
unilateral improver, which guides improvement narrators, is destabilized.    
     The narrative of intrusion and the cherishing of European non-intrusion into the national 
milieu of fundamental rights protection represents the sharpest contrast with legal patterns of 
interconnectedness. The narrative of intrusion relies heavily on the boundaries between the 
overlapping jurisdictions and understands the national apparatus as the better guarantor of 
fundamental rights protection.  
     This appreciation of the national appears to lead the narrative of intrusion towards 
jurisdictional conflict-driven modes of analysis of EU fundamental rights. By this I mean to 
think about conflicts as organized alongside jurisdictional lines, and importantly, to assume 
that these remain separable after the process of adjudication. In contrast, the margin of 
discretion-typologies in this work mediate legal conflicts involving, in different ways, the EU 
fundamental rights material, not merely the type of legal conflict that strictly organizes itself 
alongside jurisdictional lines.  
     There is a pacifist stroke in interconnectedness, which downplays the (at times highly-
strung) rhetoric of intrusion narratives, especially when intrusive narratives consider undue 
intrusion to be emblematic of the operation of fundamental rights adjudication rather than the 
exception, however troubling.  
     In sum, I argue that the legal patterns of interconnectedness represent a form of normality 
within the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication, which in turn challenges the intrusion 
narrative to reconsider its characterization of intrusion as the most emblematic form of the 
ordinary operation of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication. Or at the very least, the 
legal pattern of interconnectedness within the core operation of the CJEU’s fundamental 
rights adjudication pushes the intrusion narrative towards other areas where the value of non-
intrusion might be worth consideration, albeit structured differently compared to the core 
areas which is discussed in this work. Such difference in structure could for instance be a 
more composite idea of who the intruders are, rather than merely the CJEU. Fundamental 
rights violations in the context of the measures taken as a response to the economic crisis in 
the Eurozone may be, as has been intimated earlier, a potentially fruitful area for investigation 
into the evolution of the value of non-intrusion within EU fundamental rights protection.  
     The higher moral of organizing and understanding diversity alongside the borders of each 
Member State provides the most interesting comparison with the legal pattern of 
interconnectedness. This is so since techniques of coordination of overlapping jurisdictions, 




There is thus a prima facie association between the diversity narrative and the margin of 
discretion-technique, which may lead to the conclusion that techniques such as the margin of 
discretion may be a tool for the prescriptive moral of diversity narrators. 
     In contrast, the detection of the legal pattern of interconnectedness as produced by the 
CJEU’s use of margins of discretion to adjudicate fundamental rights constitutes an important 
challenge to the diversity narrators. The legal pattern of interconnectedness illustrates how the 
mechanics of fundamental rights adjudication may be elaborated with very little interest in 
borders.  
     More importantly, interconnectedness creates variations in the reading of fundamental 
rights that stem from both the EUropean and the national legal environment. This point is 
crucial. The interconnectedness in the CJEU’s elaborations of fundamental rights standards 
produces variations but these variations are not derivable from the bounded context of a 
particular Member State. Instead, these variations are composite and collaborative. Hence, 
while the CJEU’s use of margins of discretion may produce variations, these variations are 
not simply national.   
     In sum, the legal pattern of interconnectedness highlights the entanglement of a variety of 
diversities derivable from the structure of the legal conflict and legal sources in modes of 
fundamental rights protection, but also of different fundamental rights readings. This should 
be contrasted with the notion of legally operationable diversity that follows the territorial 
borders of Member States, and thus relies on nationalist rationales.391  
     In the same vein, interconnectedness also points to a practical problem with the 
prescriptive morals of non-intrusion and diversity, namely that they limit constructive and 
inclusive thinking on the breadth and depth of social problems that could be transferred to 
fundamental rights language. In other words, the underlying favouritism of the national 
guided by the value of non-intrusion and diversity distracts from important social problems 
that do not necessarily express themselves along EU/national-lines. Fundamental rights 
grievances increasingly connect and engage people living in multiple jurisdictions, and as 
such are transnational in character, since it seems to be the case that inequalities know no 
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jurisdictional bounds.392 The prescriptive moral underpinning non-intrusion and diversity, as 
distinct from the improvement narrative, does not address this dynamic. This ultimately risks 
narrowing the thinking of potential avenues for social change, where instead the factor of 
interconnectedness should be included. 
     Interconnectedness constitutes the foundation for a critical line of inquiry in relation to 
national identity that undermines the solidity of the connection between the specificity of 
national identity and the distinctness of the fundamental rights protection. This quality of 
interconnectedness directs us towards possible routes of further critical inquiry into the 
problems with the diversity narrative’s reliance on territorially bounded logics.   
     To sum up, all of this suggests that the representation of interconnectedness does 
something to each of these prescriptive morals. In the case of the narrative of improvement 
interconnectedness stimulates the improvement narrator to think differently about how 
improvement may happen. It may be slowing it down, due to the less momentous pace and 
deliberative style of interconnectedness, and from this perspective interconnectedness could 
prompt reformulations of the method of improvement. Simultaneously however, if 
improvement is continuously defined as the European legal regime unilaterally improving the 
national standard of fundamental rights protection then interconnectedness will represent a 
parallel story. Yet, and here like the improvement narrators I align myself with the 
fundamental appreciation of the supranational, I would argue that in order to avoid 
prematurely excluding any avenue of social change, interconnectedness is better understood 
as an integral part of possible methods of improvement.   
     In contrast then, the dichotomy between interconnectedness and intrusion is strong and 
straightforward. Interconnectedness provides a challenge to the euro-national, conflict-driven 
rationales of intrusion. Moreover, interconnectedness destabilizes the often-presumed 
victimization of the national legal locus and introduces the notion of national interpretative 
agency.  
     Finally, interconnectedness undermines the diversity narrative’s prescriptive moral of 
preservation of the legalistic expressions of the presumed nationally unique. I argue that the 
most valuable contribution of the detection of the legal pattern of interconnectedness is that it 
can be used to target the morals of nationalism embedded in the diversity narrative’s 
reconstruction of the CJEU’s fundamental rights adjudication.  
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8.2.2 Moving Between Court-Centred and Non-Court-Centred Legal Realities: Notes on 
Jurisgenerativity and Iterations 
In this section I would like to highlight how interconnectedness represents movement between 
different legal realities of fundamental rights protection, and especially between those that are 
court-centred and non-court-centred.  
     This circulating movement of one fundamental rights norm between different qualified 
interpreters in a given adjudicative process is the distinct feature of the influence of 
interconnectedness on the mechanics of fundamental rights protection. Thinking about the 
legal pattern of interconnectedness as moving a fundamental right between different venues 
where it is read and interpreted is an attempt to describe the dynamic created by shared 
interpretative authority.  
     In other words, movement between differently shaped legal loci is a quality which 
interconnectedness infuses into the adjudicative process. This movement between court-
centred and non-court-centred legal realities within one adjudicative process ultimately 
muddles and shapes the standard of fundamental rights protection.  
     In contrast, fundamental rights protection is commonly associated with more strict court-
centred logics. In the three dominant narratives of improvement, intrusion and diversity, EU 
fundamental rights protection is very much centred around the CJEU, albeit the disagreement 
on the desirability of that condition. 
     Instead, and to repeat, the representation of interconnectedness, as identified in the 
operation of the three margin of discretion-typologies, entails a reading of the fundamental 
rights triggered in a given case that circulates between administrative bodies, national courts, 
national legislators, and the CJEU. By this I mean that the reading of the same fundamental 
right will move between court-centred and non-court-centred legal realities within the process 
of establishing the applicable standard of fundamental rights protection.  
     This movement, which interconnectedness represents, means that the latitude, the 
manoeuvring, the space, the variations of norms, do not solely concern and capture 
interpretative output from the national sub-unit, but instead involve all decision-makers who 
are sharing interpretative authority. Hence, the manoeuvring of fundamental rights norms 
engages all jurisdictions sharing that norm-commitment.  
     This is, as was also noted in relation to the prescriptive moral underlying the narrative of 




the operationalization of margins of discretion, does not map onto euro-national jurisdictional 
divides.  
     There are parallels to this way of thinking. For instance, there are several sets of concepts 
stemming from scholarly inquiries into transnationalism and more dialectical understandings 
of federalism, which try to capture the same type of movement and dynamism in the 
circulation of norms between actors entrusted with their interpretation. I find the ideas of 
jurisgenerativity and iterations particularly useful. I will briefly highlight how these concepts 
provide support for the detection of interconnectedness specifically as it presents itself in the 
mechanics of adjudication. This in turn, I argue, thickens the solidity of that identification.   
     Jurisgenerativity was first used by Cover to explain the process through which legal 
meaning is created, hence law’s capacity to create normative meaning without formal law 
making.393 This way of understanding the capacity of law to generate meaning in ways not 
immediately expected (to frame it simplistically) supports the identification of legal patterns 
of interconnectedness. This is especially the case since the concept of jurisgenerativity 
understands processes such as the circulation of one fundamental right between court-centred 
and non-court-centred legal realities within a given process of adjudication (as enabled by the 
margin of discretion) as a logical outflow of law’s versatile capacities. This movement, while 
not strictly speaking foreseen in the treaties or the Charter, still created normative meaning.  
     In sum, a jurisgenerative analysis embraces the idea that law in itself produces both 
meaning and connections. The interconnectedness detected within the apparatus of EU 
fundamental rights protection can thus be understood as the output of a jurisgenerative 
process.  
     The concept of iterations is also valuable since, when applied in the context of 
supranational fundamental rights, it understands the search for a minimum core of a given 
fundamental right as a fallacy, and instead understands circulation and hence reinterpretation 
of norms as virtues. While not specifically discussing courts, Benhabib's thinking about the 
democratic iterations of human rights is instructive here. She lays out how formal decision-
makers are just one part of a much broader democratic participatory process of “local 
contextualization, interpretation and vernacularization” of human rights. Benhabib, again 
thinking outside the courtroom, states that: “Every act of iteration involves making sense of 
an authoritative original in a new and different context through interpretation.”394 She 
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continues that actors, still not courts, “must reinterpret and reappropriate human rights 
principles such as to give them shape as constitutional rights, and, if and when necessary, 
suffuse constitutional rights with new content.”395  
     Paralleling this argument, the representation of interconnectedness as produced by margins 
of discretion point to the possibility of similarly shaped movement, albeit between courts, 
administrative bodies and legislators within a given process of adjudication. I believe it is 
useful to relate interconnectedness to the idea of iterations because both seek to capture and 
account for how multiple readings of rights may relate to each other within a given context of 
fundamental rights protection.            
     In sum, the idea that interconnectedness enables movement between court-centred and 
non-court-centred contexts of fundamental rights protection is relatable to a set of analytical 
concepts such as jurisgenerativity and iterations, which seek to open up legal categories 
traditionally perceived as closed. Therefore, one way of thinking about the representation of 
interconnectedness is to think about how the elaboration of the same fundamental right is 
being circulated amongst interpreters within the overlapping jurisdictions. The margin of 
discretion-technique opens up a route in which a standard of protection can be formulated 
using interpretative input with different geographical locations and accepts both court-centred 
and non court-centred compositions. 
 
8.2.3 Engaging with Interconnectedness 
What is it like for people interested in engaging with their EU fundamental rights protection 
to encounter a process of adjudication that has operationalized a margin of discretion? How 
does it affect their thinking about the machinery of the CJEU’s fundamental rights 
adjudication, especially as a venue for social change? 
     This is a perspective that has not been explicitly explored in this work, mainly because it 
requires a different set of analytical tools. Nonetheless I believe the analysis conducted in this 
work, which aims to thoroughly understand the CJEU’s use of the technique, may serve as a 
point of references for future inquires into its effect on citizenship. As Walker states: 
“Conceptual analysis and empirical inquiry alone can never solve normative problems. Yet 
they can help us to understand these problems more clearly, and provide a better route map 
through the moral and political maze.”396  
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     What flows from my reading of the CJEU’s use of the margin of discretion-technique is 
that the utility of the question of “who has the last word,” is diminished. Interconnectedness 
means that no one actor alone is empowered to pronounce the last word unilaterally. Framed 
differently, seeking to understand who has the last word will not answer the question of how 
the fundamental rights standard was elaborated. This may mean that instances where margins 
of discretion are operationalized by the CJEU to formulate the standard of protection are 
likely to be perceived as considerably more complex and harder to foresee, since the power to 
define fundamental rights does not reside straightforwardly in one or the other legal system.  
     Interconnectedness therefore represents a version of transnationalism, which may 
complicate orientation for people seeking to engage with it, since the old maps of sources and 
decision-makers might not provide the necessary guidance.397  
    Indeed, interconnectedness illustrates that the answer to the question of who is enforcing 
what on whom does not necessarily map onto old jurisdictional lines in the area of 
fundamental rights. Interconnectedness may therefore require a reformulation of people’s 
ideas about how fundamental rights are enforced. One of the questions I would pose is 
therefore, how people seeking to litigate their fundamental rights experience a fundamental 
rights protection that is not enforced by one actor striking down the measure of another actor, 
and where the interpretative output of these actors does not map onto jurisdictional lines? 
What is the message imparted by fundamental rights enforcement characterized by 
interconnectedness and blurred jurisdictional divides?  
     In sum, given the roadmap laid out in this work in relation to the enforcement of 
fundamental rights when margins of discretion are used, an initial set of questions may 
address how that infrastructure of elaboration of the applicable standard of fundamental rights 
protection affects citizens seeking to engage with it, i.e. does that protection appear more 
remote and incomprehensible or is there a discernible sense of euro-national collaboration, 
albeit intricate, that may be appealing? How does the strand of euro-national 
interconnectedness identified within the EU’s fundamental rights protections present itself to 
people seeking to engage with it? The idea that the supranational last word either merely 
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preferences of those agents who claim to be empowered by the democratic principle can supply the whole 
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enforces rights on the national level or accords discounts from a supranational norm to the 
national level will be an important starting point for such inquiry. 
     A second set of questions concerns the legal condition of euro-national interconnectedness 
when thinking about how the living conditions in Europe might or might not change through 
law. The argument implicit in this work is that the detection of methods of adjudication that 
produce interconnectedness thickens our understanding of the way in which fundamental 
rights standards of protection are created within the EU. This in turn facilitates the 
formulation of projects of social change as these pertain to that which may be addressed using 
a language of fundamental rights.  
     As I already alluded when discussing the possible development of the improvement 
narrative, one starting point for further inquiry would be to try to structure what 
interconnectedness does to such projects of social change. What does interconnectedness, as it 
manifests itself in shared interpretative authority between different actors, courts, 
administrative bodies, and legislators, do to the determination of the better method of social 
change, as articulated in law and specifically in fundamental rights language?  
     This second set of questions essentially comes down to asking how should 
interconnectedness influence thinking about social change through law in Europe? At the very 
least this entails formulating projects of change within the European Union, which do not 
focus on one actor only or depend on thinking about adjudication as preserving one or the 
other jurisdiction’s standard of fundamental rights protection. These are all important 
questions for future engagement with the apparatus of EU fundamental rights protection, and 
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